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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME 1974 NUMBER 4
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN THE ERA OF COM-
PENSATION SYSTEMS: WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION LIMITATIONS PROVISIONS FOR
ACCIDENTAL INJURY CLAIMS
PATRICK J. KELLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope of Article
An understanding of limitations provisions in a functioning "no-
fault" compensation system may be helpful in discussing limitations
problems generally as courts and legislatures move toward "no-fault"
compensation systems for other kinds of personal injury claims. This
Article will examine the claim limitations provisions in state workmen's
compensation statutes to determine (1) whether the traditional pur-
poses of limitations provisions are consistent with the basic purposes of
workmen's compensation legislation, (2) what practical problems have
arisen in the application of different limitations provisions, and (3)
which of the limitations provisions is preferable. The examination
analyzes limitations provisions for accidental injury claims. Two other
kinds of workmen's compensation limitations provisions-for notice1
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University. B.A., 1965, University of
Notre Dame; J.D., 1969, University of Iowa. The author acknowledges with gratitude
the helpful suggestions of Professor David H. Vernon and Professor Frank W. Miller and
the research assistance of Deborah Conrad, Douglas Kelly, and Carolyn Wolff.
1. Most state workmen's compensation acts have two limitations provisions: the
employee must give the employer notice of the injury or the accident within a specified
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and for occupational disease claims 2 -will be discussed only when es-
sential to an understanding of limitations for accidental injury claims.
A critical analysis of state workmen's compensation claim limi-
tations requires a thorough understanding of the rationales for and
present-day importance of statutes of limitations for personal injury
claims outside the workmen's compensation system. The next section
attempts to establish the background for critical analysis by examining
a recent development in the interpretation of statutes of limitations for
personal injury claims-the rise of the "discovery rule."
B. Rise of the Discovery Rule
Most statutes of limitations for personal injury actions bar recovery
if suit is not brought within a specified time after the "cause of action
accrues." s Courts have traditionally construed the quoted language to
start the limitations period at the time all the elements of a cause of
action first exist, that is, when the last of the events necessary to estab-
lish a right to recover has occurred.4 To establish that right in a neg-
ligence action, the plaintiff must plead and prove actual injury caused
by the defendant's negligent acts or omissions.5 The limitations period
cannot start to run, then, until the victim sustains some injury.0 Once
time, and the employee must also file claim for compensation within a specified time.
See generally 3 A. LARsON, Thn LAw OF WomnN's ComPENsATON § 78.20 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as LARsON].
2. By special statute or by judicial interpretation of the basic coverage provision,
all states provide compensation for at least some industrial diseases. See generally 1A
LARsoN §§ 41.00-.90. Many states have special limitations provisions for claims for com-
pensation for industrial diseases. Others apply the general limitations provision, with
or without special statutory provisions specifying how the provision is to be applied in
industrial disease cases. See generally Estep & Allan, Radiation Injuries and Time Limi-
tations in Workmen's Compensation Cases, 62 MItc. L. Rv. 259 (1963).
3. See generally Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAzy. L.
REV. 1177, 1179 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. The language derives,
with little variation, from the first statute of limitations for actions of trespass and tres-
pass upon the case, enacted by Parliament in 1623. 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, § 3 (1623). That
act established limitations periods for all personal actions. It provided that all actions
for trespass and upon the case "shall be commenced and sued. . . within six years next
after the cause of such actions or suit, and not after . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). It
also provided for tolling the limitations period if the prospective plaintiff was under
twenty-one, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond the seas "at the time
of any such cause of action given or accrued. . . ." Id. § 7 (emphasis added).
4. See generally Developments 1200-03.
5. W. PRossmi, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToaTs § 30, at 144-45 (4th ed. 1971).
6. See, e.g., White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941); Theurer v,
Condon, 34 Wash. 2d 448, 209 P.2d 311 (1949).
[Vol. 1974:541
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an injury, however slight, is sustained, the limitations period begins
to run.7
The traditional approach leads to harsh results in some cases. As-
sume a limitations period of two years after the cause of action accrues;
also assume a blow to the head that seems trivial at first but causes
blindness more than two years later. The victim's claim for damages
from blindness will be barred before he discovers the seriousness of
the injury. As soon as the blow is struck, the claim accrues because
the victim then has the legal right to recover damages for the appar-
ently trivial injury." Similarly, assume that a surgeon negligently
leaves a sponge or surgical instrument in a patient's body. The pa-
tient's claim will be barred in two years even if he does not become
aware of the presence of the foreign object until after the statutory per-
iod has run.9 The cause of action for negligence accrues at the time
of the operation.10
To avoid a harsh result in the foreign-object malpractice case, some
courts in recent years have interpreted the language "when the cause
of action accrues" to refer to the time when the patient knows or should
know of the presence of the foreign object." The "knowledge"
test has been labeled the "discovery rule." Although arguments can
be made to limit the discovery rule to foreign-object malpractice
cases, 12 the following facts suggest that it may eventually be applied
7. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300-01,
200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936).
8. See, e.g., Christiani v. City of Sarasota, 65 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1953).
9. The only difference between the two cases is that in the latent-serious-injury
case the injured person knows immediately that he has been injured, although the full
extent of the damage is not then known. In the foreign-object case, however, the injured
person does not even know he has been injured.
10. See, e.g., Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me. 228, 182 A.2d 660 (1962).
11. See, e.g., Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964); Fer-
nandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577
(Tex. 1967). See generally Comment, Medical Malpractice Statutes of Limitation:
Uniform Extension of the Discovery Rule, 55 IowA L. REv. 486 (1969); 21 DEPAuL
L. Rav. 234 (1971); 35 Mo. L. Rnv. 559 (1970).
12. The reasoning of some of the courts suggests that the discovery rule should be
limited to foreign-object malpractice cases, which arguably are analogous to cases in
which the defendant fraudulently conceals from the prospective plaintiff facts establish-
ing a cause of action. See, e.g., Allen v. Layton, 235 A.2d 261 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967),
aff'd, - Del. -, 246 A.2d 794 (1968); Femandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277
(1961). By statute or judicial interpretation, the limitations period in fraudulent con-
cealment cases starts to run only upon the discovery of the concealed facts. See gener-
ally Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L. Rpv. 875
(1933); Developments 1220-22. Foreign-object malpractice cases are similar in that the
Vol. 1974:541] 543
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in all personal njury, cases:"8 the extension of the discovery rule to
other kinds of cases in some states, 4 the form of the rule as an interpre-
tation of general limitations statutes, and the emphasis in the opinions
on the injustice of precluding the plaintiff from recovery before he had
the opportunity to discover his cause of action.' 5 Already, in North
Carolina0 6 and England,17 the discovery rule has been adopted by the
legislature for all personal injury actions.
negligent acts of the surgeon injure the patient and simultaneously conceal from the pa-
tient both the fact and the cause of the injury. The difference between fraudulent and
negligent concealment is arguably unimportant, especially in light of the fiduciary rela-
tionship between surgeon and patient.
Arguments for limiting the application of the discovery rule to foreign-object malprac-
tice cases have not proved persuasive. Several courts have applied the discovery rule
in cases involving other kinds of professional malpractice. See, e.g., Renner v. Edwards,
93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1969) (doctor's negligent misdiagnosis); Grey v. Silver
Bow County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819 (1967) (hospital's negligent omission to
maintain sterile conditions during operation); cf. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Hawaii
1, 18-21, 427 P.2d 845, 855-57 (1967) (dissenting opinion). Using these cases, it could
be argued, in turn, that the discovery rule should be confined to injury caused by the
negligence of one in a professional, fiduciary relationship to the injured plaintiff.
13. See, e.g., Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont.
1970) (foreign-object malpractice case and general malpractice case used as precedent
for application of a discovery rule in products liability case).
14. See, e.g., Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1969) (doctor's neg.
ligent misdiagnosis); Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819 (1967)
(hospital's negligent omission to maintain sterile conditions during operation); cf. Yoshi-
zaki v. Hilo Hosp,, 50 Hawaii 1, 18-21, 427 P.2d 845, 855-57 (1967) (dissenting opin-
ion).
15. See, e.g., Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819 (1967).
16. Ch. 1157, § 1, [1971] N.C. Laws 1706 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b)
(Supp. 1973)).
17. Limitation Act 1963, c. 47. In 1962, the British Court of Appeal held that the
limitations period commenced when plaintiff suffered serious physical harm, even though
plaintiff had no apparent symptoms of serious physical harm. Cartledge v. E. Jopling
& Sons, [1962] 1 Q.B. 189 (C.A. 1961), afi'd, [19631] A.C. 758. Before the House of
Lords affirmed the Court of Appeal, a Command Report was issued recommending
changes in the statute of limitations to avoid the Jopling result. REPORT OF "THE COM-
MITTEE ON LIMITATION OF ACTIONS IN CASES OF PERSONAL INJURY, CMND. NO. 8809
(1962) (commonly referred to as the Davies Committee Report). The Command
Report suggested an exception to the limitations bar for late claims if the plaintiff
brought suit within one year after he could reasonably have been expected to discover
the existence or cause of his injury. Id. at 19. The recommendations of the Davies
Committee were adopted in a poorly drafted private member's bill that became the Limi-
tation Act of 1963. The obscure language of the Act led the Court of Appeal to inter-
pret it to excuse a late claimant who knew that he had been injured and what had injured
him, but was justifiably ignorant that he had a valid claim. Pickles v. National Coal
Bd., [1968] 1 W.L.R. 997 (C.A.), followed in Newton v. Cammell Laird & Co.,
[1969] 1 W.L.R. 415 (C.A.); accord, Knipe v. British R.R. Bd., [1972] 1 All E.R. 673https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
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C. Rationales for Statutes of Limitations
Courts and commentators often say that statutes of limitations serve
three separate purposes: (1) the evidentiary purpose,-to prevent er-
ror or fraud that may result from deciding factual issues long after the
events in question, when witnesses may have died, memories may have
dimmed, and documents may have been lost or destroyed; (2) the per-
sonal certainty purpose-to assure a potential defendant that he will
not be subject to court-imposed liability after a specified period of time;
and (3) the diligence purpose-to discourage prospective claimants
from "sleeping on their rights."' 8
The discovery rule seems inconsistent with both the evidentiary 9
and the personal certainty20 purposes. It is arguably consistent with
the diligence purpose, since a prospective claimant justifiably ignorant
of the facts supporting his legal right is not "sleeping on his rights"
by not suing. The fact that the diligence purpose may be consistent
(C.A.); Drinkwater v. Joseph Lucas (Elec.) Ltd., [1970] 3 All E.R. 769 (C.A.). The
Pickles question finally reached the House of Lords in Central Asbestos Co. v. Dodd,
[1972] 2 All E.R. 1135 (H.L.), but the opinions in that case did little to clarify the
law. Two Law Lords supported Pickles and three opposed it, but one of the three voted
with the two accepting Pickles on the basis of his unique factual inferences from evi-
dence introduced in the trial court. Since the three Lords in the majority disagreed
about the facts in the case, either the holding of the case must be limited to the precise
evidence introduced in the trial court, on which the judges agree, or the case stands for
no rule at all. Compare Watmore, Personal Injuries-When Time Runs, 122 NEw L.J.
672 (1972), with Woolf, Personal Injury Limitations-House of Lords Interpretation,
122 Naw LJ. 824 (1972). The Court of Appeal subsequently stated that it was unable
to extract any clear ratio decidendi from Dodd. Harper v. National Coal Bd., [1974]
2 All E.R. 441, 445-47 (C.A. 1973). In the wake of Dodd, another committee was
charged with reexamining the limitations question. LAw REFoRM CoMMrrrE, TWEN-
TIETH REPORT (INTERIM REPORT ON LIMITATION OF ACTIoNs: IN PERSONAL INJURY
CLAIMS), CMND. No. 5630 (1974). The Committee Report recommended that Pickles
be overruled by statute, that the limitations period be extended in cases of late discovery
of existence or cause of injury, and that an additional extension be allowed beyond the
discovery-rule period if the court finds that the hardship to the plaintiff from barring his
claim outweighs the prejudice to the defendant from the delay in filing claim.
18. See, e.g., Jackson, The Legal Effects of the Passing of Time, 7 MELBOURNE U.L.
REV. 407, 409 (1970).
19. Under the discovery rule, courts may be called on to determine facts long after
the events in question took place.
20. A prospective defendant ordinarily cannot discover whether the discovery rule
will be applied in his case, in part because the rule is not limited to specific types of
plaintiffs or causes of action. Rather, it focuses on what the plaintiff knew or should
have known-facts ordinarily beyond the prospective defendant's grasp. It is also un-
likely that the prospective defendant will know that he has injured the plaintiff when
the prospective plaintiff himself does not know that.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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with the rule, however, does not alone support adoption of the dis-
covery rule. The diligence purpose cannot be the primary purpose of
a statute of limitations, since on its face it is not even an independent
reason for a statute of limitations. There must be an underlying reason
for wishing to encourage claimants to be diligent; sleeping on one's
rights does not seem to be evil per se. Under the traditional analy-
sis, then, adoption of the discovery rule can be justified only by a sim-
ple equitable judgment that protecting justifiably ignorant plaintiffs
from the harsh limitations bar is more important than furthering
the traditional limitations purposes. This simple equitable judg-
ment defies rational analysis, at least under the traditional approach to
limitations questions.
The traditional purposes of statutes of limitations can be reformu-
lated to indicate their interrelationship and eliminate the analytical
problems caused by characterizing the diligence purpose as an inde-
pendent purpose, if one assumes that the evidentiary purpose of stat-
utes of limitations is primary. Under this assumption, the basic func-
tion of statutes of limitations is to protect the court from becoming an
unwitting tool of fraud and injustice when it cannot with certainty sep-
arate valid from invalid claims because of the passage of time.21 This
evidentiary purpose alone, however, does not lead necessarily to a stat-
ute of limitations in traditional form, because the dead witnesses, for-
gotten events, and missing documents may have favored either the
plaintiff or the defendant. To support the traditional statute of limi-
tations, some reason must be given for imposing the limitations bar on
the plaintiff.
Two complementary reasons can be given. First, in our legal system
the plaintiff chooses whether and when to sue. He can avoid the evi-
dentiary problem by bringing suit promptly. Barring him from recov-
ery after a specified time may encourage him to file promptly. Thus,
the traditional view is that one "purpose" of limitations is to discourage
the plaintiff from "sleeping on his rights." Similarly, since the plaintiff
chooses whether and when to sue, he can time his claim to take ad-
vantage of defects in the defendant's evidence caused by the passage
of time, the very abuse of the judicial system that statutes of limitations
were intended to prevent. Secondly, the plaintiff is asking the court
to disturb the status quo. People need to be able to rely on the way
things are in order to carry on their affairs and plan for the future.
21. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
[Vol. 1974:541
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Thus, it makes sense to require the plaintiff to sue within a reasonable
period of time. Both of these reasons for putting the burden of a limi-
tations provision on the plaintiff depend on the traditional adversary
structure of our system of adjudication, in which the plaintiff must be-
gin legal proceedings and bear the burden of proof. Consequently,
both reasons would appear to rest on the traditional assumption that
litigation is socially desirable only as a peaceful alternative to violent
means of resolving disputes.22
This reformulated rationale for statutes of limitations may not pro-
vide a better basis for analyzing the discovery-rule development than
the traditional explanation of limitations purposes. First, the reformu-
lation itself may be flawed. Some historical evidence supports the con-
clusion that the evidentiary purpose of statutes of limitations for per-
sonal injury claims is primary, but that evidence is not conclusive.2 3
22. The close relationship between statutes of limitations and the traditional attitude
toward litigation was expressed by Lord Simon of Glaisdale in his dissenting opinion
in Central Asbestos Co. v. Dodd:
Litigation is the resolution of civil contention by methods preferable to vio-
lence. But that does not mean that it is otherwise an inherently desirable ac-
tivity. The rule of law is not to be equated with the reign of litigiousness.
Litigation involves a call on scarce resources, and it is apt to set up emotional
and social strains of its own; no one with experience of litigation would suppose
that Miss Flite was a purely fanciful creation. Hence the desirability of for-
ensic dispatch. There can be a few circumstances in which contentions within
a society can be prolonged unresolved without risk to the fabric of that society.
Moreover, dilatory procedures may defeat the very purpose of the judicial proc-
ess, namely, to vouchsafe justice, since if litigation is prolonged, not only is
there waste of time and money and moral energy, but circumstances may
change in such a way that what would have been at the outset a just conclusion
is in the end no longer so. Finally, delay will make it more difficult for the
legal procedures themselves to vouchsafe a just conclusion-evidence may have
disappeared and recollections become increasingly unreliable. Speedy rough
justice will, therefore, generally be better justice than justice worn smooth and
fragile with the passage of years.
[1972] 2 All E.R. at 1153.
23. The historical evidence relating to the 1623 Act limiting personal actions, 21
Jac. 1, c. 16, leaves the question of the intended purpose of the Act somewhat obscure.
The Act was passed in 1623, but the Bill was first introduced in the Parliament of 1614
where it was read twice but died when the King dissolved Parliament. See 1 H.C. JOUR.
486, 496 (1614); 2 S. GA2RDINER, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES
I TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIvIL WAR 1603-1642, at 227-48 (1883). The Bill was re-
introduced in the Parliament of 1621, where it was passed by the House of Commons
after extensive debate but died in the House of Lords. See 4 W. NOTESmN, F. RELP
& H. SIMPSON, COMMONS DEBATES: 1621, at 370-71 (1935) [hereinafter cited as NOTE-
STmN]. The Bill was again introduced in the Parliament of 1623, where it was
finally passed by both Houses and became law with the assent of King James I. See
I H.C. JouR. 671, 673, 678 (1623). Evidence from the internal structure of the Act,
the other statutes passed by Parliament in the late Elizabethan and early Jacobean pe-
547
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The emphasis on the evidentiary purpose may thus be simply arbitrary.
Secondly, the reformulated rationale by itself provides no basis for
analysis of the simple equitable judgment behind the discovery rules.
riods, the recorded debates in Parliament, and the general legal history of that time can
be used to support any of the following three theories about the primary purpose of the
Act:
1) The primary purpose was to keep trivial litigation from cluttering up the King's
courts and to encourage revival of the local courts. Other statutes passed in this pe-
riod show that this was a continual concern of Parliament. See, e.g., 43 Eliz. 1, c. 6
(1601) ("An act to avoid trifling and frivolous suits in law in her Majesty's courts in
Westminster"); 4 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1606) (an act to give costs to the defendant upon a non-
suit of the plaintiff or verdict against him); 21 Jac. 1, c. 8 (1623) ("An act to prevent
and punish the abuses in procuring process and supersedeas of the peace and good be-
havior, out of his Majesty's courts at Westminster, and to prevent the abuses in procuring
writs of certiorari out of the said courts, for the removing of indictments found before
justices of the peace in their general sessions"). In fact, the Limitations Act of 1623,
besides imposing time limitations on the bringing of real and personal actions, included
two additional provisions specifically aimed at discouraging trivial or frivolous suits: a
provision making negligence or involuntariness or tender of damages a defense to tres-
pass q.c.f. actions when not brought to try title, and a provision imposing costs on the
plaintiff in all "actions upon the case for slanderous words" in which the jury assesses
damages at less than forty shillings. 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, §§ 5, 6 (1623). That the time
periods for real actions were much longer than those for personal actions also supports
this theory, since real actions were thought to be the most important business of the
King's courts. This conclusion finds support in the following comment by Sir Edward
Coke, then a member of the House of Commons, during debate on the Bill in the 1621
Parliament: "Thanketh God, he was a Christian Man, Englishman, and a Norfolke
Man.-Thinketh, that County may give the King a Subsidy yearly, for this Bill.-1700
Score Nisi prius, at one Assises there; and not the 5th Part worth 20s." 1 H.C. Jotm.
562 (1621). A diarist recorded a fragment of this statement, putting down the more
believable figure of seventeen score nisi prius. 5 NoTESTEIN 50.
The problem with the assumption that discouragement of frivolous or trivial suits wis
the primary purpose of the 1623 Act is that the limitations provisions barring suits not
brought within the allotted time seem poorly adapted to achieving that specific purpose,
since they bar all suits after the time period, whether trivial or not.
2) The purpose was to provide certainty and protect the status quo.
The primary purpose of the limitations periods for the real actions in the 1623 Act
was arguably to provide certainty to landholders and to protect the status quo. Joining
the limitations provisions for personal actions in the same Act as the limitations provi-
sions for real actions indicates Parliament's assumption that the purpose of the provi-
sions are the same. The evidence supporting the first theory can also be viewed as sup-
porting this second theory. The House of Commons' evident dislike for litigation could
be seen as stemming from a belief that litigation threatens certainty and the status quo.
In addition, the report of a speech made by Sir Henry Poole, member of the House of
Commons, against the Bill, both as to real and personal actions, concludes: "And yet
if it were like to procure peace, Evell is not to be done that good may come thereof.
And it is Malum per se to give the goods from the true owners to others." 4 NomE-
smiN 370. This indicates that Poole thought the primary argument for the Bill was
the need to "procure peace."
3) The primary purpose was to prevent injustice from jury determinations of facthttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
Vol. 1974:541] COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 549
D. Historical Perspective
The rise of the discovery rule can best be understood and analyzed
by placing in historical perspective the three important considerations
underlying statutes of limitations for personal injury claims-the evi-
dentiary and personal certainty purposes, and the general societal dis-
taste for litigation. History may help explain why concern for hapless,
based on stale testimony. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the need to con-
trol and limit the kinds of evidence submitted to the jury was at that time first becoming
a critical practical problem. See 9 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 127-
33, 185 (1926) [hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH]. In addition, some of the recorded
discussion on the Bill supports this view. In the 1614 Parliament, a member of the
House of Commons moved to amend the Bill by adding a provision "that all Actions
may be laid in the proper County, where they originally grow." 1 H.C. Jota. 496
(1614). For discussion of the venue problem see 5 HoLDswoRTH 140-43 (1924). This
suggests that the member considered the purpose of his amendment to be the same as
the purpose of the Bill. The purpose of the proposed amendment can be seen as the
prevention of harassment and possible injustice from holding the nisi prius trial in a
county far removed from where the defendant's witnesses live. If the main purpose of
the Bill is similar, that purpose was to avoid harassment and possible injustice from hold-
ing the trial at a time when defendant's witnesses might not be available.
In 1621 Parliament considered a companion Bill to limit suits in Equity as well as
actions at common law. This proposed Bill was read twice, but not a third time. In
the course of arguing for the proposed Bill before it was sent to a committee, Sir Edward
Coke reportedly said:
My Lord Chancellor hath a power accordinge to the Common Lawe and a
power according to Equitie. The first is lymmitted by the Bill already prepared.
Pynes, Recoveryes, Deedes inrol'd appeare of Record, and yet all theis are lim-
itted; much more reason is there for matters in equitie which consist not in
matter of Record but in testimonie, which is ever best when it is greenest.
4 NoTnsmiN 43 (footnote omitted). This suggests that the basic purpose of the main
Bill was evidentiary. The lengthier limitations for real actions, perhaps most often de-
cided on documentary evidence, than for personal actions, most often decided on oral
testimony, are consistent with this view.
The limitations solution to an evidentiary problem had been adopted by Parliament
in another statute shortly before the first introduction of the limitation Bill in the 1614
Parliament. In 1609 Parliament passed a statute that forbade admitting into evidence
a shopbook to prove the existence of a debt if the tradesman keeping the shopbook
brought suit more than one year after the goods were delivered. 7 Jac. 1, c. 12 (1609).
The statute explained that the purpose of the Act was to guard against the evil of mer-
chants bringing actions against customers based on doctored shopbooks long after the
delivery of the goods, which the customer cannot contradict,
unless he or they can produce a sufficient proof by writing or witnesses, of
the said payment, that may countervail the credit of the said shopbooks, which
few or none can do in any long time after the said payment ....
Id.
The evidence arguably supports all three of these theories, and the safe course would
be to say that all three purposes were behind the 1623 Act and that a search for a pri-
mary purpose is fruitless.
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ignorant plaintiffs now seems to outweigh the fundamental purposes
of statutes of limitations-why courts and legislatures in the twentieth
century are willing to redraw the line between plaintiffs' and de-
fendants' interests originally laid down by the first statute of limitations
for personal actions in 1623.
Between 1500 and 1700, the jury gradually evolved from an inde-
pendent method of proof into a trier of facts that heard witnesses in
open court.24 In 1623, when the first statute of limitations for personal
actions was enacted, the problem of possible error from the jury's reli-
ance on untrustworthy oral testimony was just becoming apparent.
Courts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gradually devised
certain exclusionary rules (that later became the "law of evidence")es
to limit the kinds of oral testimony presented to the jury. Because the
problem was new to the courts, the precise nature and ultimate solution
were not immediately obvious; other solutions besides exclusionary
rules may have been tried. In historical context, then, the statute of
limitations for personal actions can be viewed as an early legislative at-
tempt to prevent stale testimony from getting to the jury, by the drastic
expedient of barring the plaintiff's claim altogether.20
The 1623 statute was passed when the problem of stale testimony
may have been particularly acute. At that time, parties to a lawsuit
were not allowed to be witnesses,2 7 and hearsay testimony was freely
admitted as long as a witness testified that he actually heard a desig-
nated person say it.28 A plaintiff could easily wait until the death or
departure of adverse witnesses, to bring an action, perhaps based only
on hearsay testimony, secure in the knowledge that the defendant could
not himself rebut the charges by appearing as a witness. The need
24. See 9 HoLswoRTH 127-33, 185.
25. See id. at 127-33; J. T&YER, A PREUmNARY TREPATSE ON EVmENcE AT Tim
COMMON LAw 1-5 (1898).
26. See note 23 supra.
27. 9 Hornswoarn 193-97. This rule grew out of an early conception of the jury.
Originally, the jury decided disputes from its collective knowledge of the relevant facts.
When witnesses were later allowed to testify before the jury, they were considered addi-
tional jurors. The parties to the dispute could not be witnesses because they could not
be jurors.
28. See id. at 214-19. The hearsay rule was not developed until the end of the sev-
enteenth century. Until then, the only comparable protection for the parties was the
requirement that a witness speak "de visu et auditu," from his own personal knowledge.
Id. at 214. This rule, however, did not preclude hearsay if the witness stated that he
actually heard X say Y.
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for the statute of limitations must have seemed greater in 1623 than
it does today, when most hearsay testimony is excluded and parties can
be witnesses.
The plight of a potential defendant, his earthly possessions contin-
ually in jeopardy of a possible adverse judgment, was perhaps more
persuasive in 1623 than it is today. In 1623, liability insurance was
unheard of.29  It is now commonly assumed that any potential de-
fendant with substantial assets will have liability insurance. For the
defendant with liability insurance, the certainty of freedom from ul-
timate liability provided by insurance may be functionally equivalent
to the certainty of freedom from an adverse judgment after expiration
of the limitations period provided by the statute of limitations. Assum-
ing full insurance coverage, the focus of the personal certainty purpose
shifts from the need for individual certainty to the need for actuarial
certainty sufficient to allow insurability of the risk of loss.80 If the risk
of loss is insurable under different statutes of limitations that do not
themselves provide the traditional individual certainty, substitute cer-
tainty is still available through liability insurance."'
Personal injury litigation is no longer considered a necessary evil tol-
erable only as an alternative to violent resolution of disputes. Rather,
present-day courts32 and commentators3 3 often say that the purpose of
29. See generally H. RAYNES, A HISTORY OF BPrrsn INSURANCE (2d ed. 1950).
30. The relationship between the personal certainty purpose of statutes of limita-
tions and liability insurance was raised in a heated exchange between two British solic-
itors commenting on Central Asbestos Co. v. Dodd, [1972] 2 All E.R. 1135 (H.L.). Mr.
Woolf stated:
Unlike Mr. Watmore, I am more alarmed myself at the prospect of blameless
injured workmen and their dependents going uncompensated than of insurance
companies having to keep their files open.
Woolf, supra note 17, at 826. Mr. Watmore rejoined:
Mr. Woolf says that he is more concerned at the prospect of injured workmen
going uncompensated than that insurance companies should have to keep their
files open indefinitely. I suspect that this remark betrays Mr. Woolf's inner-
most thoughts on this subject: he would probably abolish the Limitations Acts
altogether.
Watmore, Personal Injuries-A Reply, 122 NEw L.J. 936, 936 (1972). See also LAW
REFORM COMM=TrEE, TwENTIETH REPORT, CMND. No. 5630, at 10 (1974).
31. A comprehensive evaluation of different kinds of limitations statutes would ana-
lyze the different costs of insurance under each. See text accompanying notes 354-58
infra. Assuming all defendants are insured, however, an evaluation of the different stat-
utes solely from the standpoint of individual certainty leads to the conclusion that all
statutes that allow insurability are equivalent.
32. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.
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personal injury litigation is to alleviate the crushing burdens of injury
by shifting the economic loss from the injured through insurance to
others who share the same risk of loss, or through enterprise liability
to the enterprise that profits from the injury-producing activity and can
spread the cost of injuries among those who benefit from its operations.
The purpose of adjudication in a compensation system based on such
considerations is to shift the loss from the injured to those better able
to bear it. This positive social goal can be achieved fully only if all
who are injured and entitled to compensation make claims. Therefore,
according to this theory, litigation is to be encouraged rather than dis-
couraged.
The workmen's compensation system was the forerunner of other
compensation systems in the United States. Based on the enterprise
liability theory, state workmen's compensation statutes attempt to shift
the economic burden of industrial accidents from the employee to the
employer, and ultimately to the consumers.84 Fault is no longer the
basis for liability, and an administrative agency, not the jury, usually
determines the facts of the case. If the above historical analysis of stat-
utes of limitations is valid, the pressures for relaxation or elimination
of statutes of limitations should be particularly strong within the work-
men's compensation systems.
11. HISTORY OF "ACCIDENT" AND "INJURY" CLAIM
LIMITATIONS PROVISIONS
In specifying the time when the limitations period for workmen's
compensation claims begins, few state legislatures adopted the tradi-
tional "accrual" language."5 Rather, most state legislatures adopted
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); McConville v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
33. See, e.g., Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALEn LJ. 499, 499-501, 517 (1961); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The
Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALB L.J 549, 549-51 (1948).
34. See generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WOiKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS,
ComPENnlu ON Wonm:MEN's COMPENSATION 21-26 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NA-
TIONAL COMM'N CoMPENDIUM].
35. See ch. 98, § 26, [1923] Alas. Laws 256 (two years after cause of action ac-
crues), amended in 1946 to begin period on date of injury, ch. 9, § 29, [1946] Alas.
Laws 83; ch. 112, § 27(d), [1913] Ore. Laws 206 (one year after "the day upon which
the injury occurred or the right accrued"), amended to delete "right accrued" language,
ch. 288, § 13, [1917] Ore. Laws 559; ch. 74, § 12(d), [1911] Wash. Laws 365 (one
year after "day upon which the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued"), final
phrase amended in 1927 to read "or the rights of dependents or beneficiaries accrued,"
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one of two alternatives, beginning the limitations period at the date of
accident36 or at the date of injury.37  While there may not appear to
be any difference between the date of the accident and the date of
the injury, the two terms have been interpreted quite differently in
cases of delayed or latent compensable injuries.3 8
The history of the "accident" and "injury" language suggests that the
difference in wording was not originally related to the latent injury
problem; instead, the "injury" language seems to have developed in
response to the problem of coverage for occupational diseases under
the workmen's compensation statutes with the "accident" language.
The original British Workmen's Compensation Act of 189739 began the
limitations periods for both notice and claim at the time of the acci-
dent." In an early case,41 the Court of Appeal relied on this provi-
d4. 310, § 6, [1927] Wash. Laws 847; ch. 60, § 6, [1923] Wyo. Laws 77 (one year after
"injury occurred or the right thereto accrued"), amended to delete "right thereto ac-
crued," ch. 124, § 1, 11925] Wyo. Laws 126.
Faced with workmen's compensation statutes without specific limitations provisions,
three state courts applied a general statute of limitations that started the limitations pe-
riod from the time the cause of action accrues. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 74 Utah 170, 278 P. 60 (1929), specific statutory limitations provision added,
ch. 51, § 42-1-92, [19391 Utah Laws 73; Fitch v. Parks & Woolson Mach. Co., 109 Vt.
92, 191 A. 920 (1937); Federal Rubber Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 185 Wis. 299, 201
N.W. 261 (1924), specific statutory provision added, ch. 453, § 3, [1929] Wis. Laws 694.
36. See text accompanying notes 70-76 infra.
37. See notes 147-53 infra and accompanying text. See generally Note, "Accident"
v. "Injury" in Workmen's Compensation: A Distinction With a Difference, 58 YALE
LJ. 495 (1949).
38. See text accompanying notes 86-91, 154 infra.
39. 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37 (1897). For the history of this Act see D. HANEs, THE
FIRST Biansf WowR.mN's COMPENSATiON AcT, 1897 (1968).
40. The Act barred proceedings for the recovery of compensation unless the em-
ployee gave notice of the accident to the employer as soon as practicable after the acci-
dent and made claim for compensation "within six months from the occurrence of the
accident causing the injury." 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, § 2-(1) (1897). This provision of
the 1897 Act was probably derived from a similar provision in the Employer's Liability
Act of 1880, 43 & 44 Vict., c. 42, § 4, which read:
An action for the recovery under this Act of compensation for an injury shall
not be maintainable unless notice that injury has been sustained is given within
six weeks, and the action is commenced within six months from the occurrence
of the accident causing the injury, or, in case of death, within twelve months
from the time of death: Provided always, that in case of death the want of
such notice shall be no bar to the maintenance of such action if the judge shall
be of opinion that there was reasonable excuse for such want of notice.
41. Steel v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1905] 2 K.B. 232. The British Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, amended the 1897 Act and partially over-
turned Steel by requiring employers to pay compensation for certain occupational dis-
eases listed in a schedule of compensable occupational diseases.Washington University Open Scholarship
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sion to construe the general coverage provision, which authorized com-
pensation for "injury by accident," as not authorizing compensation for
lead poisoning, an occupational disease contracted by continually hand-
ling lead at work. The court reasoned that the disease was not an "in-
jury by accident" because there was no identifiable event of which no-
tice could have been given as required by the notice and claim limi-
tations provision.
The draftsmen of the early state workmen's compensation acts
looked to the British Act as their model, believing that judicial
interpretation of the British Act would solve many problems of statu-
tory construction and thus eliminate needless litigation in this country.42
Some draftsmen simply copied the British "accident" language in the
limitations provisions. 3 Other draftsmen, however, apparently deter-
mined to provide coverage for occupational diseases without alerting
uninitiated legislators to their design, substituted the word "injury" for
the word "accident" in the notice and claim limitations provision and
deleted the words "by accident" from the basic coverage provision,
thus eliminating the announced statutory basis for the British lead
poisoning case. The historical evidence suggests that this was a delib-
erate choice by only a few draftsmen.44  The reports of state commis-
42. See NEW YoRK EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY COMM'N, REPORT 53-54 (1910).
43. See, e.g., ch. 674, § 1, [1910] N.Y. Laws 1947.
44. A conference of commissioners on compensation for industrial accidents was
held in Chicago on November 10-12, 1910. The conference discussed and voted on cer-
tain policy questions, but left the job of drafting a model act embodying their decisions
to a drafting committee. After the formal conference had ended, the drafting commit-
tee met with the lawyers who had attended the conference. The proceedings of this
meeting indicate that the chairman of the drafting committee (and presumably the other
members of the drafting committee attending the rump drafting session, too) was well
aware of the Steel case and the possible ways to avoid its result. See PROCEEDINaS Or
THE CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONS ON COMPENSATION FOR INDusTmIAL ACCIDENTS 285-
88 (1910) [hereinafter cited as CIICAGO CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS]. The committee
drafted an act that provided compensation for "all personal injuries received by. . . em-
ployee arising out of and in the course of . . . employment," eliminating the "by acci-
dent" restriction in the British Act of 1897. Id. at 319. The notice provision in the
draft act dated the limitations period from the injury, not from the accident. Id. at 322-
23. The report of the drafting discussions at the Chicago Conference indicate that the
Chairman and the Secretary of the Massachusetts Commission charged with drafting an
act for Massachusetts were also aware of the Steel decision and the ways to avoid its
result. Id. at 285-88. The Massachusetts Commission submitted three alternative draft
bills to the Massachusetts legislature. In each draft the coverage provision eliminated
the "by accident" qualification, and the notice and claim period ran from the date of
the injury, not from the date of the accident. MASS. HoUsE, No. 1925, at 9, 30, 44
(1911). Several other states, probably without awareness on the part of the local drafts-
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sions charged with drafting compensation acts suggest that in most cases
ittle attention was given to the notice and claim limitations provi-
sions or the relationship between limitations provisions and the cover-
age provision. 45  The draftsmen often simply copied a limitations pro-
vision from a convenient model, such as the British Act of 1897,46 an-
other state's act, 47 or the proposed Uniform Workmen's Compensation
men, also adopted an "injury" limitations provision together with a coverage provision
that deleted the "by accident" qualification. See, e.g., ch. 138, §§ 1, 21, [1913]
Conn. Acts 1634, 1735; No. 10, Pt. H, §§ 1, 15, [1912] Mich. Laws 1st Extra Sess. 23, 27.
For those few who were aware of these distinctions, the purpose of drafting the coverage
language and the limitations language to eliminate any reference to an accident was to
provide coverage for occupational diseases. The question of coverage for occupational
diseases was soon extensively litigated. Of the state courts faced with an original cover-
age provision using the term "personal injury" alone and a limitations provision running
from the time of the "injury," only the Massachusetts court accepted the argument that
these changes in the language of the 1897 British Act indicated an intention to authorize
compensation for industrial diseases. In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N.E. 336 (1914).
It alone held that a disease contracted by continual exposure to disease-inducing working
conditions was a "personal injury" compensable under a workmen's compensation act.
Ohio, Michigan, Connecticut, and Oregon, with statutory language similar to that in
Massachusetts, all rejected this argument and held that industrial diseases were not "per-
sonal injuries" covered under the act. Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co., 90 Conn.
349, 97 A. 345 (1916); Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 182 Mich. 157,
148 N.W. 485 (1914); Industrial Comm'n v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 309, 110 N.E. 744
(1915); Iwanicki v. State Indus. Ace. Comm'n, 104 Ore. 650, 205 P. 990 (1922). Be-
hind the technical arguments in these opinions, one can sense the courts' conviction that
the legislature had not intended by use of this language to include occupational diseases
under workmen's compensation. Refusing to turn statutory construction into a secret
game played only by knowledgeable draftsmen and the courts, these courts left the ques-
tion of coverage for occupational diseases to the legislature.
45. See [COLORADO] EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION CoMm'N, REPORT 14 (1913);
CONNECTICUT STATE COMM'N ON COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL AccimENTs, REPORT
16-18 (1912); EMPLOYERS' LIABLITY COMM'N OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, REPORT
(1911); [IowA] EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY COMM'N, REPORT (1912); EMPLOYERS' LIAmnrY
AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMM'N OF THE STATE OF MIcHIGAN, REPORT 34-
39 (1911); NEBRASKA EMPLOYERS' LIABIIrrY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CON'N,
PRELIMINARY REPORT 3-16 (1912); NEw JERSEY EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY COMM'N, RE-
PORT (1911); OHmo EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY COMM'N, REPORT 1, at viii-ix, lxii (1911);
[OREGON] COMM'N TO DRAFT A WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BILL, REPORT 2-8 (1913);
[PENNSYLVANIA] INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS COMM'N REPORT 1-16 (1912); [WASHINGTON]
COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE THE PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND TO DRAFT
A BILL ON THE SUBJECT OF EMPLOYERS' COMPENSATION, REPORT 3-7 (1910); BtmnAu
OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS, STATE OF WISCONSIN, TmTEENTH BIENNIAL RE-
PORT 105-16 (1909) (section entitled "Industrial Accidents and Employer's Liability in
Wisconsin"). See also NEW YORK EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY COMM'N, supra note 42, at
52-54.
46. See, e.g., NEW YoRK EMPLOYERS' LIABILrrY COMM'N, supra note 42, at 53-54.
47. See, e.g., [OREGON] COMM'N TO DRAFT A WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BILL,
REPORT 5 (1913) (recommending adoption of Washington Act, note 35 supra).Washington University Open Scholarship
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Act.48
Most state commissions and other early draftsmen did not foresee
the problem presented by latent or progressive injuries. The problem
was soon revealed, however, as the workmen's compensation systems
went into operation. Since not every accidental injury is immediately
compensable under workmen's compensation, starting the limitations
period from the date of the initial injury might bar an employee's claim
before a latent or progressive injury became compensable. Only Mas-
sachusetts, 49 New Hampshire, 0 North Dakota," Texas,52 and Ver-
mont had provisions in their early acts excusing a late claim for speci-
fied reasons that could be stretched to aid the employee in a latent com-
pensable injury case. Other state courts faced the latent compensable
injury problem guided only by the bare language specifying the date
the limitations period commenced. With only two exceptions," the
courts construing "accident" provisions started the limitations period at
the time of the specific work incident that ultimately caused the com-
pensable condition," thus barring some claims before the right to com-
pensation ever arose. Late claimants fared somewhat better in "injury"
states. Although courts in eight "injury" states construed the date of
injury as the date of the initial injury concomitant with the accident,r"
the courts in fifteen other "injury" states construed the date of injury
more liberally, starting the limitations period from one of the following
times: (1) the time the injury became manifest,57 (2) the time the
48. A Uniform Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1914, after many states had already adopted workmen's compen-
sation acts. See C. TEmY, UNIFORm STATE LAws IN THE UNrrED STATES ANNOTATED
445-46 (1920).
49. Ch. 14, § 5, [1912] Mass. Acts 578-79 (delay in filing claim excused if oc-
casioned by "mistake or other reasonable cause").
50. Ch. 163, § 5, [1911] N.H. Laws 455 (later notice excused unless employer
proves prejudice), interpreted to apply to late claims in Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg. Co.,
80 N.H. 194, 115 A. 449 (1921) (dictum).
51. Ch. 162, § 15, [1919] N.D. Laws 270 (claims must be filed within sixty days
after injury, but Bureau may, "for any reasonable cause shown," allow claims to be made
at any time within one year).
52. Ch. 103, § 4a, [1917] Tex. Acts 283 ("for good cause the Board may, in meri-
torious cases, waive.., strict compliance with... limitations as to notice ... and
... filing").
53. No. 101, [1925] Vt Acts 138 (delay in making claim excused if employer had
not been prejudiced by delay).
54. Nebraska and Tennessee. See notes 103-10 infra and accompanying text.
55. See note 86 infra and accompanying text.
56. See state court cases cited notes 155, 157 infra.
57. Johansen v. Union Stockyards Co., 99 Neb. 328, 156 N.W. 511 (1916).
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injury became compensable,58 or (3) the time the employee knew or
should have known the compensable nature of his injury.59 The courts
in six "injury" states have evidently never construed the date of the
injury in their states' claim limitations provisions.6"
State legislatures often reacted to judicial interpretation of limitations
provisions. Ten state legislatures switched once from an "injury" pro-
vision to an "accident" provision,61 in most cases after a liberal judicial
interpretation of the "injury" provision. 62  Three other legislatures"
58. Arkansas: Donaldson v. Calvert-McBride Printing Co., 217 Ark. 625, 232
S.W.2d 651 (1950); Connecticut: Esposito v. Marlin-Rockwell Corp., 96 Conn. 414,
114 A. 92 (1921); Louisiana: Guderian v. Sterling Sugar & Ry., 151 La. 59, 91 So.
546 (1922); Maine: Hustus' Case, 123 Me. 428, 123 A. 514 (1924); Rhode Island:
Rosa v. George A. Fuller Co., 74 R.I. 215, 60 A.2d 150 (1948). In all the states except
Rhode Island, the legislature subsequently switched to an "accident" provision. See
notes 62 & 67 infra.
59. Arizona: English v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Ariz. 86, 237 P.2d 815 (1951); Cal-
ifornia: Marsh v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933 (1933) (occupa-
tional disease); Continental Cas. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 2d 619,
54 P.2d 753 (1936) (accidental injury), overruled by implication, ch. 1034, § 5, [1974]
Cal. Stat. 2307; Colorado: City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 426 P.2d 194
(1967); Indiana: International Detrola Corp. v. Hoffman, 224 Ind. 613, 70 N.E.2d 844
(1947); Mississippi: Tabor Motor Corp. v. Garrard, - Miss. -, 233 So. 2d 811
(1970); Missouri: Marie v. Standard Steel Works, 319 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. 1959) (occupa-
tional disease); Crites v. Missouri Dry Dock & Repair Co., 348 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961); Nebraska: Williams v. Dobberstein, 182 Neb. 862, 157 N.W.2d 776
(1968); Tennessee: Burcham v. Carbide & Carbon Chem. Corp., 188 Tenn. 592, 221
S.W.2d 888 (1949); Ogle v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., 185 Tenn. 527, 206 S.W.2d 909
(1947); Washington: Fee v. Department of Labor & Indus., 151 Wash. 337, 275 P. 741
(1929), "accident" language adopted by legislature, ch. 310, § 2, [1927] Wash. Laws
818, 847 (now WAsH. Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 51.08.100-.28.050 (1962)). See also notes
324-27 infra and accompanying text (discussion of Minnesota's interpretation of its no-
tice provision).
60. Alaska, Florida (but cf. interpretation of "reasonable excuse" exception to no-
tice limitations provision in Escarra v. Win-Dixie Stores, Inc., 131 So. 2d 483 (Fla.
1961), and Stoner v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 218 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1969)), Pennsyl-
vania ("injury" provision first adopted in 1972, Act No. 223, § 4, [1972] Pa. Sess.
Laws Serv. 696-97), South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia.
61. Ch. 307, § 5, [1927] Conn. Acts 4401; no. 116, § 1, [1963] Hawaii Laws 119;
ch. 106, § 9, [1927] Idaho Laws 143; ch. 162, § 2, [19471 Ind. Acts 257; no. 85, § 31,
[1926] La. Acts 124; ch. 300, § 32, [1929] Me. Acts 296; ch. 233, § 10, [1917] Nev.
Stats. 448; ch. 139, § 1, [1935] Ore. Laws 215; ch. 310, § 6, [1927] Wash. Laws 84
(by definition); ch. 102, § 102.12, [1931] Wis. Stat. 1196 (by definition).
62. Connecticct: Esposito v. Martin-Rockwell Corp., 96 Conn. 414, 114 A. 92
(1921); Indiana: International Detrola Corp. v. Hoffman, 224 Ind. 613, 70 N.E.2d 844
(1947); Louisiana: Guderian v. Sterling Sugar & Ry., 151 La. 59, 91 So. 546 (1922);
Maine: Hustus' Case, 123 Me. 428, 123 A. 514 (1924); Washington: Stolp v. Depart-
ment of Labor & Indus., 138 Wash. 685, 245 P. 200 (1926); Wisconsin: Acme Body
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switched to an "accident" provision from a previous provision that did
not contain the "injury" language but which nevertheless had been con-
strued liberally."' New York 5 and California 6" switched twice, ending
with "accident" provisions. Arkansas also switched twice, but ended
with an "injury" provision.67  Four states switched from an "accident"
provision to an "injury" provision,68 and one state switched from an "ac-
cident" provision interpreted harshly to an "injury" provision.69
TI. "ACCIDENT" JURISDICTIONS
The statutes of twenty-four states by a simple provision start the
limitations period for claims for compensation for accidental injuries at
the time of the "accident. '70  California, Washington, and Wisconsin
Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756, rehearing denied, 204 Wis.
500, 236 N.W. 378 (1931).
63. Ch. 814, § 37(a), [1957] Md. Laws 1504 (changing prior "disability" lan-
guage); ch. 77, § 1, [1951] N.H. Laws 249 (changing prior unlimited claim provision);
ch. 51, § 42-1-92, [1939] Utah Laws 73 (changing prior "cause of action accrues" pro-
vision).
64. Baltimore Steel Co. v. Burch, 187 Md. 209, 49 A.2d 542 (1946); Mulhall v.
Nashua Mfg. Co., 80 N.H. 194, 115 A. 449 (1921); Salt Lake City v. Industrial
Comm'n, 104 Utah 436, 140 P.2d 644 (1943).
65. Ch. 816, § 28, [1913] N.Y. Laws Extra Sess. 2292-93 (switch from "accident"
to "injury"); oh. 634, § 4, [1918] N.Y. Laws 2020 (switch from "injury" to "accident").
66. Ch. 607, § 5, [1915] Cal. Stat 1085 (switch from "accident" to "injury");
ch. 1034, §§ 3-5, [1947 Cal. Stat. Extra Sess. 2307 (switch from "injury" to "accident,"
by definition).
67. [1948] Arkansas Initiated Measure No. 14, § 18, summarized in [1949] Ark.
Acts 1420 (switch from "injury" to "accident"); [1968] Arkansas Initiated Measure
No. 1, § 5 ("accident" to "injury"). The 1948 switch to a harsher provision may have
been unintentional, for the provision was included in a generally more liberal initiated
measure which redrafted the entire workmen's compensation act.
68. .Ch. 103, § 81, [1921] Ariz. Laws 223; ch. 201, § 15, [1923] Colo. Laws 744;
ch. 287, § 4, [1963] Neb. Laws 863; Act No. 223, § 4, [1972] Pa. Sess. Laws Serv.
696-97.
69. Ch. 9, § 29, [1946] Alas. Laws 83.
70. ALA. ConD tit. 26, § 296 (1958) (complaint must be filed within one year "after
the accident"); CONN. GEN. STAT. Rv. § 31-294 (1973) (notice of claim or request
for hearing must be given within one year from "date of the accident"); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 2361 (Supp. 1970) (appeal to Board allowed within two years "after
the accident"); GA. CoDu ANN. § 114-305 (1973) (claim must be filed "within one year
after the accident"); HAwAu Rnv. STAT. § 386-82 (1968) (claim must be made within
two years of date effects of injury become manifest and within five years "after the date
of the accident or occurrence which caused the injury"); IDAHO CODE § 72-701 (1973)
(claim must be made within one year "after the date of the accident"); ILL. ANN. STAT.
oh. 48, § 138.6 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (application for compensation must be made "within
one year after the date of the accident"); IND. CODE § 22-3-3-3 (Bums 1974) (claim
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start the period at the time of the injury,1 but separately define injury
or date of injury as the date of the accident. 72  Both Nebraska and
Tennessee have two provisions purporting to limit claims. Nebraska
in one provision requires claim for compensation to be made within
six months after the occurrence of the injury,73 and in another provision
must be filed "within two years after the occurrence of the accident"); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-520a, -535 (Supp. 1972) (claim must be made "within two-hundred (200) days
after the accident"); KY. REV. STAT. § 342.185 (1973) (claim must be made "within
two years after the date of the accident"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1209 (1964) (pro-
ceedings must be begun "within two years from the date of the accident" and within
one year "from the time the injury develops"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 95 (Supp.
1973) (petition must be filed "within 2 years after the date of the accident," or, if failure
to file petition because of "mistake of fact as to the cause and nature of the injury,"
within reasonable time); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39(a) (Supp. 1973) (application
must be filed "within two years from the date of the accident"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
176.151 (Supp. 1974) (proceedings must be begun within two years after employer has
made written report of injury to commission and within "six years from the date of the
accident"); MoNr. REv. CODES ANN. § 92-601 (Supp. 1973) (claim must be made
within "twelve months from the date of the happening of the accident," or if lack of
knowledge of disability shown, commission may waive time requirement "up to an addi-
tional twenty-four (24) months"); NEv. REv. STAT. § 616.500 (1973) (claim must be
filed "within 90 days after the happening of the accident"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
281.17 (1966) (claim barred unless notice of injury given to employer "within one year
from the date of the accident"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-51 (1959) (petition must be
filed "within two years after the date on which the accident occurred"); N.Y. WORK-
MEN'S COMP. LAw § 28 (McKinney Supp. 1973) (claim must be filed "within two years
after the accident"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24 (1972) (claim must be filed "within two
years after the accident"); ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.319 (1973) (request for hearing must
be filed within "one year after the date of the accident"); no 1059, § 13, [1974] S.C.
Acts 2272 (claim must be filed "within two years after the accident"); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-99 (1953) (claim must be filed "within three years from the date of the acci-
dent"); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-87 (1973) (claim must be filed "within one year after
the accident").
71. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5405 (Deering 1964) (proceedings must be commenced
"one year from .. . [t~he date of injury"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.28.050 (1962)
(application must be filed "within one year after the day upon which the injury oc-
curred"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.12 (1973) (application must be filed "within 2 years
from the date of the injury" or "from the date the employee. . . knew or ought to have
known the nature of the disability and its relation to the employment").
72. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5411 (Deering 1964) ("date of injury, except in cases of
occupational disease, is that date during the employment on which occurred the alleged
incident or exposure, for the consequences of which compensation is claimed"); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 51.08.100 (1962) ("'Injury' means a sudden and tangible happening
of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and occurring from
without, and such physical conditions as result therefrom"); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
102.01(f) (1973) (" 'Time of injury', 'occurrence of injury', or 'date of injury' means
the date of the accident which caused the injury, or in the case of disease, the last day
of work for the last employer whose employment caused disability").
73. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-133 (1968).
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requires petition to be filed within one year after the accident."4 Ten-
nessee in one provision requires claim to be filed within one year after
the accident, 78 and in another provision requires proceedings to recover
compensation within one year after the occurrence of the injury. 0
Several "accident" states have additional provisions that affect the
application of the claim limitation. Hawaii, 77 Louisiana,78 and Minne-
sota7 9 date only their final limitations cutoff from the time of the acci-
dent. The final cutoff operates only if an initial, shorter limitations
period, dated from a different event, 0 has not precluded the claim.
Montana gives the workmen's compensation agency discretion to ex-
tend the initial one-year "accident" limitations period for up to two
years if the claimant shows prior lack of knowledge of disability.81
Maine dates the limitations period from the time of the accident, but
provides an open-ended alternative of a "reasonable time' if failure to
make claim is occasioned by "mistake of fact as to the cause and nature
of the injury.""2  On its face, the Wisconsin statute seems similar to
the Maine statute.83 The language of the Wisconsin provision bars re-
covery if the application is not filed within two years from the date of
the injury or from the date the employee knew or ought to have known
the nature of the disability and its relation to his employment.8 4
Shortly after this provision was enacted, the legislature enacted an
amendment that defined the date of the injury as the date of the acci-
dent. The legislative history of the amendment establishes that the
legislature intended the limitations period for accidental injuries to run
without exception from the date of the accident, and that the exception
for late knowledge was intended to remain applicable only to occupa-
74. Id. § 48-137.
75. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 50-1003 (1966).
76. Id. § 50-1017(1).
77. HAWAii Rav. STAT. § 386-82 (Supp. 1973).
78. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1209 (1964).
79. MADNN. STAT. ANN. § 176.151(t) (Supp, 1974).
80. HA A I REv. STAT. § 386-82 (Supp. 1973) (two years from date effects of injury
for which employee is entitled to compensation have become manifest); LA. Rnv. STAT.
ANN. § 23:1209 (1964) (one year from time the injury "develops"); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.151(1) (Supp. 1974) (two years after employer has made written report of injury
to commission).
81. MoNT. Rnv. CODES ANN. § 92-601 (Supp. 1973).
82. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 95 (Supp. 1974).
83. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.01 (1973).
84, Id. § 102.12,
[Vol. 1974:541
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
Vol. 1974:541] COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
tional disease claims.8 5 Otherwise, the enactment adding the separate
definition would have been pointless.
Except for Tennessee and Nebraska, every "accident" state court
that has faced the problem of limitations in a case of delayed, latent
or undiscovered compensable injury caused by a single incident at
work has held that the limitations period runs from the date of the caus-
ative incident, the "accident." 86  The courts in these cases have ad-
85. Wisconsin's initial statute required written notice to the employer within thirty
days of the occurrence of the accident, and set out specific excuses for failure to give
notice within that time. Ch. 50, § 11, [1911] Wis. Laws 50. The right to compensa-
tion was completely cut off if notice was not given and compensation was not paid
within two years of the accident. There was no specific time limitation on filing claims,
but the Wisconsin court held that the general six-year limitation from the time the cause
of action accrued for personal injury claims applied to an otherwise unlimited claim for
compensation in a case where the employer had originally paid compensation for tempo-
rary disability. The notice limitation therefore did not bar the later claim. Federal
Rubber Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 185 Wis. 299, 201 N.W. 261 (1924). In 1929, a
specific claim limitation was added that required claim within two years from the date
of injury or the date the employee knew or should have known the nature of his disabil-
ity and its relation to his employment. Ch. 453, § 3, [19291 Wis. Laws 694. In Janu-
ary of 1931, the Wisconsin Supreme Court seemed to interpret "injury" as "compensable
injury" in a latent-compensable-injury case. Acme Body Works v. Industrial Comm'n,
204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756, rehearing denied, 204 Wis. 500, 236 N.W. 378 (1931).
In response to a motion for rehearing based on the fact that the 1929 statute was irrel-
evant and inapplicable to the case because all the events occurred before the 1929 stat-
ute was passed, the court emphasized that it had merely interpreted the six-year "cause
of action accrued" statute applicable under the Federal Rubber case. Evidently reacting
to the Acme case, the Wisconsin legislature, later in 1931, passed a statute specifically
defining the time of injury as the "date of the accident which caused the injury or the
date when the disability from the occupational disease first occurs." Ch. 403, § 2,
11931] Wis. Laws 636. The obvious legislative intention to limit the Acme holding to
occupational disease cases would be frustrated by giving independent force to the unre-
pealed discovery exception in the 1929 claim limitation, and suggests that this is one
of those rare instances when a court interpreting a statute, faithful to the obvious legisla-
tive intent, must ignore the plain meaning of a provision in the statute. Cf. Markham
v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945). The Wisconsin Supreme Court subsequently limited
the discovery exception in the 1929 statute to occupational disease cases, consistent with
the legislative history of the 1931 Act. Larson v. Industrial Comm'n, 224 Wis. 294,
271 N.W. 835 (1937) (alternative holding); Andrzeczak v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis.
12, 20 N.W.2d 551 (1945); Zabkowicz v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Wis. 317, 58 N.W.2d
677 (1953). A more recent case suggests in dicta that the court may soon overrule this
line of cases and apply the plain meaning of the statute, regardless of legislative intent.
Boyle v. Industrial Comm'n, 8 Wis. 2d 601, 99 N.W.2d 702 (1959).
86. Alabama: Davis v. Standard Oil Co., 261 Ala. 410, 74 So. 2d 625 (1954); Con-
necticut: Gavigan v. Visiting Nurses Ass'n, 125 Conn. 290, 4 A.2d 923 (1939);
Georgia: Thomas v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 57 Ga. App. 434, 195 S.E. 894
(1938); Idaho: Moody v. State Highway Dep't, 56 Idaho 21, 48 P.2d 1108 (1935); Illi-
nois: Central Car Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 290 Ill. 436, 125 N.E. 369 (1919); In-
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vanced -the following arguments: (1) the statutory term "accident"
under these circumstances is clear and unambiguous, so there is no
room for construction;8r (2) other states with "accident" statutes reach
the same result; 8 (3) there are persuasive reasons for this legislative
judgment in the need to bar stale and possibly fraudulent claims and
the need to assure employers that they will not be sued after a specified
diana: Huffman v. State Sign Co., 145 Ind. App. 486, 251 N.E.2d 489 (1969); Kansas:
Rutledge v. Sandlin, 181 Kan. 360, 310 P.2d 950 (1957); Long v. Watts, 129 Kan. 489,
283 P. 654 (1930); Kentucky: Fiorella v. Clark, 298 Ky. 817, 184 S.W.2d 208 (1944)
(but cf. Goode v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 275 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1955) (distinguish-
ig claim limitations case from discovery-rule-notice-imitations case in terms that as-
sume applicability of discovery rule in claim limitations case)); Louisiana: Carroll v. In-
ternational Paper Co., 175 La. 315, 143 So. 275 (1932); Maine: Thibodeau's Case, 135
Me. 312, 196 A. 87 (1938); Maryland: Dintaman v. Board of Comm'rs, 17 Md. App.
345, 303 A.2d 442 (1973); Minnesota: Bergstrom v. O'Brien Sheet Metal Co., 251
Minn. 32, 86 N.W.2d 82 (1957); Lunzer v. W.F. Buth & Co., 195 Minn. 29, 261 N.W.
477 (1935); New Hampshire: Levesque v. Bronze Craft Corp., 104 N.H. 195, 182 A.2d
603 (1962); New Jersey: Schwarz v. Federal Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 16 N.J.
243, 108 A.2d 417 (1954); Cristo v. Standard Oil Co., 98 N.J.L. 871, 121 A. 609 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1923); New York: Lissow v. Mabbett Motors, Inc., 279 N.Y. 585, 17
N.E.2d 450 (1938) (mem.); Britton v. Mayersohn, 274 App. Div. 862, 81 N.Y.S.2d 698
(1948); Duquette v. General Elec. Co., 257 App. Div. 881, 11 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1939);
North Carolina: Whitted v. Palmer-Bee Co., 228 N.C. 447, 46 S.E.2d 109 (1948); Ore-
gon: Landauer v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 175 Ore. 418, 154 P.2d 189 (1944) (ek-
baustive survey of other states); Utah: McKee v. Industrial omm'n, 115 Utah 550,
206 P.2d 715 (1949); Washington: Ferguson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 168
Wash. 677, 13 P.2d 39 (1932); Wisconsin: Labkowicz v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Wis.
317, 58 N.W.2d 677 (1952); Andrzeczak v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 12, 20 N.W.2d
551 (1945) (but cf. Boyle v. Industrial Comm'n, 8 Wis. 2d 601, 99 N.W.2d 702 (1959)
(dictum)). The courts in seven states--California, Delaware, Hawaii, Montana, Ne-
vada, South Carolina, and Virginia-have not faced the issue directly. But cf. Califor-
nia: Fruehauf Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 68 Cal. 2d 569, 440 P.2d 236, 68
Cal. Rptr. 164 (1968) (court-implied exception to harsh accident provision); Hanna v.
Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 719, 108 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1973) (stretch-
ing definition of occupational disease to avoid harsh accident provisions); Delaware:
Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp. v. Mullen, 32 Del. 55, 119 A. 314 (1922) (implicit harsh
interpretation); Montana: Vetsch v. Helena Transf. & Storage Co., 154 Mont. 106, 460
P.2d 757 (1969); Dean v. First Trust Co., 152 Mont. 469, 452 P.2d 81 (1969); South
Carolina: Chapman v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 249 S.C. 438, 154 S.E.2d 845 (1967)
(avoiding interpretation question, holding for employee on waiver grounds); Burnhart
v. Duneau Mills, 214 S.C. 113, 51 S.E.2d 377 (1949) (implicit harsh interpretation);
Virginia: American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 145 Va. 391, 135 S.E. 21 (1926)
(seemingly assuming harsh interpretation in estoppel case).
87. See, e.g., Thomas v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 57 Ga. App. 434, 195 S.E.
894 (1938); Moody v. State Highway Dep't, 56 Idaho 21, 48 P.2d 1109 (1935); Fiorella
v. Clark, 298 Ky. 817, 184 S.W.2d 208 (1944).
88. See, e.g., Davis v. Standard Oil Co., 261 Ala. 410, 74 So. 2d 625 (1954);
Schwarz v. Federal Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 16 N.J. 243, 108 A.2d 417 (1954);
Landauer v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 175 Ore. 418, 154 P.2d 189 (1944) (exhaustive
review of subject). The courts often cite to Annot., 108 A.L.R. 316 (1937). See, e.g.,
Davis v. Standard Oil Co., supra at 415, 74 So. 2d at 629.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_law eview/vol1974/iss4/1
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period of time; 9 and (4) the remedy for this harsh result lies with the
legislature and not the courts.9  In states where the legislature has
changed from a limitations provision that had been liberally inter-
preted, the courts have emphasized the apparent legislative intent to
overturn the prior rule. 9' The arguments, taken together, are convinc-
ing as a matter of statutory construction, although the result may leave
something to be desired.
The only significant argument to the contrary is contained in Pro-
fessor Larson's influential treatise on workmen's compensation law.
Professor Larson states that
[e]ven under a statute dating the claim period from "the accident," it
is perfectly possible to achieve by judicial decision the rule dating the
period from the time claimant knows he has a compensable disability,
as a number of states have done [citing cases from Georgia,92 Louisiana, 93
Nebraska, 4 New Jersey,9 5 Pennsylvania,9" South Carolina,97 and Ten-
89. See Long v. Watts, 129 Kan. 489, 283 P. 654 (1930).
90. See, e.g., Moody v. State Highway Dep't, 56 Idaho 21, 48 P.2d 1109 (1935);
Central Car Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 290 ll. 436, 125 N.E. 369 (1919); Levesque
v. Bronze Craft Corp., 104 N.H. 195, 182 A.2d 603 (1962).
91. See, e.g., Carroll v. International Paper Co., 175 La. 315, 143 So. 275 (1932);
Dintaman v. Board of Comm'rs, 17 Md. App. 345, 303 A.2d 442 (1973); McKee v.
Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 550, 206 P.2d 715 (1949).
92. Free v. Associated Indem. Corp., 78 Ga. App. 839, 52 S.E.2d 325 (1949). Free
involved a claim for compensation for occupational disease and the interpretation of the
date of disablement under a special provision equating disablement from occupational
disease with injury by accident, GA. CODE ANN. § 114-801 (1973).
93. Fontenot v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 127 So. 2d 822 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Hodge
v. T.L. James & Co., 57 So. 2d 913 (La. Ct. App. 1952). The claims in Hodge and
Fontenot were brought within two years after the accident-the time allotted by the
strictly construed overall cutoff provision, LA REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1209 (1964). The
issue in each case was whether the claim had been brought within one year of the injury,
as required by the intermediate limitations provision, id.
94. Williams v. Dobberstein, 182 Neb. 862, 157 N.W.2d 776 (1968); Keenan v.
Consumers Pub. Power Dist., 152 Neb. 54, 40 N.W.2d 261 (1949); Dryden v. Omaha
Steel Works, 148 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.2d 293 (1947).
95. Panchak v. Simmons Co., 15 NJ. 13, 103 A.2d 884 (1954); Bucuk v. Edward
A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. Super. 187, 139 A.2d 436 (Super. Ct. 1958); Minardi
v. Pacific Airmotive Corp., 43 N.J. Super. 460, 129 A.2d 51 (Union County Ct. 1957).
Panchak interpreted the general New Jersey notice requirement that specified the date
of injury as the date triggering the notice limitations period, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-
17 (1959). Bucuk applied an explicit statutory discovery rule that by its terms was lim-
ited to occupational diseases, NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:15-33 to -34 (1959). Minardi in-
terpreted a special hernia notice provision that required notice within forty-eight hours
of the "occurrence of the hernia," NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-12(23) (Supp. 1974). ,
96. Sierzega v. U.S. Steel Corp., 204 Pa. Super. 531, 205 A.2d 696 (1964); Ma-
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nessee98].59
He argues that this interpretation is supportable on two grounds.
First, it is
the only way to give effect to the overall legislative intent. The legisla-
ture could hardly intend to give substantive benefits and then snatch
them away by the imposition of a literally impossible procedural condi-
tion.100
Secondly, the limitations provision should be interpreted in conformity
with the coverage formula.101 The "operative factor" in the coverage
formula is injury of accidental character. It is a mistake to construe
the coverage formula to require a specific accident. The legislative
choice of the date of the accident as the starting point for the limitations
period necessarily leads to confusion and "bad results" because it is not
consistent with the "operative factor for acquiring substantive rights,"
an injury.
Except for Nebraska and Tennessee, courts in accidental injury cases
have never construed the "accident" limitations language to start the
limitations period from the date the employee knows he has a compen-
souski v. Hammond Coal Co., 172 Pa. Super. 409, 94 A.2d 55 (1953); Valent v. Ber-
wind-White Coal Mining Co., 172 Pa. Super. 305, 94 A.2d 197 (1953); Roschak v. Vul-
can Iron Works, 157 Pa. Super. 227, 42 A.2d 280 (1945). All four cases were decided
under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1415 (Supp. 1974), a special occupational-disease-claim-
limitations provision that starts the limitations period when "compensable disability be-
97. Drake v. Raybestos-Mantattan, Inc., 241 S.C. 116, 127 S.E.2d 288 (1962); Alt.
man v. Williams Furniture Co., 250 S.C. 98, 156 S.E.2d 433 (1967); Dawkins v. Capi-
tol Constr. Co., 252 S.C. 536, 167 S.E.2d 439 (1969). Drake involved determining the
date of disablement in an occupational disease case under a statutory provision, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 72-253! (1962), equating disablement by occupational disease with injury
by accident. In Altman, the court held that the employer was estopped from asserting
the limitations bar in an accidental injury case because the company doctor had told
the employee there was nothing wrong with him when the doctor should have known
that there was something wrong with him. Dawkins interpreted the explicit statutory
excuses for late notice of injury, id. §§ 72-301 to -302.
98. Tennessee Prod. & Chem. Corp. v. Reeves, 220 Tenn. 148, 415 S.W.2d 118
(1967); Imperial Shirt Corp. v. Jenkins, 217 Tenn. 602, 399 S.W.2d 757 (1966); Ameri-
can Bridge Div. v. McClung, 206 Tenn. 317, 333 S.W.2d 557 (1960); Mathes v. Blue
Ridge Glass Corp., 206 Tenn. 19, 330 S.W.2d 342 (1959) (holding incorrectly described,
3 LARsoN § 78.41, at 55 n.23); Charnes v. Burk, 205 Tenn. 371, 326 S.W.2d 657
(1959); Burcham v. Carbide & Carbon Chem. Corp., 188 Tenn. 592, 221 S.W.2d 888
(1949).
99. 3 LARsoN § 78.42(d), at 75-76.
100. Id. at 75.
101. Id. at 75-76.
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sable disability. 10 2 The cases Professor Larson cites to the contrary from
other jurisdictions all involve either (1) the construction of a statutory
provision not phrased in terms of "accident,' '1 0 3 (2) the determination
of the date of disablement from occupational disease under statutory
provisions equating such disablement with injury by accident, 0 4 (3)
the application of a statutory exception to an "accident" limitations pro-
vision, 0 5 or (4) the application of the principle of equitable estop-
pel.1' 6 The Nebraska and Tennessee discovery-rule interpretations of
"accident" limitations provisions were influenced by the peculiar cir-
cumstance that each state's statute had -two limitations provisions, one
dating the limitations period from the "injury" and the other from the
"accident." Both courts seem to have seized on the ambiguity created
by the two separate limitations provisions to avoid the harsh "accident"
result, for neither resolution of the technical statutory construction
problem posed by the presence of two limitations provisions is a model
of legal reasoning. The Nebraska court at first relied on the statutory
distinction between "accident" and "injury" to support a liberal inter-
pretation of the six-month "injury" provision.10 7  In a subsequent case
it relied on the "injury" cases to support giving the same interpretation
to the one-year "accident" provision.108 The Tennessee court ignored
a possible harmonizing construction of the separate limitations provi-
sions' 09 and asserted that the "injury" provision was controlling because
102. Professor Larson's statement was not limited to judicial construction of "acci-
dent" limitations provisions in accidental injury cases. Given the generality of his state-
ment, see text accompanying note 99 supra, some of the occupational disease cases he
cites from states other than Nebraska and Tennessee arguably support his statement.
103. See cases cited notes 93, 95-96 supra.
104. Free v. Associated Indem. Corp., 78 Ga. App. 839, 52 S.E.2d 325 (1949);
Drake v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 241 S.C. 116, 127 S.E.2d 288 (1962).
105. Dawkins v. Capitol Constr. Co., 252 S.C. 536, 167 S.E.2d 439 (1969).
106. Altman v. Williams Furniture Co., 250 S.C. 98, 156 S.E.2d 433 (1967). See
also notes 116-25 infra and accompanying text (discussion of equitable estoppel).
107. Johansen v. Union Stock Yards Co., 99 Neb. 328, 156 N.W. 511 (1916), con-
struing ch. 198, § 33, [1913] Neb. Laws 593 (now NEB. RV. STAT. § 48-133 (1968)).
108. City of Hastings v. Saunders, 114 Neb. 475, 208 N.W. 122 (1926), construing
ch. 198, § 38, [1913] Neb. Laws 595 (now NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-137 (1968)).
109. The two limitations provisions in the Tennessee Act, ch. 123, §§ 24, 31, [1919]
Tenn. Acts 377, 389 (now TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1003, -1017 (1966)), specified the
same time period (one year), with one simple provision dating the period from the "acci-
dent" and a subsequent, more complicated provision dating the period from the "injury"
and setting forth exceptions to the statutory bar. It appears that the "accident" provi-
sion was intended to be the basic limitation and was simply repeated in the subsequent
"injury" provision for the sake of consistency in detailing the exceptions to the basic
limitations bar. The obvious conclusion is that both one-year limitations provisions
Vol. 1974:541] 565
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it was the more detailed and "later" of the two limitations provisions."10
Courts have never found the "accident" language by itself ambigu-
ous when applied to latent compensable accidental injuries. If the "ac-
cident" language is not ambiguous, Professor Larson's first statutory
construction argument makes sense only if it is reformulated as follows:
the legislature, through inadvertence or ignorance, made a mistake in
starting the limitations period from the date of the "accident," for it
could not have intended to impose an impossible procedural restric-
tion on the right to compensation. That argument would be more
convincing if the "accident" provision operated in all cases to preclude
recovery before the right to compensation accrued. As it is, the "ac-
cident" provision precludes recovery before the right to compensa-
tion accrues only in the small number of cases in which the injury be-
comes compensable. after the limitations period has passed. It is un-
reasonable to say that the legislature could not possibly have intended
this result. The fact that many "accident" provisions are the results
of changes from more liberal provisions demonstrates that legislatures
have at times specifically intended this result. The certainty and evi-
dentiary considerations behind limitations provisions, moreover, are
persuasive reasons for precluding these claims, even though the results
in particular cases seem harsh and inconsistent with 'the compensation
purpose of a workmen's compensation system.
If the "accident" language is not ambiguous, Professor Larson's sec-
ond statutory construction argument makes sense only if it is reform-
ulated as follows: legislatures, and courts interpreting workmen's com-
pensation acts, have made a simple mistake in requiring that a personal
injury be traceable to a particular accident before compensation can
be awarded. The mistake is repeated in the decision to start the limita-
tions period from the date of the accident. Professor Larson's implicit
were thought and intended to be identical. The "accident" language therefore should
control, since the only way the date of the "injury" and the date of the "accident" can
be identical is if they both refer to the date of the accident. The Tennessee court at
first accepted this harmonizing construction. Graham v. J.W. Wells Brick Co., 150
Tenn. 660, 266 S.W. 770 (1924) (alternative holding).
110. Ogle v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., 185 Tenn. 527, 530-31, 206 S.W.2d 909, 910
(1947). The court referred to the "injury" section's position in the statute, not its date,
in its "later section" argument, since both provisions were included in the original Ten-
nessee Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 123, §§ 24, 31, [1919] Tenn. Acts 377, 389.
The subtlety of this point was later lost by the court. See Imperial Shirt Corp. v. Jen-
kins, 217 Tenn. 602, 606, 608, 399 S.W.2d 757, 759-60 (1966) (characterizing the "in-
jury" provision as later in, time).
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accusation that courts and legislatures made an inadvertent mistake is
contradicted by the history of the early exclusion of occupational dis-
eases from coverage under the workmen's compensation acts. A key
and often intentional method of excluding coverage of occupational dis-
eases was to formulate the coverage provision to cover "personal injury
by accident" and to start the limitations period from the accident. Ex-
clusion of occupational disease from the workmen's compensation stat-
ute is not prima facie unreasonable, at least by 1912 standards, when
there was political opposition to compensation for occupational diseases
because of fears that such compensation would place an intolerable
burden on local industry,"' and when a respected law professor, Fran-
cis Bohlen, argued that compensation for occupational diseases was in-
consistent with the fundamental purposes of workmen's compensation
statutes."12  Professor Larson's argument is convincing only if one
views workmen's compensation statutes as perfectly consistent embodi-
ments of the compensation principle rather than as 'the historical results
of legislative compromise of competing interests.
The best argument for a liberal interpretation of the "accident" lan-
guage can be made only in states without a history of a change from
a more liberal provision to the "accident" language. In those states,
it could be argued that the legislature did not intend to preclude claims
for latent compensable injuries by the "accident" language. At most,
the legislature intended to preclude coverage for occupational diseases.
In the absence of any more specific legislative intent, the date of "acci-
dent" can be interpreted by reference to the general compensation pur-
poses of the workmen's compensation act. This argument, however, is
flawed. There is little room for legislative intent arguments in constru-
ing the date of the "accident," since the term "accident" can bear the
meaning assigned to it by Professor Larson only with great difficulty, if
at all. The legislative intent arguments would have to be unassailable
to support this strained and artificial interpretation, and simple absence
of a specific legislative intent to achieve the harsh "accident" result may
not be enough to overcome the natural import of the word. Reference
to the general compensation purpose of the act is not persuasive, be-
cause the existence of a limitations provision in the act indicates some
111. Cf. CHICAGO CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 44, at 288.
112. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HIv.
L. REv. 328, 344-48 (1912).
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compromise of that purpose in favor of other interests. The question of
the extent of that compromise cannot be answered by simple reference
to the compromised interest.
Courts in the "accident" states have recognized, with good reason,
that the harsh "accident" interpretation is inescapable as a matter of
statutory construction, but that has not stopped some courts in "acci-
dent" states and some commentators from searching for ways to avoid
harsh results in individual cases.
In cases in which an accident aggravates an injury received in an
earlier accident, courts in Georgia and California have held that the
limitations period for a claim for the resulting compensable condition
runs from the second accident."" They have also held that when the
injury results from continuous strain or cumulative minor traumas that
cease only when the employee quits work, the date of the "accident"
is the day the employee quits work. 1 4  n California the legislature
overturned this line of cases in 1968,11 but the approach is still valid
in Georgia, and it remains a possibility in other "accident" jurisdictions
whose courts have not faced the issue but have authorized compensa-
tion in such cases.
If cumulative trauma or aggravation cannot be found, courts may be
able to avoid harsh results from application of the "accident" provisions
113. Beveridge v. Industrial Ace. Comnm'n, 175 Cal. App. 2d 592, 346 P.2d 545
(1959); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cagle, 106 Ga. App. 440, 126 S.E.2d 907 (1962).
114. Freuhauf Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 68 Cal. 2d 569, 440 P.2d 236,
68 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1968); Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 39
Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148 (1952) (en bane); Mallory v. American Cas. Co., 114 Ga.
App. 641, 152 S.E.2d 592 (1966); Noles v, Aragon Mills, 114 Ga. App. 130, 150 SE.2d
305 (1966).
115. Ch. 4, § 2, [1968] Cal. Stat. 31 (codified at CAL. LABOR CODE § 3208.2 (Deer-
ing Supp. 1973)), provides in part:
When disability, need for medical treatment, or death results from the com-
bined effects of two or more injuries, either specific, cumulative, or both, all
questions of fact and law shall be separately determined with respect to each
such injury, including, but not limited to, the apportionment between such in-
juries of liability for disability benefits, the cost of medical treatment, and any
death benefit.
Ch. 4, § 10, [1968] Cal. Stat. 33-34 (codified at CAL. LABOR CODE § 5303 (Deering
Supp. 1973)), provides in part:
MNlo injury, whether specific or cumulative, shall, for any purpose whatsoever,
merge into or form a part of another injury; nor shall any award based on a
cumulative injury include disability caused by any specific injury or by any
other cumulative injury causing or contributing to the existing disability, need
for medical treatment or death.
For a discussion of the conflict between these statutes and previous case law, see Note,
Judicial Philanthropy Curbed, 9 SANTA CLARA LA W. 156 (1968).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
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only by using legal doctrines that do not depend on direct interpretation
of the statutory "accident" language. Equitable estoppel is the most
eligible of these independent doctrines. Traditionally, the equitable
estoppel doctrine has precluded one litigant from using to his advan-
tage prior actions of another litigant that he has induced when to do
so would be inequitable or unconscionable.116 Some state courts have
held that equitable estoppel does not apply in workmen's compensation
limitations cases, 117 reasoning very technically that the limitations provi-
sion is jurisdictional rather than procedural. Other state courts, how-
ever, have applied equitable estoppel in workmen's compensation limi-
tations cases."" Using the traditional equitable estoppel doctrine, 119
these courts barred the employer from asserting the limitations de-
fense when the employer had assured -the employee that he need
not file a claim by promising him that compensation would be
paid without a formal claim 20 or that the employer would file
claim for him,'21 and when the employer's conduct led the em-
ployee to believe that a claim would not be necessary to protect his
rights,' 22 as when both employer and employee recognized the em-
ployee's impaired working capacity and the employer continued to pay
the employee the same wages for lighter work. 23  A few courts have
e x ded equitable estoppel in workmen's compensation limitations
oases beyond its traditional scope. Some, relying on the relationship
of trust between employer and employee, have barred the employer
116. See generally Dawson, Estoppel ana Statutes of Limitations, 34 MIcH. L. REV.
1 (1935).
117. See, eg., Holland v. Industrial Comm'n, 78 Ariz. 16, 274 P.2d 836 (1954);
Rebtarchik v. Hoyt-Messinger Corp., 118 Conn. 315, 172 A. 353 (1934); Petraska v.
National Acme Co., 95 Vt. 76, 113 A. 536 (1921).
118. See generally cases cited 3 IARSON § 78.45.
119. See generally Dawson, supra note 116; Annot., 24 A.LR.2d 1413 (1952);
Annot., 130 A.L.R. 8 (1941). As Professor Dawson points out, application of equitable
eatoppel in limitations cases differs from the traditional requirements for equitable estop-
pel, chiefly in the recognition of a promise as a basis for estoppel in addition to the
traditional basis of a factual misrepresentation. See, e.g., 2 J. PoMROY, EQUITY JuRis-
PRUDENCE §§ 801-21 (3d ed. 1905).
120. See, e.g., Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 80 N.H. 194, 115 A. 449 (1921); Skip-
per v. Marlowe Mfg. Co., 242 S.C. 486, 131 S.E.2d 524 (1963).
121. See, e.g., Parks & Hull Appliance Corp. v. Reimsnyder, 177 Md. 280, 9 A.2d
648 (1939); McCoy v. Mike Horse Mining & Milling Co., 126 Mont. 435, 252 P.2d
1036 (1953).
122. See, e.g., Benner v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 2d 346, 159 P.2d 24
(1945).
123. See, e.g., St. Joe Ice Co. v. Frazier, 103 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958).
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from asserting the limitations defense if he in good faith told the em-
ployee that his injury was not legally compensable. 24 Two courts have
barred -the employer from asserting the limitations defense when the
employee failed -to make timely claim because he relied on the em-
ployer's doctor's innocent misdiagnosis, which concealed the compensa-
ble nature of his injury. 25 In extending the doctrine of equitable es-
toppel, the courts seem to be imposing affirmative duties on the em-
ployer because of either the employment relationship itself or the em-
ployer's statutory duty to provide medical care for work-related injuries,
for the employer's reliance on the limitations defense in these cases
would not otherwise appear "inequitable" or "unconscionable."
Commentators have suggested,12  although no court so far has been
persuaded, 27 that it is an unconstitutional denial of due process to ap-
ply the "accident" limitations provision to bar compensation before the
employee ever had a right to compensation. 128  The commentators rely
on a 1917 United States Supreme Court case, New York Central Rail-
124. Dupaquier v. City of New Orleans, 260 La. 728, 257 So. 2d 385 (1972); Levo
v. General-Shea-Morrison, 128 Mont. 570, 280 P.2d 1086 (1955); Watkins v. Central
Motor Lines, Inc., 279 N.C. 132, 181 S.E.2d 588 (1971); Young v. Sonoco Prods. Co.,
210 S.C. 146, 41 S.E.2d 860 (1947); cf. City & County of San Francisco v. Workmen's
Comp. App. Bd., 2 Cal. 3d 1001, 472 P.2d 459, 88 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1970). But see
Ryan v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., - Tenn. -, 485 S.W.2d 548 (1972) (misrepre-
sentations of law ordinarily cannot be basis for equitable estoppel).
125. McCoy v. Mike Horse Mining & Milling Co., 126 Mont. 435, 252 P.2d 1036
(1953); Esperson v. Gowanda State Homeopathic Hosp., 20 App. Div. 2d 828, 247
N.Y.S.2d 835 (1964); cf. Angermier v. Hubley Mfg. Co., 206 Pa. Super. 422, 213 A.2d
171 (1965). But see American Can Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 204 Cal. App. 2d
276, 22 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1962) (no showing of reliance on company physician); Case
v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 236 S.C. 285, 113 S.E.2d 794 (1960); Netherland v. Mead
Corp., 170 Tenn. 520, 98 S.W.2d 76 (1936) (no estoppel without fraudulent or negligent
misdiagnosis); McKee v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 550, 206 P.2d 715 (1949).
126. 3 LARSON § 78.42(e), at 76-79; W. SCHNEIDER, WORXMEN'S COMPENSATION
TExT § 2358, at 11 (3d ed. 1959).
127. The issue has been raised in two reported cases. In Ancor v. Belden Concrete
Prods., Inc., 260 La. 372, 256 So. 2d 122 (1971), the Louisiana court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the harsh accident result, rejecting an argument based on a Louisiana con-
stitutional provision that provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person for injury done him in his rights,
lands, goods, person or reputation shall have adequate remedy by due process
of law .....
LA. CoNST. art. 1, § 6. In Dintaman v. Board of Comm'rs, 17 Md. App. 345, 303 A.2d
442 (1973), the court held that the employee's federal constitutional objections to the
harsh accident result had been raised too late in the proceedings to be considered.
128. Both state and federal constitutional objections might be raised. Detailed analy-
sis of all the relevant state constitutional provisions is beyond the scope of this Article.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
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road v. White,129 in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of
New York's Workmen's Compensation Act when applied to require the
employer to pay benefits without proof of the employer's fault. Dicta
in that case suggested that a statutory change in common law liability
rules might violate due process if a substantive right is taken from one
class of persons without providing a "reasonably just substitute."'130
That dicta carries little weight now, however. The Court decided the
White case in the heyday of substantive due process, using as its due
process standard whether the statute was arbitrary and unreasonable
from the standpoint of natural justice. That standard is no longer ap-
plied. Rather, the Court now -asks whether the statute is rationally re-
lated to a constitutionally permissible objective, based on facts that the
legislature could have assumed were true.''
The "accident" limitations provision, applied to bar a right to com-
pensation before the right accrues, passes the current due process test.
A reasonable legislature could determine that the "accident" provision
was necessary to assure the employer of freedom from liability after
the passage of a definite period of time and to protect the employer
from false and fraudulent claims impossible to refute after the passage
of the limitations period. That these are legitimate state goals is as-
sured by the long history and unquestioned constitutionality' 32 of stat-
utes of limitations for common law negligence actions. The same ar-
gument supports the rationality-and hence the constitutionality under
the "old" equal protection analysis' 33-- of the legislative distinction be-
tween employees whose injuries become compensable within the limi-
tations period and employees whose injuries do not.
129. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
130. Id. at 201.
131. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
132. Of course, an argument can be made that the discovery-rule interpretation of
the general statute of limitations is constitutionally required. This argument was firmly
rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Clark v. Gulesian,
429 F.2d 405 (1st Cir. 1970), in which the court applied Maine's statute of limitations
to preclude recovery by the plaintiff in a medical-malpractice-foreign-object case. The
court reasoned that the statute of limitations effectuates a policy decision balancing
rights of both plaintiffs and defendants, saying:
The] state may reasonably recognize that a defendant has an interest in re-
pose, and in the avoidance of stale claims, however free from fault the claim-
ant's delay may be. Such a conclusion does not deprive the plaintiff of any
constitutional right to fair and equal treatment.
Id. at 406. Cf. Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970).
133. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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Similar constitutional attacks have been made on the recently en-
acted statutes that start the limitations periods for tort actions against
architects or builders from the time the building is completed or occu-
pied rather than the time injury results from the defective construction
or design. Under some circumstances, these statutes bar recovery be-
fore the right to recover damages ever exists. Most state courts that
have faced the question have upheld the constitutionality of these stat-
utes'34 against state and federal constitutional attacks. A decision of
the Arkansas Supreme Court upholding one of these statutes' 8" was ap-
pealed as a matter of right to the United States Supreme Court, which
dismissed the appeal for lack of a substantial federal question.18  Only
the fllinois and Kentucky courts have held statutes like this unconstitu-
tional, and they have done so on grounds that are not widely applica-
ble-Iinois on state equal protection grounds (because of the exclu-
sion of everyone who might be held liable for defects in a building ex-
cept architects and contractors from the scope of the statutory protec-
tion)137 and Kentucky'3 8 because of a peculiar state constitutional pro-
vision that precludes the legislature from changing common law liability
rules.'8 9
An employee attacking the constitutionality of an "accident" limita-
tions provision could try to avoid the result in the architects-limitations
cases by arguing that the right to workmen's compensation payments
is a fundamental right or a fundamental interest. Therefore, any
classification determining who receives workmen's compensation pay-
ments must be subjected -to close scrutiny under the "new" equal pro-
tection test,140 and the legislative judgment behind the "accident" pro-
134. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed,
401 U.S. 901 (1971); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662
(1972); Joseph v. Bums, 260 Ore. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971).
135. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed,
401 U.S. 901 (1971).
136. 401 U.S. 901 (1971).
137. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
138. Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
139. The Kentucky court had previously held that these constitutional provisions did
not apply to the voluntary workmen's compensation scheme in the state. Green v. Cald-
well, 170 Ky. 571, 186 S.W. 648 (1916). This suggests that the Kentucky "accident"
provision within the voluntary workmen's compensation act is immune from attack under
these constitutional provisions.
140. For an explanation of the differences between the "new" and the "old" equal
protection, see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Gunther, The Supreme
[Vol. 1974:541
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vision must be scrutinized closely under the refurbished substantive due
process analysis epitomized by Roe v. Wade141 and Doe v. Bolton.142
The employee could argue that the right to workmen's compensation
payments is "fundamental" by analogizing those payments to the wages
in the procedural due process case of Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.14 13 on the one hand, and to welfare payments in the equal pro-
tection case of Shapiro v. Thompson'44 on the other.
The prospects for acceptance of this "new" equal protection argu-
ment are not good. The Court has been reluctant to expand its cate-
gory of fundamental rights to include interests other than the right to
vote and the right to travel interstate,'45 and the employee cannot
buttress his equal protection argument by pointing to a "suspect" classi-
fication in addition to the infringement of an allegedly fundamental
right. If the Court would apply the new equal protection analysis,
however, it is unlikely that the "accident" provision could withstand the
close scrutiny of that test. Since other states with less onerous limita-
tions provisions appear to have functioning, healthy workmen's com-
pensation systems, there are obviously viable alternatives that burden
the fundamental interest less.' 46
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. R v. 1 (1972).
141. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
142. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
143. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment wage garnishment). For the subsequent
application of the Sniadach principle to prejudgment repossessions under conditional
sales contracts, see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974). See generally Note, Provisioral Remedies and Due Process in
Default-Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 653.
144. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (statutes limiting state welfare benefits to residents who
have lived in state for one year violate equal protection clause of fourteenth amend-
ment). Cases decided after Shapiro indicate that a statutory classification will not be
subject to the strict scrutiny of the "new" equal protection test simply because it tends
to withhold from one class benefits that might be termed "necessities of life." Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Strict scrutiny under the Shapiro principle
seems to be restricted to durational residence classifications that penalize the exercise
of the right to move from one state to another by withholding important benefits from
new residents. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (dura-
tional residence restriction on nonemergency medical care for indigents). In Sosna v.
Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975), however, the Court seemed to retreat from the strict scru-
tiny test to a simple balancing test in reviewing a state's durational residence restriction
on the availability of a significant state benefit--dissolution of marriage.
145. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(education not a fundamental interest); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (hous-
ing not a fundamental interest). See also note 144 supra.
146. The determination of whether the state's interest behind the "accident" provision
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IV. "INJURY" JURISDICTIONS
Of the twenty-one states and the District of Columbia 14 7 that do not
have "accident" workmen's compensation claim limitations provisions,
twenty states and the District of Columbia date their limitations periods
from the date of the "injury. '148  The remaining state, New Mexico,
dates its limitations period from the failure or refusal of the employer
or insurer to pay compensation. 4 The New Mexico court has con-
was "compelling" would presumably take into account the considerations discussed in the
conclusion of this Article, text accompanying notes 348-60 infra.
147. The District of Columbia has adopted as its general workmen's compensation
statute the federal Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. D.C. CoDn
ANN. § 36-501 (1973). The Longshoremen's Act limitations provision is 33 U.S.C. §
913(a) (Supp. m, 1973).
148. ALASKA, STAT. § 23.30.105 (1972) (claim must be filed within two years after
"employee has knowledge of the nature of disability and its relation to his employment
and after disablement" and within four years after date of injury); Am. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23-1061A (Supp. 1974) (claim must be filed "within one year after the injury
occurred or the right thereto accrued"); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1318(a) (1) (Supp. 1973)
(claim must be filed within two years "from the date of the injury"); CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 81-13-5(2) (1963) (notice claiming compensation must be filed within one year
"after the injury"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-501 (1973) (adopting U.S. Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Act provisions, 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (Supp. I, 1973)) (claim
must be filed within "one year after the injury"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.19(1) (a)
(1966) (claim must be filed "within two years after the time of injury"); IowA CODE
ANN. § 85.26 (Supp. 1974) (proceedings must be commenced "within two years from
the date of the injury"); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 152, § 41 (Supp. 1974) (claim must
be made within one year after injury); MIcn. STAT. ANN. § 17.237(381) (Supp. 1974)
(claim must be made "within 6 months after the occurrence" of injury); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 71-3-35 (1972) (application for benefits must be filed "within two years from
the date of the injury or death"); Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.430 (Supp. 1974) (claim must
be filed "within one year after the injury or death"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01
(Supp. 1973) (claim must be filed "within sixty days after injury or death"); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 4123.84 (Page 1973) (written notice must be made to industrial commis-
sion or bureau of workmen's compensation "within two years after the injury or death");
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 43 (1961) (claim filed "within one (1) year after the injury
or death"); Act No. 263, § 13, [1974] Pa. Sess. Laws Serv. 745 (petition must be filed
or agreement made "within three years after the injury"); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-
35-57 (1968) (agreement or petition must be filed "within two years after the occur-
rence or manifestation of the injury or incapacity"); S.D. COMPILED LAvs ANN. § 62-
7-35 (Supp. 1974) (claim must be filed "within two years after the injury"); TEx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967) (claim must be made "within six (6) months
after the occurrence of the injury"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 656 (1967) (claim must
be made "within six months after the date of the injury"); Rules and Regulations of
the West Virginia Workmen's Fund § 10, at 20 (1973) (claim must be made "within
two years after the injury"), adopted pursuant to W. VA. CODE § 23-1-13 (1973); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 27-105 (1967) (application or claim for award must be filed "within one
year after the day on which the injury occurred").
149. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-13.6 (Supp. 1973) (limitations period of one year).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
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strued the provision to start the limitations period from the time the
injury becomes compensable. 150 New Mexico will therefore be in-
cluded in the following discussion of states with a "compensable injury"
interpretation of the "injury" language. Ten of the twenty-two juris.
dictions have statutory exceptions or excuses for late claims: for
"reasonable cause," undiscovered or latent injuries, or other reasons.
Three of those ten have an overall cutoff to the exception, dated from
the time of the injury;151 six of the ten have no overall cutoff to the
exception' 2 (at least not in the workmen's compensation statute); and
one state, Alaska, has a puzzling limitations section that seems to have
an express cutoff provision and an express open-ended provision153
governing the applicability of a liberal exception to the limitations bar.
Courts in the twenty-one "injury" jurisdictions have interpreted the
"date of the injury" language in four different ways: (1) the date of
150. Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873 (1944).
151. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-5(2) (1963) (one-year limitation does not ap-
ply if "reasonable excuse" for late claim established, employer rights have not been prej-
udiced by delay, and notice claiming compensation filed within two years after the in-
jury); MicI. STAT. ANN. § 17.237(381) (Supp. 1974) (if "actual injury, disability, or
incapacity does not develop or make itself apparent within 6 months after the happening
of injury," limitation period is three months after it does develop or make itself apparent,
with overall cutoff of three years "from the date the personal injury was sustained");
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01 (Supp. 1973) ("[fIor any reasonable cause shown," work-
men's compensation bureau may allow claims to be filed "at any time within one year
after the injury or death").
152. The District of Columbia adopted the U.S. Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Act, 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (Supp. III, 1973) ("[tlhe time for filing a claim shall not
begin to run until the employee or beneficiary is aware, or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have been aware, of the relationship between the injury or death and
the employment"); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 49 (1965) (late claim excused "if it
is found that it was occasioned by mistake or other reasonable cause, or if it is found
that the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay"); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-35-57
(1968) ("[t]he time for filing claims shall not begin to run in cases of latent or undis-
covered physical or mental impairment due to injury including disease until (1) the per-
son claiming benefits knew, or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have known,
of the existence of such impairment and its causal relationship to his employment or
(2) after disablement, whichever is later"); TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a
(1967) ("[flor good cause the Board may, in meritorious cases, waive the strict com-
pliance with the foregoing limitations as to . . . filing of the claim before the Board");
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 660 (1967) ("[wlant of or delay . . . in making such claim,
shall not be a bar to proceedings . . . if it is shown that the employer, his agent or
representative, had knowledge of the accident or that the employer has not been preju-
diced by such delay"), read as subject to a six-year general statute of limitations for
contracts in Fitch v. Parks & Woolson Mach. Co., 109 Vt. 92, 191 A. 920 (1937); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 27-105 (1967) ("[flor injuries not readily apparent," application must
be filed "within one (1) year after discovery of the injury by the workman").
153. ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.105(a) (1972).
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the initial injury accompanying the accident (the "accident inter-
pretation"); (2) the date the accident culminates in serious physical
consequences (the "latent-physical-injury interpretation"); (3) the
date the injury becomes compensable under the workmen's compensa-
tion statute (the "compensable-injury interpretation"); or (4) the date
the employee learns or should have learned all the facts establishing
the compensability of his injury (the "discovery-rule interpreta-
tion"). 154 Each of these interpretations is discussed below.
A. Accident Interpretation
At the time the courts of Massachusetts, Texas, and North Dakota
first interpreted the date of injury in the limitations provisions, the acts
of those states included one or more excuses for late claims. In all these
states, the courts construed the term "injury" to mean the initial injury
received at the time of the accident.15 The statutory excuses for late
claims may have lessened the pressure on these courts to interpret the
date of "injury" more liberally. Also, the existence of a more specific
statutory excuse may have suggested to the courts that the choice of the
word "injury" was not intended to rescue late claimants.' 0  In five
states without statutory excuses for late claims, however, courts also
154. For a discussion of the relationship between the compensable-injury interpreta-
tion and the discovery-rule interpretation, see text accompanying notes 230-47 infra.
155. Massachusetts: Carroll's Case, 225 Mass. 203, 114 N.E. 285 (1915); cf. Crow-
ley's Case, 287 Mass. 367, 191 N.E. 668 (1934) (but cf. Brown's Case, 228 Mass. 31,
116 N.E. 897 (1917)); North Dakota: Biorseth v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp.
Bureau, 62 N.D. 623, 244 N.W. 515 (1932); Texas: Jones v. Texas Employers Ins.
Ass'n, 128 Tex. 437, 99 S.W.2d 903 (1937).
156. See Bjorseth v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 62 N.D. 623, 244
N.W. 515 (1932), construing ch. 162, [1919] N.D. Laws 270 (now N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 65.05-01 (Supp. 1973)). The statute provided that claim had to be filed within sixty
days after the injury, but allowed the Workmen's Compensation Bureau to waive the lim-
itation "for any reasonable cause shown" and allow claims to be filed at any time within
one year after the injury. The court reasoned:
We should be strongly inclined. . . [to interpret the date of injury as the date
of subsequent serious manifestation of injury] if it were possible to spell out
such a legislative intention. The statute itself presupposes that the serious con-
sequences of any injury may not become so manifest within sixty days there-
after as to cause the claimant to file a claim. This would undoubtedly be a
"reasonable cause" for presenting the same at a later time. In the very provi-
sion authorizing the making of delayed claims, where a reasonable cause exists
for the delay, the authority of the bureau to receive them is limited to one
year from the injury or death.
62 N.D. at 629, 244 N.W. at 517. Compare the rejection of a similar argument, based
on the explicit excuse in the Colorado statute for "reasonable excuse," in City of Boulder
v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 426 P.2d 194 (1967).
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construed the date of injury to mean the date of the initial injury ac-
companying the accident, 15 7 and the United States Supreme Court in
two cases seemingly adopted this interpretation of the similar "injury"
limitations provision in the United States Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.15 The reasoning supporting these cases
can be summarized as follows. 159 In ordinary language 60 and in tradi-
157. Iowa: Otis v. Parrott, 233 Iowa 1039, 8 N.W.2d 708 (1943) (but see Mousel
v. Bituminous Material & Supply Co., - Iowa -, 169 N.W.2d 763 (1969) (dictum));
Michigan: Cook v. Holland Furnace Co., 200 Mich. 192, 166 N.W. 1013 (1918) (lead-
ing case); Ohio: Larimore v. Perfect, 45 Ohio App. 136, 186 N.E. 739 (1932); Okla-
homa: Tulsa Hotel Co. v. Sparks, 200 Okla. 636, 198 P.2d 652 (1948), overruling
Brown & Root v. Dunkelberger, 196 Okla. 116, 162 P.2d 1018 (1945); Oregon: Lough
v. State Indus. Acc. Comm'n, 104 Ore. 313, 207 P. 354 (1922) (statute changed to
"accident" language in 1935, ch. 139, [1935] Ore. Laws 215).
158. Pillsbury v. United Eng'r Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1952); Kobilkin v. Pillsbury, 103
F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1939), affd mem. by an equally divided Court, 309 U.S. 619 (1940).
Opponents of the harsh "accident" interpretation have argued that neither case really
adopts the "accident" interpretation. Kobilkin arguably held only that the limitations
period runs from the time the injury becomes compensable under any standard of com-
pensability. United Engineering is arguably unrelated to latent-compensable-injury
problems, since the Court specifically emphasized that the facts did not raise the latent-
injury problem. See Stancil v. Massey, 436 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 3 LARSON
1 78.51.
These interpretations of the two cases are plausible because an "accident" interpreta-
tion of the "injury" language is not essential for the result in either case. Relief could
have been denied in Kobilkin even under a compensable-injury interpretation, given a
nonseparability interpretation of the scope of the limitations bar, since the claimant suf-
fered an immediate, compensable, temporary disability at the time of the accident, see
text accompanying notes 182-215 infra. Similarly, in United Engineering the claim-
ants could have been barred even under a compensable-injury interpretation, since each
claimant suffered a compensable loss of earning power at the time of the accident (the
trial court in United Engineering barred the claimants precisely on this ground, United
Eng'r Co. v. Pillsbury, 92 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Cal. 1950)). In both cases, however,
the court stated that it rejected the interpretation of the "injury" language that would
equate "injury" with "disability." Pillsbury v. United Eng'r Co., 342 U.S. 197, 198-200
(1952); Kobilkin v. Pillsbury, 103 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1939), affd mem. by an
equally divided Court, 309 U.S. 619 (1940). When either of two interpretations of a
statutory provision would bar recovery in a particular case, it is difficult to dismiss the
court's express rejection of one of those interpretations as mere dicta.
The "accident" interpretation of Kobilkin and United Engineering may not have been
entirely mooted by the 1972 amendment to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Act adding a discovery rule to the claim limitations provision, since the provision talks
only of the discovery of the causal relationship between the injury and the employment,
not the discovery of the existence or seriousness of a compensable injury. 33 U.S.C.
1 913(a) (Supp. I1, 1973).
159. Two of the six courts gave other reasons than those summarized here. In Otis
v. Parrott, 233 Iowa 1039, 8 N.W.2d 708 (1943), the court relied on peculiarities in
the wording of Iowa's limitations provision. In Lough v. State Indus. Acc. Comm'n,
104 Ore. 313, 207 P. 354 (1922), the Oregon court evidently felt obliged to make true
577
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tional negligence personal injury cases, it is settled that an accident pro-
duces an injury, albeit minor or trivial, at the time of the accident, even
though the serious results of the accidental injury do not appear until
some later time.'61 There is no reason to assume the legislature used
the term "injury" in any but the ordinary and legally accepted mean-
ing.162  Any other interpretation of the date of "injury" in accidental
injury cases would be inconsistent with the personal certainty purpose
of a limitations provision, for it would necessarily substitute an indef-
inite and uncertain time for the definite and easily ascertainable time
of the accident. 63
B. Latent-Physical-Injury Interpretation
The Nebraska court, in 1916, was the first to reject the "time of acci-
dent" interpretation of the "injury" limitations provision. In Johansen
v. Union Stockyards Co.,'64 the court relied on the separate definitions
of the terms "injury" and "accident" in the statute to support its con-
clusion that the date of the "injury" (defined as violence to the physical
structure of the body) was not necessarily the same as the date of the
"accident" that caused the injury. The court reasoned:
by decision what it had assumed to be true in a prior case rejecting workmen's compensa-
tion coverage for occupational diseases. In the preceding case, Iwanicki v. State Indus.
Acc. Comm'n, 104 Ore. 650, 205 P. 990 (1922), the court had used the Steel argument,
note 41 supra and accompanying text, against coverage of occupational diseases: "The
requirements of our Code that the claim shall be filed within a certain time after the
date of the accident . . . enforce this conclusion, that the injury must be referable to
a certain point of time." 104 Ore. at 665, 205 P. at 995. The only flaw in this argu-
ment was that the coverage provision in the Oregon statute had deleted the "by accident"
qualification and the claim limitation provision ran from the date of the injury, not the
date of the accident. The court in Lough plugged this gaping hole in the Iwanicki rea-
soning by stating that since the language of the act precluded compensation for occupa-
tional diseases (citing Iwanicki), the words "date upon which the injury occurred"
plainly refer to a specific point in time, and thus refer to the date of the accident and
the immediately consequent injury. This seems to be a variation of the old shell game.
160. See Kobilkin v. Pillsbury, 103 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1939), aff'd mein. by
an equally divided Court, 309 U.S. 619 (1940).
161. See Cooke v. Holland Furnace Co., 200 Mich. 192, 202, 166 N.W. 1013, 1016
(1918).
162. See id. at 203, 166 N.W. at 1017; Larimore v. Perfect, 45 Ohio App. 136, 141,
186 N.E. 739, 741 (1932); Tulsa Hotel Co. v. Sparks, 200 Okla. 636, 640, 198 P.2d
652, 656 (1948).
163. See Dane v. Michigan United Traction Co., 200 Mich. 612, 614, 166 N.W.
1017, 1017 (1918); cf. Bjorseth v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 62 N.D.
623, 629, 244 N.W. 515, 517 (1932).
164. 99 Neb. 328, 156 N.W. 511 (1916).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
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[Between the time of the accident and the time the employee first saw
a doctor,] the injury resulting from the accident gradually became de- "
veloped, and it cannot be said that the injury resulted from the accident,
within the meaning of the statute, before the time it was discovered it
might become permanent, which was some time after the 25th of De-
cember. 165
Although the exact interpretation the court gave to the phrase "occur-
rence of the injury" in the limitations provision is not clear, the court's
reliance on the distinction between "accident" and "injury" suggests
that it interpreted the date of the occurrence of the injury as the date
of physical impairment. This latent-physical-injury interpretation was
later abandoned sub silentio by the Nebraska court,'6 and no other
state court has ever adopted this interpretation expressly, although the
Tennessee 16 7 and New Mexico' 68 courts have at times applied their
states' limitations provisions as if they had adopted it.
The unpopularity of the latent-physical-injury interpretation may de-
rive from its defects, which were pointed out in 1918 by the Michigan
court in Cooke v. Holland Furnace Co. 6 9 The Michigan court argued
that "injury" as an element in the traditional negligence cause of action
has a well-defined meaning, and the initial, apparently trivial physical
effect of an accident is an "injury" under that meaning. Since there
is no evidence that the legislature intended a different meaning for the
term "injury," there is no statutory or historical warrant for interpreting
"injury" as the Nebraska court did in Johansen. In addition, there is
no basis in the normal usage of the term "injury" for choosing any time
after the apparently trivial initial injury as the date of the "injury."
C. Compensable-Injury Interpretation
1. In General
Perhaps influenced by the criticisms of the Nebraska analysis, other
165. Id. at 330, 156 N.W. at 512.
166. See Selders v. Cornhuskers Oil Co., 111 Neb. 300, 196 N.W. 316 (1923); Astuto
v. V. Ray Gould Co., 123 Neb. 138, 242 N.W. 375 (1932); Park v. School Dist. No.
27, 127 Neb. 767, 257 N.W. 219 (1934). See also note 235 infra.
167. Compare Griffitts v. Humphrey, 199 Tenn. 528, 536-38, 288 S.W.2d 1, 4-5
(1955) (response to petition to rehear), with Bradford v. Dixie Mercerizing Co., 199
Tenn. 170, 285 S.W.2d 136 (1955).
168. See Gonzales v. Coe, 59 N.M. 1, 277 P.2d 548 (1955) (focus on latency of the
injury rather than latency of compensability).
169. 200 Mich. 192, 166 N.W. 1013 (1918).
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courts that rejected the "accident" interpretation-Indiana in 1919,170
Connecticut in 1921,'1 Louisiana in 1922,172 Maine in 1924,173
and Washington in 1926174--concluded that the date of the injury was
the date the employee's condition became compensable under the
workmen's compensation statute. 1'7 The reasoning supporting this in-
terpretation probably was expressed best by the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors in Esposito v. Marlin-Rockwell Corp.,'70 in which the
court held that the date of the "injury" in the limitations provision
meant the date of the compensable injury. The court argued:
A compensable injury is an injury for which compensation is payable,
and the date of such an injury is not the time of the accident or occur-
rence causing injury, but the time under § 5348 [the basic compensa-
tion provision] when the right to compensation accrues. 177
Therefore, when § 5360 [the basic limitations provision] provides that
a written notice of a claim for compensation must be made within one
year from the date of the injury, the claim spoken of must be a compen-
sable claim under § 5348, as there is no other kind of a claim for com-
pensation referred to in the Compensation Act.178
The court further argued that construing the limitations period to start
from the date of the accident, thus precluding some claims before they
accrued, would be "an unreasonable construction and entirely out of
harmony with the beneficent purpose of the Act."'17
Connecticut's interpretation solves the analytical problems of the
Nebraska latent-physical-injury interpretation. First, by emphasiz-
ing the meaning of "injury" as one of the elements of a prima facie
case under the workmen's compensatiori act, the Conneoticut court
170. Hombrook-Price v. Stewart, 66 Ind. App. 400, 118 N.E. 315 (1918) (alternative
holding) (interpretation of "injury" language in notice provision). In In re McCaskey,
65 Ind. App. 349, 117 N.E. 268 (1917), an earlier Indiana case, the court liberally inter-
preted a thirty-day-after-injury limitation on provision of medical services, using an argu-
ment that can be interpreted either as a Johansen rule, relying on the simple distinction
between accident and injury, or as a "compensable injury" interpretation.
171. Esposito v. Marlin-Rockwell Corp., 96 Conn. 414, 114 A. 92 (1921).
172. Guderian v. Sterling Sugar & Ry., 151 La. 59, 91 So. 546 (1922).
173. Hustus' Case, 123 Me. 428, 123 A. 514 (1924).
174. Stolp v. Department of Labor & Indus., 138 Wash. 685, 245 P. 20 (1926).
175. In each of these states, the legislature subsequently changed to a harsher limita-
tions provision. See note 62 supra.
176. 96 Conn. 414, 114 A. 92 (1921).
177. Id. at 418-19, 114 A. at 94.
178. Id. at 419, 114 A. at 94.
179. Id.
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demonstrated that there is reason to assume that the legislature, in
adopting the workmen's compensation limitations provision, was using
The term "injury" in a different sense than its traditional meaning as
part of a prima facie negligence case, 'because the prima facie case for
recovery in workmen's compensation is different. Secondly, the court's
emphasis on the "word of art" interpretation of the word "injury" in
the context of the workmen's compensation act solves the plain-mean-
ing criticism of Nebraska's latent-physical-injury interpretation. The
absence of any ordinary language meaning of "injury" to support the
Connecticut result does not negate the Connecticut interpretation, for
"injury," in the context of the workmen's compensation act, can bear
the meaning assigned to it.
The Connecticut court's focus on the difference between the prima
facie case in negligence and the prima facie case in workmen's com-
pensation raises a fundamental problem with limitations provisions in
workmen's compensation statutes. With certain exceptions not related
to the nature of the injury, 180 any injury, however trivial, caused by
the negligence of the defendant is prima facie compensable under neg-
ligence liability theory; but not every injury caused by an accident at
work is compensable under the workmen's compensation acts. Be-
cause of that difference, no single workmen's compensation limitations
provision can strike exactly the same balance between employers' and
employees' interests that the traditional statute of limitations strikes be-
tween the interests of prospective defendants and prospective plaintiffs,
viewing the interests of prospective plaintiffs solely in terms of the right
to recover and not in terms of the amount of the recovery.' 8' If the
limitations period starts when the injury becomes compensable, the em-
ployee is treated in the same way under the workmen's compensation
limitations provision as under the traditional negligence statute of limi-
tations ("when the cause of action accrues"), but the employer's posi-
180. E.g., scope of duty limitations, contributory negligence, sovereign immunity, and
guest statutes.
181. As a practical matter, claimants with apparently trivial initial injuries and claim-
ants with serious latent injuries that become apparent after the statutory period may be
in substantially the same position whether claiming in negligence or in workmen's com-
pensation. If the claimant sues in negligence for the initial trivial injury, his recovery
would be minimal. As a practical matter, he probably would not sue at all. In large
cities, the delay between filing suit and trial in negligence actions may mean that by
the time of trial the latent injury will have become manifest, but, absent this circum-
stance, the plight of claimants with latent serious injuries may be substantially the same
under both a negligence theory and workmen's compensation.
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tion in terms of certainty is drastically changed since the date of the
accidental injury is no longer necessarily the date when the limitations
period starts. If the limitations period starts when the accident oc-
curred, the employer is in the same position as under the negligence
statute of limitations, but the employee may be precluded from recov-
ery by limitations before he ever had the right to compensation, some-
thing that could never have happened under the negligence statute of
limitations.
The announced interpretation in all "injury" jurisdictions that reject
the "accident" interpretation is now either the compensable-injury in-
terpretation or the discovery-rule interpretation. These two interpreta-
tions share a common characteristic: both require the court to look to
the statutory rules for determining the compensability of an injury in
deciding when the limitations period starts to run. This close relation-
ship between the rules for determining compensability and the limita-
tions provision raises several problems common to both interpretations,
problems which will be discussed below.
2. Problems in Application of the Compensable-Injury
Interpretation
a. Scope of the Limitations Bar
A single accidental injury may give rise to several different claims
for compensation under a workmen's compensation act. The employ-
ee may be entitled to compensation for (1) total temporary disability
for the periods he was away from work, (2) medical expenses in-
curred, and (3) a resulting permanent condition of partial disability,
total disability, or "specific" or "scheduled" injury resulting from the
accident.' 82  The rights to these kinds of compensation may not all
arise at the same time and, with one exception,""3 the different rights
182. See generally 2 LARSON §§ 57.10, 58.10, 61.10. Recovery for any kind of dis-
ability usually requires a showing of lost wages or impaired wage-earning capacity. See
id. § 57.10. In addition to disability payments, specified sums often are payable with-
out regard to the impact on earnings for certain "specific" or "scheduled" injuries (e.g.,
loss of a specified member, a percentage-loss of use of a specified member). See id.
§ 58.10. In addition, compensation in the form of payment of medical expenses or di-
kect provision of medical services usually is required by the act. See id. § 61.10.
183. In many states, if the employee's injury is compensable as a "specific" or "sched-
uled" injury, he may recover only medical expenses and the compensation authorized for
the specified injury. He cannot receive compensation for permanent partial or per-
manent total disability resulting from the scheduled injury in addition to or in substitu-
tion for the scheduled compensation. See generally id. § 5&20.
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are not mutually exclusive. The multiple rights issue causes no dif-
ficulty in the interpretation of the scope of "accident" limitations provi-
sions, for under these provisions all claims for compensation arising
from the accident, regardless of when they accrue, are barred if not
brought within the specified time after the accident. Under the com-
pensable-injury and discovery-rule 84 interpretations, however, the fol-
lowing problem arises: If the limitations period starts only when the
injury becomes compensable or when compensability is reasonably dis-
coverable, does the limitations bar apply separately to different claims
arising at different times (the "separability rule"), or does the limita-
tions bar apply to preclude all claims arising at subsequent times if any
claim would be precluded (the "nonseparability rule")?
Most states that now have compensable-injury or discovery-rule in-
terpretations have not clearly decided this question.'8 5 Missouri courts
have faced the scope of the limitations issue, however, and the
Missouri development is instructive. The first Missouri case, Wheeler
v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,"6 involved successive accrual of an
initial claim for temporary total disability and a subsequent claim
for a "scheduled" permanent injury (loss of sight of one eye).
The Missouri Supreme Court gave the "injury" language a compen-
sable-injury interpretation,'8 1 but went on to hold that the limitations
period began running from the time the injury first became compen-
sable under any standard for compensation. The court rejected the
argument that the limitations period ran from the time long after the
accident that the employee lost the sight of his eye, pointing out that
shortly after the accident he became entitled to payments for medical
aid and for temporary total disability. The court argued that its de-
cision was consistent with the goal of the limitations provision to protect
184. See notes 223-47 infra and accompanying text (discussion of discovery-rule
variation). The basic issue under both interpretations is the same. In the compensable-
injury interpretation, the problem is whether the occurrence of one compensable condi-
tion starts the limitations period running for all claims for compensation for conditions
deriving from the same accident; in the discovery-rule variation, the problem is whether
the discovery or reasonable discoverability of one compensable condition starts the limi-
tations period running for all claims for compensation for conditions arising from the
same accident. The problem will be analyzed solely in terms of the compensable-injury
interpretation because the special considerations underlying the discovery rule do not af-
fect the analysis.
185. See text accompanying notes 199-215 infra.
186. 328 Mo. 888,42 S.W.2d 579 (1931).
187. The court's opinion also could be construed as adopting a discovery-rule inter-
pretation, see note 249 infra.
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the employer against stale claims, "stale, not only as to the matter as
to whether the accident has culminated in a particular disability, but
stale as to other matters, including one as to whether the accident was
a compensable one."'18 8 The court also argued that its interpretation
was supported by the legislative purpose behind the provision author-
izing the Workmen's Compensation Commission to reopen and change
an award because of a change in the employee's condition: 189
[The reopening provision] plainly shows that it was [the legislature's]
intention to provide that the claim should be filed within six months
after the receipt of a compensable injury by the 'employee, and, should
it transpire thereafter that the injury received has developed into a more
serious injury compensable in a different manner, the commission should
change the award, if any, previously made.'90
The Wheeler court's reasoning is not persuasive. The basic limita-
tions provision in the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act at the
time of the Wheeler case read:
No proceedings for compensation under this act shall be maintained un-
less a claim therefor be filed with the commission within six months
after the injury or death .... 101
Once the Missouri court adopted the compensable-injury interpretation
of the "injury" language, the term "injury" as construed referred to a
compensable condition, not to the underlying deleterious physical pro-
cess initiated by the original accident. Therefore, each separate com-
pensable condition resulting from the underlying physical process
would seem to be a separate "injury," with a separate limitations period
running from the date that compensable condition first appeared. The
contrary Wheeler interpretation is arguably unsupportable as a matter
of statutory construction, for it assigns two different meanings to the
single word "injury" as used in the limitations provision. In adopting
the compensable-injury interpretation, the court says that "injury" re-
fers to a particular compensable condition, but in interpreting the scope
of the limitations bar, the court implies that "injury" refers to the un-
derlying physical process initiated by the accident.
The separability interpretation of the limitations language, on the
188. 328 Mo. at 894, 42 S.W.2d at 581.
189. Act of Apr. 30, 1925, § 42, [1925] Mo. Laws 396 (now Mo. Rnv. STAT.
§ 287.470 (1969)).
190. 328 Mo. at 895, 42 S.W.2d at 582.
191. Act of Apr. 30, 1925, § 39, [1925 Mo. Laws 396 (now Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 287.430 (1969) (period now one year)).
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other hand, is consistent with the policy considerations supporting the
original compensable-injury interpretation: the beneficent purpose of
workmen's compensation acts in general and the inequity of preclud-
ing one from recovery before he ever had the right to compensation.19
The differences between the ordinary case under the compensable-in-
jury interpretation and the Wheeler case are insignificant. The em-
ployee's failure to claim compensation for a minor previous compen-
sable condition would not seem to increase the likelihood that his pres-
ent claim is false or fraudulent. The employer's ability to investigate
and gather evidence is hampered equally in both cases. The time be-
tween accident at work and compensation hearing may be just as long
in an ordinary compensable-injury case as in a case involving the sep-
arability problem. The only significant difference between the cases
is that in Wheeler the employee failed to file claim for his prior, minor
disability. Barring compensation for the employee's subsequent serious
192. The argument here, which differs slightly from that in the main compensable-
injury interpretation, is that it does not make sense to preclude the employee from recov-
ery of compensation for subsequent serious disability simply because he failed to claim
compensation for prior minor disability.
The response to the arguments against the Wheeler result might go as follows, First,
there is nothing inconsistent in the Wheeler court's interpretation, since the compen-
sable-injury interpretation never equated the "injury" with a particular disability or spe-
cific compensable condition, but referred instead to the underlying physical process (the
injury) initiated by the accident, at the time that process resulted in a compensable con-
dition, or became compensable. The compensable-injury interpretation was never meant
to give an unusual meaning to the term "injury," but was intended only to give content
to the notion of the "time of the injury."
Secondly, the arguments in favor of a compensable-injury interpretation do not apply
with the same force to support the employee's position in the Wheeler case. One argu-
ment supporting the compensable-injury interpretation is that the legislature could not
have intended to authorize compensation and then bar the right to compensation before
the right ever existed. The argument does not apply in the Wheeler situation because,
as pointed out by the court, if the employee files claim within six months after the injury
becomes compensable, he can thereafter without limitation reopen the original case to
claim additional compensation for a change in condition. Act of Apr. 30, 1925, § 42,
[1925] Mo. Laws 396 (now Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.470 (1969)). Wheeler, therefore,
does not preclude innocent, diligent employees before they could have made claim for
compensation. The interpretation only precludes employees who slept on their rights.
The employee might respond that the situations are substantially the same, since it
makes little sense to preclude him from claiming compensation for an accident's serious
results that did not occur immediately simply because he did not claim compensation
for the apparently minor immediate compensable results of the accident. The employ-
ee's argument here may be persuasive, but it is demonstrably different from the simple
argument in favor of a compensable-injury interpretation. It is the difference between
precluding someone before he had a right to recover and precluding someone for failing
to make timely claim for a prior, less serious compensable condition.
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disability solely on this ground seems a harsh penalty for a trifling of-
fense. It seems unreasonable to preclude an employee from compensa-
tion for serious disability just to encourage other employees to file claim
for every technically compensable disability they incur.1 93 To support
the Wheeler result on such a ground turns the paternalism of the work-
men's compensation scheme into oppression-oppression not required
by the language of the Act, which can bear the separability meaning.
The Wheeler court's reference to the reopening provision in the Mis-
souri statute is perhaps its most persuasive argument. Missouri's re-
opening provision, however, does not contain any limitation on the time
within which a case can be reopened for change in conditions, 194 so
it would appear the legislature did not intend to limit the time in which
the reopening relief would be available. Therefore, it is difficult to
argue that the existence of the reopening provision indicates an intent
to preclude application of the complementary compensable-injury rule
in the Wheeler situation, since the ultimate purpose of the reopening
provision and the purpose of a liberal application of the compensable-
injury interpretation seem identical: to solve the problem of unfore-
seen future contingencies in the employee's favor. One could argue
that applying the compensable-injury interpretation to aid the em-
ployee in the Wheeler case would make the reopening provision super-
fluous. It would be reasonable, however, for the legislature to provide
alternative solutions to the same problem, depending on whether a
prior claim had been made. The employee in an original claim
has to shov that a prior work-incident caused his current compensable
condition. The previously compensated employee has already proved
that his original condition was caused by the work-incident, and the
only relevant question is whether his current condition developed out
of his original condition. The difference well might lead a legislature
to provide alternative remedies, eliminating the need in a reopening
proceeding to prove again that the original injury was compensable.103
193. The social interest in encouraging workers to claim compensation for every tech-
nically compensable condition is arguably minimal in light of the strain such claims
would impose on the employer-employee relationship and the burden such claims would
impose on the workmen's compensation system itself.
194. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.470 (1969). Most other states have time limitations on
reopening. See generally 3 LAsoN § 81.20.
195. One recurrent problem in interpreting reopening provisions relates directly to
the latent-injury limitations question. The question is whether the original claim can
be reopened to show a subsequently developed disability that results not from the origi-
nally compensated injury, but from a concomitant, previously unmentioned injury re-
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The Missouri Supreme Court carried the Wheeler rule to its logical
extreme in a subsequent case in which the employer's insurer volun-
tarily paid compensation for the initial temporary total disability.196
Applying the Wheeler nonseparability rule, the court held that the lim-
itations period ran from the date of the initial temporary total disability,
not from the date the injury culminated in serious permanent disability.
The court thought it was irrelevant that the employee had been com-
pensated fully for the initial compensable results of the injury. 97
Given its continued adherence to the Wheeler nonseparability rule,
the Missouri court's decision in this case is difficult to criticize on statu-
tory construction grounds. If the nonseparability rule is accepted, no
exploitable ambiguity remains on which to distinguish the case in which
the injury was initially compensable and compensation was paid from
ceived in the same accident. See, e.g., Erhart v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 172 Cal. 621,
158 P. 193 (1916), overruled by implication, ch. 1034, § 5, [1947] Cal. Laws 2307;
Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America v. Rucker, 87 Ga. App. 375, 73 S.E.2d 609
(1952). The responses of the Ohio and Rhode Island courts to this problem have been
interesting. The Ohio court fluctuated until the question was definitely resolved by the
legislature. State ex rel. Bernhardt v. Industrial Comm'n, 127 Ohio St. 582, 190 N.E.
224 (1934); Kaiser v. Industrial Comm'n, 136 Ohio St. 440, 26 N.E.2d 449 (1940);
Miller v. Spicer Mfg. Co., 159 Ohio St. 571, 113 N.E.2d 4 (1953); Kittle v. Keller, 9
Ohio St. 2d 177, 224 N.E.2d 751 (1967), overruled by implication, § 4123.84, [1967]
Ohio Laws 1432 (denying reopening). The Rhode Island court's harsh interpretation
of the state's reopening provision to preclude reopening if the original injury was misdi-
agnosed, Barin v. Lymansville Co., 88 R.I. 169, 143 A.2d 705 (1958), may have led
in a roundabout way to the court's strained interpretation of the limitations provision
in Provencher v. Glas-Kraft, Inc., 107 R.I. 97, 264 A.2d 916 (1970).
196. Hundley v. Matthews Hinsman Co., 379 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. 1964).
197. The court rejected the contrary arguments in Professor Larson's treatise, 3 LAR-
SoN § 78.44, as unsupported by any authority and as primarily directed to the legisla-
ture and not to the courts. Professor Larson was commenting on the case of Kobilkin
v. Pillsbury, 103 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1939), affirmed mem. by an equally divided Court,
309 U.S. 619 (1940). Professor Larson first interpreted the opinion as holding that the
claim for compensation was barred under a compensable-injury interpretation with a
nonseparability rule. See note 158 supra. Next, he argued that the claimant in Kobil-
kin should not be treated differently from the claimant in any other latent-injury case.
The fact that compensation was paid for the initial minor temporary disability should
not lead to a different result. The basic question is "whether claimant had any reason-
able occasion to file a claim sooner than he did." 3 LARsoN § 78.44. If the employer
pays full compensation voluntarily, the employee has no reason to make claim for com-
pensation. The contrary result in Kobilkin, which encourages an employee to attribute
the worst imaginable consequences to an injury and file claim immediately for all of
them, is inconsistent with the rule in the majority of states, properly understood, and,
given the liberal reopening provisions, makes the availability of compensation for the
subsequently developing condition depend on the irrelevant technicality of whether the
initial compensation was paid voluntarily or pursuant to an award.
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the case in which the injury was initially compensable and compensa-
tion was not paid. Prior full payment of compensation cannot affect
the date the injury becomes compensable, just as a compromise settle-
ment or full payment of claimed damages cannot prevent the cause of
action from "accruing" under the similar traditional statute of limita-
tions for negligence claims. Carried one step further, however, the
analogy between this case and settlement cases under the traditional
negligence limitations provision breaks down. Under the "cause of ac-
tion accrues" language, it makes sense to start the limitations period
without regard to settlement of the plaintiff's claim because in practice,
as well as in theory, he has only one cause of action. If, instead of
settling with the defendant, plaintiff had brought suit to recover dam-
ages and received full payment for all damages incurred or predicted,
that would have been the end of the matter. Plaintiff could not reopen
the case to seek additional damages for further, originally unforeseen
injuries. Therefore, in the ordinary negligence case, it makes little dif-
ference whether the claimant is paid voluntarily or recovers damages in
a lawsuit. The workmen's compensation situation may be different, be-
cause of the reopening provisions. As Professor Larson points out,10 8
the claimant in a workmen's compensation case may be able to reopen
an award to obtain additional compensation for an unforeseen change
in condition. Under these circumstances, there is a significant differ-
ence under Wheeler and its progeny between employees whose em-
ployers voluntarily paid compensation and those who received the
same amount under an award by the compensation commission. In the
latter case the employee can reopen and obtain additional compensa-
tion for change in condition, even after the limitations period has run.
In the former case, however, the employee's subsequent claim will be
barred if the limitations period has run on the initial, compensated
claim. Different treatment of employees in the two situations seems
patently inconsistent with both the compensation purpose of the work-
men's compensation statute and the rationale behind the reopening
provision. Furthermore, the difference is not supportable by reference
to the purposes of the limitations provision, since the evidentiary and
certainty purposes seem equally applicable whether previous compen-
sation was paid voluntarily or by award. Once the nonseparability rule
has been adopted, however, the result in the case of prior voluntary
compensation seems inevitable as a matter of statutory construction.
198. 3 LAMsoN § 78.44; see note 197 supra.
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The impossibility of reconciling that result with the purpose of the
workmen's compensation statute and the right to reopen if a prior
award has been made argues against the Wheeler decision itself, not
against the subsequent gloss of the later voluntary compensation case.
Most of the other states that have settled the question of the scope
of the limitations bar are states in which the legislature subsequently
changed from an "injury" to an "accident' limitations provision: Ha-
waii, 19 9 Maryland," 0 and Utah2 ' adopted the nonseparability rule; In-
diana adopted a separability rule;20 2 and Washington rejected the non-
separability result without adopting a separability rule.203 The status
of the nonseparability rule in states with current compensable-injury or
discovery-rule interpretations is far from clear. The Nebraska,20 4 New
Mexico,20 5 Rhode Island,2 0 6 and United States20 7 Supreme Courts have
all seemingly adopted a nonseparability rule in at least one case. The
courts do not seem to apply the rule consistently, however. Prior and
subsequent cases in Nebraska208 and Rhode Island0 9 were decided in
199. Silva v. Wheeler & Williams, Ltd., 32 Hawaii 920 (1933).
200. Griffin v. Rustless Iron & Steel Co., 187 Md. 524, 51 A.2d 280 (1947).
201. Katsanos v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 479, 267 P. 781 (1928) (decided be-
fore liberal compensable-injury interpretation of statute of limitations in Salt Lake City
v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657 (1937)).
202. International Detrola Corp. v. Hoffman, 224 Ind. 613, 70 N.E.2d 844 (1947);
cf. Briggs Indiana Corp. v. Davis, 107 Ind. App. 177, 23 N.E.2d 285 (1939).
203. Fee v. Department of Labor & Indus., 151 Wash. 337, 275 P. 741 (1929). The
case was decided after the legislature had changed to an "accident" provision, but on
facts that occurred before the change. The facts in Fee were almost identical to the
facts in Wheeler. The court rejected the employer's argument that the limitations period
should run from the time the injury to the employee's eye first became compensable for
total temporary disability instead of the time the employee was told he would lose the
sight of his eye:
[Ie do not think that it [the compensable-injury rule announced in a prior
case] militates against a workman who may have suffered some compensable
damage, but who, in the hope of preventing any permanent injury and loss,
makes no claim for the minor loss, but continues to endeavor to prevent per-
manent, partial disability, for which hopes are held out to him by those spe-
cially skilled in that line to whom he applies for treatment.
Id. at 342, 275 P. at 742.
204. Park v. School Dist. No. 27, 127 Neb. 767, 257 N.W. 219 (1934).
205. Noland v. Young Drilling Co., 79 N.M. 444, 444 P.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1968).
206. Cruso v. Yellow Cab Co., 82 R.I. 158, 106 A.2d 734 (1954).
207. Kobilkin v. Pillsbury, 103 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1939), affd mem. by an equally
divided Court, 309 U.S. 619 (1940) (alternative interpretation of holding).
208. The prior case is Montgomery v. Milldale Farm & Live Stock Imp. Co., 124
Neb. 347, 246 N.W. 734 (1933), overruled sub silentio, Park v. School Dist. No. 27,
127 Neb. 767, 257 N.W. 219 (1934). The subsequent cases are Plambeck v. Natkin
& Co., 171 Neb. 774, 107 N.W.2d 734 (1961) (prior voluntary compensation), and
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favor of employees on facts which seem to negate the nonseparability
rule. A subsequent District of Columbia case 1° applying the statute
construed in the United States Supreme Court case also reached a re-
sult seemingly negating the nonseparability rule. In New Mexico, the
nonseparability rule has not been applied in cases of prior voluntary
compensation beoause of the specific wording of the limitations provi-
sion, which starts the limitations period from the date the em-
ployer failed to pay compensation due the employee. 211 In two other
states-Arizona and Tennessee-the result or language in some cases
suggests a position on the separability question, but neither state court
has announced a definite position on the question. All that can be said
is that Arizona may have adopted a nonseparability rule 12 and Tennes-
see may have adopted a separability rule.2 13 The question is still open
in those two states, as well as in the liberal "injury" states of Alaska,
Arkansas, Colorado, Mississippi, and Wyoming.
Without discussing the separability issue, the courts in many liberal
"injury" states have decided cases involving prior voluntary compensa-
Webb v. Consumers Coop. Ass'n, 171 Neb. 758, 107 N.W.2d 737 (1961) (same). Prior
to Park, the Nebraska court had analyzed limitations cases by applying a formula: If
the condition was latent and progressive and undiscovered, the limitations period would
not run until the nature of the injury was discovered. The court stretched the latency
formula to include misdiagnosis cases in which employees were told by their doctor that
their condition was not caused by the accident at work when in fact it was. See Astuto
v. V. Ray Gould Co., 123 Neb. 138, 242 N.W. 375 (1932). In Montgomery, the court
extended its past misdiagnosis cases to allow recovery by a late claimant even though
she had been totally disabled for a long period immediately after the accident and the
relationship between the disability and the work-accident was clear, simply because the
precise nature of her condition was not properly diagnosed until much later. In Park,
the court rejected the Montgomery analysis, and moved toward a test of latency by a
misdiagnosis that conceals the compensable character of the injury.
209. The prior case is Larkin v. George A. Fuller Co., 76 R.I. 395, 71 A.2d 690
(1950) (subsequent "scheduled" injury). The subsequent cases are Tirocchi v. United
States Rubber Co., 101 R.I. 429, 224 A.2d 387 (1966) ("scheduled" injury), and Lozow-
ski v. Nicholson File Co., 92 R.I. 270, 168 A.2d 143 (1961) ("scheduled" injury).
These cases may be explainable in terms of Rhode Island's peculiar scheduled injury pro-
vision which makes "scheduled" payments nonexclusive additions to compensation for
disability, R.I. GEN. LAws ArNx. § 28-33-19 (1968).
210. Stancil v. Massey, 436 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
211. Rayburn v. Boys Super Mkt., Inc., 74 N.M. 712, 397 P.2d 953 (1964).
212. See Hughes v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Ariz. 264, 304 P.2d 1066 (1956); Shepard
v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ariz. App. 207, 431 P.2d 102 (1970).
213. See Griffitts v. Humphrey, 199 Tenn. 528, 288 S.W.2d 1 (1955); Murray
Ohio Mfg. Co. v. Vines, - Tenn. -, 498 S.W.2d 897 (1973); Imperial Shirt Corp. v.
Jenkins, 217 Tenn. 602, 399 S.W.2d 757 (1966). But see A.C. Lawrence Leather Co.
v. Britt, 220 Tenn. 444, 414 S.W.2d 830 (1967).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
Vol. 1974:541] COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
tion by rejecting the nonseparability result. In almost every "injury"
state with a compensable-injury or discovery-rule interpretation, the
provision of medical services alone does not seem to start the limitations
period running.214  In five jurisdictions there are cases in which prior
compensation for some kind of disability was paid voluntarily and the
court found that the limitations period ran from a later date than the
initial compensated disability.215
b. Elective Corrective Surgery
Action within the discretion of the employee may determine the date
on which his injury becomes compensable, and thus may trigger com-
mencement of the limitations period under the compensable-injury in-
terpretation. The most common cases are those in which the employee
has no right to compensation unless and until he submits to corrective
surgery. In such cases, courts have had difficulties in applying the
compensable-injury or discovery-rule interpretations. Some courts
214. Alaska: Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alas. 1966); Ari-
zona: Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 43 Ariz. 50, 29 P.2d 142
(1934); Arkansas: T.J. Moss Tie & Timber Co. v. Martin, 220 Ark. 265, 247 S.W.2d
198 (1952); Colorado: City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 426 P.2d 194 (1967);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Industrial Conmu'r, 474 P.2d 242 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); Dis-
trict of Columbia: Stancil v. Massey, 436 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Louisiana: Mot-
tet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 220 La. 653, 57 So. 2d 218 (1952) (applying Lou-
isiana's intermediate "injury" limitation); Missouri: Kostron v. American Packing Co.,
227 Mo. App. 34, 455 S.W.2d 871 (1932) (but see Hundley v. Matthews Hinsman Co.,
379 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. 1964); Conn v. Chestnut St. Realty Co., 235 Mo. App. 309, 133
S.W.2d 1056 (1940)); Nebraska: Plambeck v. Natkin & Co., 171 Neb. 774, 107 N.W.2d
734 (1961); Webb v. Consumers Coop. Ass'n, 171 Neb. 758, 107 N.W.2d 737 (1961);
Rhode Island: Rosa v. George A. Fuller Co., 74 R.I. 215, 60 A.2d 150 (1948); Tennes-
see: Griffitts v. Humphrey, 199 Tenn. 528, 288 S.W.2d 1 (1955); Ogle v. Tennessee
Eastman Corp., 185 Tenn. 527, 206 S.W.2d 909 (1947).
215. Stancil v. Massey, 436 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1970); T.J. Moss Tie & Timber Co.
v. Martin, 220 Ark. 265, 247 S.W.2d 198 (1952); Webb v. Consumers Coop. Ass'n, 171
Neb. 758, 107 N.W.2d 737 (1961) (semble); Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., 101
R.I. 429, 224 A.2d 387 (1966); Larkin v. George A. Fuller Co., 76 R.I. 395, 71 A.2d
690 (1950); Murray Ohio Mfg. Co. v. Vines, -Tenn. -, 498 S.W.2d 897 (1973).
In these states, a late claimant who failed to make claim for a prior compensable con-
dition might use one of these cases to assert that the court has rejected the nonseparabil-
ity rule completely, arguing as a matter of statutory construction that the nonseparability
rule is applicable equally to cases of compensated and uncompensated prior disability.
The cases are not completely supportive, however, because at least arguably, the claimant
in the case of prior voluntary compensation was diligent in filing and the claimant in
the uncompensated case was not. The court might distinguish the cases on this ground
even though the statute never mentions diligence and cannot be construed reasonably
to support the distinction.
Washington University Open Scholarship
592 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
have held that the condition becomes compensable and the limitations
period begins when the employee first discovers that corrective surgery
is needed.216 Other courts have held that the condition becomes com-
pensable and -the limitations period begins when the employee has the
operation, incurring compensable medical expenses and postoperative
temporary disability.21 7
Which application of the compensable-injury rule is better? The
language of the statute could bear either meaning, given a prior com-
pensable-injury interpretation. Starting the limitations period at the
time the need for corrective surgery arises can be supported by reading
"compensable injury" as an injury for which compensation is payable
now if the employee chooses to take all steps within his control neces-
sary to perfect a possible claim for compensation. Starting the limita-
tions period at the time of the corrective surgery can be supported by
reading "compensable injury" as an injury for which compensation is
payable now if the employee chooses to take all the procedural steps
within the workmen's compensation system necessary to perfect a claim
for compensation. When laid alongside the traditional "cause of action
accrues" limitations provision, the second reading of the compensable-
injury rule is -arguably preferable. Traditionally, the cause of action
accrues when all nonprocedural events necessary to establish plaintiff's
right to recover have occurred. In this context, submission to an opera-
tion is -an event necessary to establish plaintiffs right to recover surgical
expenses and total temporary disability for postoperative convales-
cence. It is obviously not a procedural step in the process of recovering
compensation through the established legal procedures.
On the other hand, the traditional accrual limitations provision may
be used -to support -the first reading of the compensable-injury rule. In
the traditional relationship between limitations provisions and the prima
facie case for a negligence personal-injury action, the right to recover
damages depends on an event-negligent act or omission of the de-
fendant causing the plaintiff injury-over which the plaintiff has no
control. If workmen's compensation rules make the right -to compensa-
tion depend on events within the control of the claimant, those events
should be treated for limitations purposes as procedural prerequisites
216. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 686 (D. Md. 1937); Conn
v. Chestnut St. Realty Co., 235 Mo. App. 309, 133 S.W.2d 1056 (1939).
217. See, e.g., Raybum v. Boys Super Mkt., Inc., 74 N.M. 712, 397 P.2d 953 (1964);
Chicoria v. Kenyon Piece Dyeworks, Inc., 74 R.I 260, 60 A.2d 492 (1948).
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to recovery of compensation rather than as substantive elements of the
"cause of action."
The above analysis goes to the heart of the matter. Courts are re-
luctant to adopt an interpretation of the limitations provision that con-
nects the commencement of the limitations period to an action within
the control of the claimant. To do so seems contrary to a basic aim
of any statute of limitations-to force a claimant to perfect his claim
within a specified time and thus to prevent fraudulent claims and claims
brought by claimants "lying in wait" until contradictory evidence has
disappeared. Since the timing of the surgery is within the claimant's
control, in most cases both the compensation purposes of workmen's
compensation and the protective purpose of the limitations provision
can be furthered without sacrificing either. All that is needed is a stat-
utory incentive for the claimant to have the operation and make claim
within the limitations period after the need for the operation arises or
becomes apparent. Adoption of this rationale for starting the limita-
tions period at the time the need for corrective surgery becomes ap-
parent, however, seems to carry the paternalism of workmen's compen-
sation acts to an unreasonable extreme. The workmen's compensation
system in effect dictates to the employee that he must have an opera-
tion within a certain time or forego compensation, despite the fact that
the employee's physician has not specified a time for the operation.
Is there a way to promote the objectives of the limitations provision
without dictating to the employee when he must submit to an opera-
tion? The obvious answer lies in enforcement of the notice require-
ments."," If the employer has notice of the injury and notice of the
need for eventual corrective surgery within a reasonable time after the
employee learned of the injury and the need, the employer can inves-
tigate the circumstances of the accident and prepare and keep docu-
mentary evidence relating to the possible future claim for surgical care.
Thus, at least in elective-corrective-surgery cases,219 the date triggering
218. See generally 3 LARsON § 78.20.
219. Some states have special provisions limiting the compensability of hernias, the
most common work-related condition correctible by elective surgery. See, e.g., MIcH.
SrAT. ANN. § 17.237(405)(c) (1968). These special hernia provisions often contain
a special notice requirement more stringent than the notice requirement generally appli-
cable to other accidental injuries. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.15-12(23) (Supp.
1974). Even without special notice requirements for hernias, courts in hernia cases
have emphasized the importance of notice. Compare McGee v. San Manuel Copper
Corp., 89 Ariz. 244, 360 P.2d 1024 (1961), with Arizona Grocery Co. v. Meier, 61 Ariz.
317, 149 P.2d 274 (1944).
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the notice limitations period should not be the same as the date trigger-
ing the claim limitations period.220 The notice period should begin to
run as soon as the need for eventual corrective surgery arises or be-
comes apparent; the claim period should begin to run from the date
of the corrective surgery. Starting the claim limitations period at the
time of the operation would then pose no more threat to the limitations
purposes than the ordinary compensable-injury case.
c. Preclusion of Claim Before Wage Loss
In most states, compensation for permanent partial disability is pay-
able upon a showing of impaired earning capacity, whether or not there
was an actual wage loss.22' Compensation for permanent "scheduled"
injuries also is payable without a showing of actual wage loss. 222  In
limitations cases involving claimed compensation for impaired earning
capacity or for a permanent scheduled injury, therefore, application of
,the compensable-injury rule (starting the limitations period at the time
the injury becomes compensable) may bar the employee's claim before
he has ever suffered any wage loss from the injury.2 23  This result
is open to question.
220. See notes 322-26 infra and accompanying text (discussion of interpretation of
Minnesota notice requirement).
221. See generally 2 LARSON § 57.21.
222. See generally id. § 58.11.
223. See, e.g., Helle v. Eyermann Contracting Co., 44 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. Ct. App.
1932) (scheduled injury); Ohnmacht v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 178 Neb. 741, 135
N.W.2d 237 (1965); Bradford v. Dixie Mercerizing Co., 199 Tenn. 170, 285 S.W.2d 136
(1955) (all permanent partial disability in Tennessee is "scheduled" injury). In Louisi-
ana, compensation for permanent partial disability requires a showing of actual wage
loss. The Louisiana court's compensable-injury interpretation of the state's intermediate
"injury" limitations provision, therefore, has not been used to preclude a claim for per-
manent partial disability before the employee lost any wages. Wallace v. Remington
Rand, Inc., 229 La. 651, 661-62, 86 So. 2d 522, 525-26 (1956). The Louisiana court
then faced a problem like the elective-corrective-surgery problem, since the court's inter-
pretation starts the limitations period from the time the employee loses time from work,
an event partially within the employee's control. The court analyzed the problem as
follows:
Mhe law did not require plaintiff to work during those 70 tedious weeks fol-
lowing the accident enduring the pain that he must have continuously experi-
enced and perhaps a man of less fortitude would have immediately stopped
working and demanded compensation for total permanent disability. But for
us to presently conclude that the injury developed on the day of the accident
would be dealing in conjecture and the commencement of prescription cannot
be decided on that basis. What may be a disabling injury to one man may
not be to another and the plain purpose of the [amendment of 1934] is to pro-
vide a reasonable period of limitation in cases like this, where the injured work-
man continues on at his job and earns his wage, even though he does not per-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/is 4/1
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The primary purpose of compensation for disability is to replace lost
wages. 224 The only way that purpose can be reconciled with compen-
sation for impaired earning capacity or for permanent "scheduled" in-
juries is to view those forms of compensation as based on statutory as-
sumptions about the probable effects of a particular condition on the
employee's future earnings. These forms of compensation can thus be
seen as attempts to solve the problem of future contingencies in a sys-
tem in which an award must be made at some definite time, similar
to the assessment of damages in a traditional tort action, in which the
probable future effects of the injury are taken into account in deter-
mining the amount of damages.
The need for a measure of damages that hedges against future con-
tingencies may be less pressing in workmen's compensation acts than
in traditional tort actions. In many state workmen's compensation sys-
tems the problem of unforeseen future contingencies is also dealt with
by liberal interpretation of the limitations provision and by the reopen-
ing provision. The compensable-injury interpretation s5 postpones the
running of the limitations period until the injury becomes compensable,
and the reopening provision allows the employee to reopen prior claims
for a change in condition. If the state with a compensable-injury inter-
pretation of its limitations provision also authorizes compensation for
impaired earning capacity or for scheduled injuries, however, the con-
clusion seems unavoidable that the limitations period starts to run from
the date the employee's earning capacity is impaired or the date the
scheduled injury occurs. Thus, the employee who files claim within
the allotted time after he first loses wages may be precluded from re-
covery by the combination of two provisions--the compensable-injury
interpretation of the limitations provision, and provisions authorizing
compensation for impaired earning capacity or scheduled injury. It is
ironic that each of the provisions was intended to resolve the problem
of future contingencies in the employee's favor.
form all of the duties formerly assigned to him. It is to be remembered that
the statute does not countenance an unreasonable delay for filing compensation
claims in any case as it provides a peremption of two years from the date of
the accident within which all suits must be instituted.
Id. at 661-62, 86 So. 2d at 525-26 (footnote omitted).
224. See generally Larson, Basic Concepts & Objectives of Workmen's Compensation,
in I SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMN'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAws 31-35 (1973).
225. The analysis in text applies to jurisdictions following the discovery-rule in-
terpretation as well.
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D. Discovery-Rule Interpretation226
1. History and Development
A few jurisdictions have adopted some form of discovery rule by stat-
ute.227  The courts of twelve jurisdictions have adopted a discovery rule
by interpretation of the basic limitations language. 228  Three of these
226. Professor Larson's influential discussion of the discovery rule differs in certain
respects from the analysis in this Article. Professor Larson states the rule as follows:
The time period for notice or claim does not begin to run until the claimant,
as a reasonable man, should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable
compensable character of his injury or disease.
3 IAsoN § 78.41, at 47. Professor Larson, in a footnote to the passage quoted above,
supports this general statement by citing cases from the federal courts and thirty states.
Professor Larson's statement and citations must be clearly understood in order to avoid
possible misinterpretation. He is discussing the interpretation of three different kinds
of limitations provisions: notice limitations provisions, claim limitations for occupa-
tional disease claims, and claim limitations provisions for accidental injury claims. If
a state has what appears to be a discovery-rule interpretation of any one of these three
kinds of limitations, it is included in the footnote. Professor Larson therefore cites cases
from several states that have a harsh "accident" claim limitations provision for acci-
dental injury claims but also have a liberally-interpreted notice-limitations provision or
occupational-disease-claim-limitations provision (California, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,
Maryland (citing a case superseded by 1957 change to "accident" language, ch. 814, §
37(a), [1957] Md. Laws 1504), Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania (sub-
sequently changed to "injury" form in 1972, Act No. 223, § 4, [1972] Pa. Sess. Laws
Sere. 696-97), South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin). For similar rea-
sons, Professor Larson includes cases from jurisdictions with "injury" claim limitations
provisions in which the prevailing interpretation, starts the limitations period from the
time of the initial injury accompanying the accident (Iowa, Massachusetts, North Da-
kota, Oklahoma (citing an irrelevant reopening case, State Highway Dep't v. Crossland,
391 P.2d 801 (Okla. 1964))), or in which the claim limitations provision has received
no definitive interpretation (Florida). Professor Larson further cites claim limitations
cases from Louisiana, in which the compensable-injury interpretation seems to prevail,
and in which the highest court has never clearly adopted the discovery-rule interpreta-
tion. See Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 220 La. 653, 57 So. 2d 218 (1952);
Johnson v. W.C. Fatjo, Inc., 154 So. 2d 781 (La. Ct. App. 1963), appeal denied, 245
La. 61, 156 So. 2d 603 (1963) (misdiagnosis case analyzed under compensable-injury
interpretation).
227. 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (Supp. 1m, 1973); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.105 (1972);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 95 (Supp. 1974); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.237
(381) (Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-35-57 (1968); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-
105 (1967); cf. MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. § 92-601 (Supp. 1973) (commission may
waive time requirement up to an additional two years if delay is because of lack of
knowledge of disability); NEv. Rav. STAT. § 616.500(6)(C) (1973) (commission may
excuse failure to file claim within specified time period if due to employee's mistake or
ignorance of fact or law).
228. Arizona: English v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Ariz. 86, 237 P.2d 815 (1951); Cal-
ifornia: Marsh v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933 (1933) (occupa-
tional disease); Continental Cas. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 2d 619,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
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jurisdictions now have a harsh, legislatively imposed "accident" limita-
tions provision.2 29  The histories of the discovery-rule interpretation in
eight230 of these twelve jurisdictions share certain characteristics. The
Arizona development is typical.
The Arizona court first interpreted the state's limitations provision
in 1934, in the case of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission.23' In that case, the employee's lower lip was punc-
tured at work. The wound did not immediately result in a compen-
sable disability or a compensable scheduled injury. Later on, carci-
noma developed at the site of the wound and surgical removal of the
cancerous tissue resulted in permanent disfigurement, a compensable
scheduled injury. The court held that the limitations period ran from
the date of the operation, since that was the time the injury became
compensable. The court stated the rule as follows:
[I]f it [the injury] is slight or trivial at the time [of the accident] and
noncompensable and later on develops unexpected results for which the
employee could not have been expected to make a claim and receive
compensation, then the statute runs, not from the date of the accident,
but from the date the results of the injury became manifest and compen-
sable.23 2
54 P.2d 753 (1936) (accidental injury), overruled by implication, ch. 1034, § 5, [1974]
Cal. Stat. 2307; Colorado: City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 426 P.2d 194
(1967); District of Columbia: Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Britton, 179 F.2d 60 (D.C.
Cir. 1949); cf. Pillsbury v. United Eng'r Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1952); Stancil v. Massey,
436 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Indiana: International Detrola Corp. v. Hoffman, 224
Ind. 613, 70 N.E.2d 884 (1947); Mississippi: Tabor Motor Co. v. Garrard, - Miss.
-, 233 So. 2d 811 (1970); Missouri: Marie v. Standard Steel Works, 319 S.W.2d 871
(Mo. 1959) (occupational disease); Crites v. Missouri Dry Dock & Repair Co., 348
S.W.2d 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Nebraska: Williams v. Dobberstein, 182 Neb. 862,
157 N.W.2d 776 (1968); New Mexico: Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 48 N.M.
158, 146 P.2d 873 (1944) (applying unique statute starting limitations period at employ-
er's refusal to pay compensation, ch. 113, § 13, [1929] N.M. Laws 220 (now N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 59-10-13.4 (1953))); Tennessee: Burcham v. Carbide & Carbon Chem. Corp.,
188 Tenn. 592, 221 S.W.2d 888 (1949); Ogle v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., 185 Tenn.
527, 206 S.W.2d 909 (1947); Washington: Fee v. Department of Labor & Indus., 151
Wash. 337, 275 P. 741 (1929), "accident" language adopted by legislature, ch. 310, §
2, [1927] Wash. Laws 818, 847 (now WAsH. RV. CODE AN. H9 51.18.100, .28.050
(1962). See also notes 324-27 infra and accompanying text (discussion of Minnesota's
interpretation of its notice provision).
229. California, Indiana, and Washington. See notes 62 & 67 supra.
230. Arizona, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Mississippi, Nebraska,
New Mexico, and Wyoming. See notes 231-43 infra and accompanying text.
231. 43 Ariz. 50, 29 P.2d 142 (1934).
232. Id. at 55-56, 29 P.2d at 144.
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In 1951, the Arizona court faced a different problem in the case of
English v. Industrial Commission.233 In that case, the employee suf-
fered an immediately compensable disability from inhaling toxic fumes
at work. The employer's doctors, however, told him that his condition
was not caused by his work, and the employee attributed his condition
to tuberculosis. Five years later he learned that his condition was
caused by inhaling toxic fumes at work, and shortly thereafter he filed
an application for compensation. The court held that the limitations pe-
riod began when the employee learned -that his condition was caused by
the prior incident at work. In support of this holding, the court empha-
sized the statement in the Hartford case that the limitations period does
not start until thQ results of the injury become manifest and compensa-
ble. The court went on to argue that in light of the beneficent pur-
poses of the workmen's compensation act, the limitations provision
should not be interpreted to bar an employee when in the exercise of
reasonable care, relying on the expert opinion of employer's physicians,
he was unable to discover the causal relationship between his condition
and the work-accident within the 'allotted time after the injury other-
wise became compensable. The court seemed to adopt the general
rule proposed by the employee that the right to compensation accrues
when the employee knows or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
should know that he has sustained a compensable injury.284
The developments of the discovery rule in Nebraska and the District
of Columbia share the basic characteristics of the Arizona development.
In each jurisdiction, the court started with an arguably justifiable inter-
pretation of the basic limitations provision (either the latent-physical-
injury235 or the compensable-injury interpretation236). In each, the
court jumped from the first interpretation to a discovery rule237 by a
process of common law development, relying solely on the language
and reasoning of the prior case without returning to the underlying stat-
utory language. In each, the court moved to a formulation of a reason-
able-man discovery rule in a case in which the employee originally did
not know that he had a compensable injury because a doctor misdiag-
233. 73 Ariz. 86, 237 P.2d 815 (1951).
234. Id. at 90, 237 P.2d at 818.
235. Johansen v. Union Stock Yards Co., 99 Neb. 328, 156 N.W. 511 (1916).
236. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Cardillo, 107 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
237. Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Britton, 179 F.2d 60 (D.C Cir. 1949); Astuto v. V.
Ray Gould Co., 123 Neb. 138, 242 N.W. 375 (1932); Selders v. Cornhuskers Oil Co.,
111 Neb. 300, 196 N.W. 316 (1923).
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nosed the cause238 of his condition. Indeed, in the Nebraska and the
District of Columbia cases, the doctors who misdiagnosed were not
company doctors, and were probably selected and paid by the em-
ployees.
In California,23 9 Colorado, 240 Mississippi,241' New Mexico, 242 and
Wyoming,243 a liberal interpretation of the basic limitations language
first occurred in a misdiagnosis case. All five states adopted a discov-
ery-rule interpretation which starts the limitations period at the date
the employee learned that his condition was caused by his work. In
each case, the court first announced that it was interpreting the limita-
tions provision to start the limitations period from the date the injury
became compensable. The core characteristics of the Arizona, District
of Columbia, and Nebraska developments are thus present in Califor-
nia, Colorado, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Wyoming, except that in
the latter group a discovery rule came about in a single case rather than
as a result of a progressive case development.
The recurrent relationships between the compensable-injury inter-
pretation and the discovery rule on the one hand, and between the dis-
covery-rule interpretation and causation-misdiagnosis cases on the
other suggest that the discovery rule in most cases developed out of the
compensable-injury interpretation because of the courts' unwillingness
to preclude an employee who failed to make claim within the allotted
time because a physician misdiagnosed the cause of his condition.
Of the states that appear to have adopted the discovery rule, only
Indiana, Missouri, Tennessee, and Washington deviate from this gen-
eral pattern. The Indiana and Washington developments in part paral-
lel the Arizona development, starting with a compensable-injury
case 2 44 and then adopting a discovery rule in a subsequent case involv-
ing misdiagnosis,2 4' but the misdiagnoses in the Indiana and Washing-
238. Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Britton, 179 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Astuto v. V.
Ray Gould Co., 123 Neb. 138, 242 N.W. 375 (1932).
239. Marsh v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933 (1933) (occupa-
tional disease).
240. City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 426 P.2d 194 (1967).
241. Tabor Motor Co. v. Garrard, - Miss. -, 233 So. 2d 811 (1970), overruling
Thyer Mfg. Co. v. Keys, 235 Miss. 229, 108 So. 2d 876 (1959).
242. Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873 (1944).
243. Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531 (1936).
244. S.G. Taylor Chain Co. v. Marianowski, 95 Ind. App. 120, 182 N.E. 584 (1932);
Stolp v. Department of Labor & Indus., 138 Wash. 685, 245 P. 20 (1926).
245. International Detrola Corp. v. Hoffman, 244 Ind. 613, 70 N.E.2d 844 (1947);
Fee v. Department of Labor & Indus., 151 Wash. 337, 275 P. 741 (1929).
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ton cases concealed only the ultimate seriousness of the injury, not the
work-causation. The early development of the discovery rule in Ten-
nessee was influenced by the peculiar problem of interpreting two sep-
arate limitations provisions, ,and the development in Missouri was
influenced by the importance assigned the nonseparability rule in -that
state. 247
246. In the first liberal Tennessee case, the court focused on resolution of the pe-
culiar Tennessee double limitations provision problem. Ogle v. Tennessee Eastman
Corp., 185 Tenn. 527, 206 S.W.2d 909 (1947), construing ch. 123, § 4, [1919] Tenn.
Acts 377 (now TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1003 (1966)), and ch. 123, § 31, [1919] Tenn.
Acts 389 (now TENN. CoDE ANN. § 50-1017 (1966)). See notes 110-11 supra and ac-
companying text. The court's opinion in Ogle announces no clear interpretation of the
limitations provision. Parts of the opinion support a discovery-rule reading of the case:
No reasonable construction of law could require that complainant give notice
of a disability which he did not know existed or which did not, in fact, exist,
or that he should file suit for a disability before he had suffered it.
185 Tenn. at 532, 206 S.W.2d at 911. Other parts of the opinion support a compensable-
injury reading of the case: the court says that the limitations period starts from the "in-
jury," not the "accident," and argues that "[t]his construction finds strong support in
common sense. It is the 'injury' and not the 'accident' which determines the rights of
the employee under the Act .. . " Id. at 531, 206 S.W.2d at 910. Whether the court
meant to adopt the compensable-injury interpretation or the discovery-rule interpretation,
it is clear that the result in the case is consistent only with the discovery rule and incon-
sistent with Missouri's Wheeler nonseparability rule, since the court held that the limita-
tions period started when the employee first discovered the permanent total loss of sight
in one eye, even though, from the facts given, he must have known of prior serious com-
pensable impairment of his vision in that eye short of total blindness. In a subsequent
company-doctor case of causation-misdiagnosis, the Tennessee court reached a discovery-
rule result and announced a discovery-rule interpretation of the limitations provisions.
Burcham v. Carbide & Carbon Chem. Corp., 188 Tenn. 592, 221 S.W.2d 888 (1949).
This interpretation was confirmed in Griffitts v. Humphrey, 199 Tenn. 528, 288 S.W.2d
1 (1955). The Tennessee court's application of its discovery rule differs from other
courts', for the Tennessee court, perhaps influenced by the fact that all compensation
for partial disability is based on scheduled percentage of physical impairment rather than
on impairment of wage-earning capacity, starts the limitations period from the time the
employee discovers the nature of his physical injury, while other states start the limita-
tions period from the time the employee discovers his compensable condition. Compare
Griffitts v. Humphrey, 199 Tenn. 528, 288 S.W.2d 1 (1955), with Bradford v. Dixie
Mercerizing Co., 199 Tenn. 170, 285 S.W.2d 136 (1955). Given the peculiar basis for
determining permanent partial disability in Tennessee, however, the Tennessee develop-
ment may be consistent with the rule in other states.
247. An early Missouri Court of Appeals case specifically rejected the discovery-rule
interpretation. Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Prod., 229 Mo. App. 866, 25 S.W.2d
529 (1930). Subsequently, in Wheeler, the Missouri Supreme Court announced what
could be interpreted as a discovery-rule interpretation, but combined that with the non-
separability rule to preclude the claimant. Wheeler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 328 Mo. 888,
42 S.W.2d 579 (1931). See text accompanying notes 186-95 supra. Because of the em-
phasis on nonseparability in Missouri, even though the courts continued to announce a
discovery-rule interpretation of the basic limitations provision, it was not until a series
[Vol. 1974:541
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2. Statutory Construction
However the courts arrived at the discovery-rule interpretation, and
however socially desirable the result may seem to be as an inter-
pretation of the "injury" limitations language, the discovery rule must
still be evaluated by the generally accepted standards of statutory con-
struction. The discovery-rule interpretation of the "injury" language
may not pass the first test of statutory construction: Can the "time
of the injury" reasonably bear the discovery-rule meaning of the
time when the claimant discovered or should have discovered the
compensable nature of his injury? Courts in Missouri,24 Connec-
ticut, 2 " and Rhode Island, 250 at one time or another expressly rejected
the discovery-rule interpretation, arguing that the "injury" language
will simply not bear that meaning. These courts have a good point:
the context of the workmen's compensation act may support reading
the term "injury" to mean "an injury compensable under the act," but
the context does not support stretching the word "injury" to mean "dis-
covery" (actual or constructive) of an injury compensable under the
act. It is hard to see how the word "injury" can mean "discovery of
injury."
The Supreme Court of Mississippi25 1 and one commentator25 2 have
of occupational disease cases that the Missouri courts applied the announced rule in
cases where there might be a significant difference between the result from a compen-
sable-injury interpretation and the result from a discovery-rule interpretation. See
Cleveland v. Laclede Christy Clay Prod. Co., 129 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939), over-
ruled on other grounds, Wentz v. Price Candy Co., 352 Mo. 1, 8, 175 S.W.2d 852, 856
(1943); Ford v. American Brake Shoe Co., 252 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Marie
v. Standard Steel Works, 319 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. 1959). These cases were decided under
a cryptic 1931 amendment, H.B. 498, § 1, [1931] Mo. Laws 383-84, that simply made
occupational diseases compensable without providing any guidance on the application of
the general "injury" limitations provision to occupational disease claims. A specific dis-
covery rule for occupational disease claims was later adopted, S.B. No. 167, [1959] Mo.
Laws 11-13 (now Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 287.063, .067 (1969)). Except for these early
occupational disease cases, all the Missouri cases seem consistent with either a compen-
sable-injury interpretation or a discovery-rule interpretation. Cf. Crites v. Missouri Dry
Dock & Repair Co., 348 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. CL App. 1961).
248. Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Prod., 224 Mo. App. 304, 25 S.W.2d 529
(1930). But see note 247 supra (discussion of subsequent developments in Missouri).
249. Rossi v. Jackson Co., 120 Conn. 456, 181 A. 539 (1935); Connolly v. Pennsyl-
vania Seaboard Steel Corp., 100 Conn. 423, 123 A. 906 (1924).
250. Cruso v. Yellow Cab Co., 82 R.I. 158, 106 A.2d 734 (1954). Rhode Island
legislatively adopted the discovery rule in 1960. Ch. 94, § 1, [1960] R.I. Acts 378-
79 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 28-35-57 (1969)).
251. Tabor Motor Co. v. Garrard, - Miss. -, 233 So. 2d 811 (1970); cf. Keenan
v. Consumers Pub. Power Dist., 152 Neb. 54, 40 N.W.2d 261 (1949).
252. Tate, Workmen's Compensation Claimants' Latent or Unknown Injuries-Pre-Washington University Open Scholarship
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suggested an interpretation of the "injury" language that preserves the
discovery-rule result but avoids the plain-meaning arguments against
the simple discovery-rule interpretation. The term "injury" is inter-
preted to mean "compensable injury," but the injury becomes compen-
sable only when the evidence sufficient to establish a right to compen-
sation becomes available. In the causation-misdiagnosis case, for ex-
scription, 12 LA. L. Rav. 73, 79 (1951). After the article was published, the Louisiana
Supreme Court interpreted the intermediate "injury" limitations provision, No. 29, § 1,
[1934] La. Acts 188 (now IA. REv. STAT. ANN. 23:1209 (1964)), to mean "compen-
sable injury." Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 220 La. 653, 57 So. 2d 218
(1952). Because compensation for partial disability in Louisiana is not payable without
a showing of actual wage loss, the Louisiana courts subsequently applied the simple com-
pensable-injury interpretation to start the intermediate limitations provision from the
time the employee suffered actual wage loss. See, e.g., Wallace v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 229 La. 651, 86 So. 2d 522 (1956). The discovery-rule interpretation was never
specifically adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The author of the article subse-
quently became a Judge on the New Orleans Court of Appeal. While there and before
he became a Judge on the Louisiana Supreme Court, he wrote the opinion in an interest-
ing limitations case, Guillory v. Maryland Cas. Co., 227 So. 2d 620 (La. Ct. App.
1969). The employee, the manager of the employer's plant, twisted his knee at work.
He did not report the injury to employer's insurer because he thought it was minor and
he did not want to raise the employer's insurance rates. Less than a month after the
accident the employee changed employment to teach for a year. His knee continued
to trouble him, so he consulted a doctor three months after the accident. The doctor
diagnosed the condition as a torn cartilage. Claim was filed less than one year after
this diagnosis, but more than a year after the accident. Judge Tate held that the date
of the injury was the same as the date of the accident in this case, since the employee
knew of pain and difficulty with the knee at that time. Judge Tate distinguished the
Wallace case on the grounds that the rule does not apply when the employee continues
to work, but does so at a different job and for a different employer. He refused to hold
that the injury became compensable only when properly diagnosed, distinguishing the ap-
parently contrary conclusion in his 1951 article by noting that in Guillory there was
no prior misdiagnosis. Judge Tate's reasoning makes little sense. First, if the employee
could not have recovered compensation for partial disability while working at his new
job because he could not prove actual wage loss, the reasoning of the Wallace case would
seem to apply regardless of the fact that he switched jobs. Secondly, the reasoning in
the 1951 article would appear to support the employee's position in Guillory. While
the employee thought his condition was trivial and temporary and had no expert advice
to the'contrary, he had no evidence to establish the right to compensation. Therefore,
the injury was not then compensable. Judge Tate's distinction between a case of prior
misdiagnosis and Guillory seems to penalize an employee because he did not see a doctor
when the court deems he should have. See text accompanying notes 282-89 infra. The
only obvious reason to avoid application of the reasoning in the 1951 article was that
the Louisiana courts since 1951 had had opportunity to adopt a discovery rule but had
never done so, relying instead on the compensable-injury interpretation. See, e.g., John-
son v. W.C. Fatjo, Inc., 154 So. 2d 781 (La. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 245 La. 61, 156
So. 2d 603 (1963). Judge Tate's opinion in this case suggests that he may have been
trying so hard to appear unbiased by his prior article that he seized on unsupportable
distinctions to reach a result that would prove his freedom from bias.https://opens holarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
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ample, the injury becomes compensable only when the employee ob-
tains competent medical advice indicating that the condition was work-
related, since, if causation is an issue, an employee ordinarily cannot es-
tablish a right to compensation without expert testimony relating the
injury to the job. Although the Mississippi interpretation is less strained
than the ordinary discovery-rule interpretation, it is still difficult to jus-
tify the interpretation on the basis of the statutory language. It seems a
strained construction to read "the date of injury" as meaning "the time
at which the employee is in a position to establish by competent evi-
dence that the injury was work-related." If the statutory purpose is
forwarded by an artificial reading-by either -the ordinary discovery
rule or the Mississippi interpretation-however, it is at least arguable
that the result converts the unreasonable reading of the specific lan-
guage to a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion. The issue then
becomes whether the purposes of compensation statutes in fact require
judicial development of a broad discovery-rule interpretation.
Courts have justified adopting a discovery rule by reference to a gen-
eral legislative purpose to compensate injured workers5 3 and to a pre-
sumption that the legislature could not have intended to preclude a late
claimant who reasonably relied on a doctor's misdiagnosis in foregoing
claim. 25' Although on the surface these arguments appear persuasive,
the employer can argue that on closer analysis they do not justify the
violence done to the language of the statute by the discovery-rule inter-
pretation. First, the general purpose of the applicable workmen's com-
pensation act to compensate injured workers should not be used to in-
terpret the limitations provision, because the very existence of a limita-
tions provision in the act indicates that the legislature has deliberately
compromised the general compensation purpose in the interests of the
purposes served by a limitations provision. Secondly, it is difficult to
support the presumption that the legislature could not have intended
to preclude a late claimant who acted reasonably in foregoing suit in
reliance on a physician's misdiagnosis. The legislature may very well
have intended to preclude such claimants. The traditional statute of
limitations, after all, has often been held to preclude a late claimant
even though he acted reasonably, and this result is consistent with the
253. See English v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Ariz. 86, 237 P.2d 815 (1951); Selders
v. Cornhuskers Oil Co., 111 Neb. 300, 196 N.W. 316 (1923).
254. See Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Britton, 179 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1949); English
v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Ariz. 86, 237 P.2d 815 (1951).
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evidentiary and personal certainty purposes of the statute of limitations.
Without a showing that the contrary policy choice favored by the court
was expressly or impliedly adopted by the legislature, the legislative
purpose argument fails.
The employee might argue that the same legislative intent arguments
that support the compensable-injury interpretation also support the sim-
ilar Mississippi evidentiary-compensable-injury interpretation or the
simple discovery-rule interpretation. The employer might answer that
the argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the compensable-
injury interpretation is not strained on its face, as are the discovery-rule
and Mississippi readings, so no presumption against it arises from the
bare language of the statute. Since the question of statutory construc-
tion resolved by the compensable-injury interpretation was close, the
same legislative intent arguments that supported the compensable-in-
jury interpretation would not prevail when used to support an inter-
pretation that is presumptively incorrect. Secondly, the most important
legislative intent argument favoring a compensable-injury interpreta-
tion-that the legislature could not have intended to preclude a claim
before the claimant ever had the right to receive compensation-does
not always support the discovery rule or the Mississippi interpretation.
When the work-causation of the injury could not have been correctly
diagnosed by a competent physician before it was in fact diagnosed, the
argument supports application of the discovery rule or the Mississippi
interpretation. When the work-causation of the injury could have been
diagnosed by a competent physician, however, and the doctor treating
the employee simply missed it, the above argument does not support
the discovery-rule or Mississippi interpretation, for the employee could
have enforced his right to compensation had he consulted different
physicians and discovered the work-relation. In that case, the issue is
not whether the legislature intended to preclude a claim before the
right to compensation arose. Rather, the issue is whether the legisla-
ture intended to allocate the risk of avoidable mistaken diagnosis to the
employee or to the employer. Although one could argue that the
basic compensation purpose of the workmen's compensation statute
supports the conclusion that the legislature intended to place the ris<
of mistaken diagnosis on the employer, the argument is not as persua-
sive as the argument that the legislature could not have intended to
preclude claims before the right to compensation arose.
The discovery-rule result may be achieved in a limited class of mis-
[Vol. 1974:541
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diagnosis cases, however, without resort to statutory construction. In
cases in which the employer's salaried physician fraudulently2n5 or neg-
ligently256 misdiagnoses the employee's condition, thus concealing from
the employee the causal relationship between his condition and his
work, the courts may combine the traditional doctrines of principal-
agent and equitable estoppe1257 to aid the late claimant. The doctrine
of equitable estoppel may only approximate the results under a dis-
covery rule, however, for the discovery rule may aid late claimants in
cases in which the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot apply. Courts
applying the discovery rule have aided late claimants who relied on
nonnegligent misdiagnoses 258 and who relied on misdiagnoses by a
doctor selected and paid by the claimant.25 9 Agency and estoppel
principles support allocation of the risk of misdiagnosis to the employer
when the employer's salaried physician misdiagnoses the injury, and
agency principles arguably can be extended to support imposing on the
employer the risk of misdiagnosis by a nonsalaried physician selected
and paid by the employer or its insurer.260 When the physician is se-
lected by the employee and paid by the employer, however, estoppel
principles cannot support allocation of the risk of misdiagnosis to the
employer, and when the physician is selected and paid by the em-
ployee, neither agency nor estoppel principles support allocation of the
risk of misdiagnosis to the employer. In addition, a good faith misdiag-
nosis by the employer-selected physician may not be negligence at all,
much less the culpable negligence traditionally required for application
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.2 ' An argument could be made,
however, that because of the relationship of faith and trust between
the employee and the company doctor and the conflict of interest be-
255. McCoy v. Mike Horse Mining Co., 126 Mont. 435, 252 P.2d 1036 (1953); Es-
person v. Gowanda State Homeopathic Hosp., 20 App. Div. 2d 828, 247 N.Y.S.2d 835
(1964); Altman v. Williams Furniture Co., 250 S.C. 98, 156 S.E.2d 433 (1967).
256. Cf. Watson v. Proctor & Gamble Defense Corp., 188 Tenn. 494, 221 S.W.2d
528 (1949).
257. Esperson v. Gowanda State Homeopathic Hosp., 20 App. Div. 2d 828, 247
N.Y.S.2d 835 (1964).
258. See, e.g., English v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Ariz. 86, 237 P.2d 815 (1951).
259. See, e.g., Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Britton, 179 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
260. Because future referrals by the employer may depend on the physician's treat-
ment of the case, it makes sense to ignore the technical independent contractor status
of the physician and treat him for these purposes as an agent of the employer. See 1
F. MECHEM, AGENCY §§ 200-08 (1914).
261. See Netherland v. Mead Corp., 170 Tenn. 520, 98 S.W.2d 76 (1936).
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tween the doctor's patient and the doctor's employer,2 2 any misdiag-
nosis should be treated as equivalent to culpable negligence for pur-
poses of the traditional equitable estoppel analysis.203
3. Application of the Discovery Rule
The fundamental question in the application of a discovery rule is
what must be discovered or discoverable in order to start the limitations
period. Given the close relationship between the discovery rule and
the compensable-injury interpretation, 2 4 the answer seems obvious:
the limitations period begins when all the facts necessary to establish
the employee's right to compensation are discovered or are reasonably
discoverable.
Almost all courts that have decided the issue agree that the employ-
ee's justifiable ignorance that his otherwise compensable condition was
caused by a work-accident postpones the start of the limitations period
under the discovery rule. 26a The only significant problems have arisen
in determining (1) whether the employee must have known from the
sequence of events that his condition was caused by the work-
accident,2 6 and (2) whether the employee's belief that his condition
was caused by a work-accident should start the limitations period even
though the doctors he consulted all told him that his condition was not
work-related. 0 7
More troublesome than work-causation ignorance cases are cases in
which the employee knows that his condition was caused by a work-
accident but is ignorant of the exact nature and full seriousness of the
condition. The following two examples are typical. Assume that in
each case the limitations period was twelve months from date of
262. See generally Murray, Ethics in Occupational Health Practice, in OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH PRACTICE 421 (R. Schilling ed. 1973); Roberts, The Question of Ethical Stand-
ards in Occupational Medical Practice, 14 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 633 (1972).
263. Cf. Angermeir v. Hubley Mfg. Co., 206 Pa. Super. 422, 213 A.2d 171 (1965)
(imposing duty on employer to inform employee of its attitude toward workmen's com-
pensation liability within limitations period if employer's physician treats employee).
264. See text accompanying notes 230-47 supra.
265. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alas. 1966); English v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 73 Ariz. 86, 237 P.2d 815 (1951); City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo.
345, 426 P.2d 194 (1967).
266. See Surratt v. Otoe Food Prod. Co., 146 Neb. 854, 21 N.W.2d 862 (1946).
267. See Keenan v. Consumers Pub. Power Dist., 152 Neb. 54, 40 N.W.2d 261
(1949); Rastella v. State Dep't of Pub. Works, 102 R.I. 123, 229 A.2d 43 (1967).
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"injury" and that the employee files claim within twelve months after
he discovers the nature and seriousness of his condition.
Case One: The employee hurts his back at work. A doctor diag-
noses it as a back sprain and tells him that he will get better soon with
no serious, harmful results. After several months or years of intermit-
tent back trouble, the employee is told by another doctor that he has
a herniated disc traceable to the original injury. The employee then
has corrective surgery that is not entirely successful, leaving him per-
manently partially disabled. 6s
Case Two: The employee injures his arm. The doctor who exam-
ines him discovers a broken bone, which he sets. After the cast is re-
moved, his arm is stiff, but the doctor tells him the stiffness will go
away eventually. The stiffness remains, and months or years later an-
other doctor tells the employee that his arm will be permanently stiff,
causing permanent percentage-loss of use of his arm.269
In a jurisdiction with a discovery rule and a nonseparability rule, the
employee need know only that he is suffering from some work-related
compensable condition to start the limitations period. The exact medi-
cal diagnosis or ultimate seriousness of the employee's condition is not
ordinarily -2 71 a fact needed to establish the right to compensation.17 1
Unlike ignorance of work-causation, the employee's ignorance of the
true nature or seriousness of his condition does not automatically post-
268. This fact pattern is perhaps the most common one in compensable-injury or dis-
covery-rule cases. See, e.g., Dees v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 192 S.W.2d 635 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1946); Webb v. Consumers Coop. Ass'n, 171 Neb. 758, 107 N.W.2d 737
(1961); Gomez v. Hausman Corp., 83 N.M. 400, 492 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1971); Cruso
v. Yellow Cab Co., 82 R.I. 158, 106 A.2d 734 (1954); Imperial Shirt Corp. v. Jenkins,
217 Tenn. 602, 399 S.W.2d 757 (1966). See also Tate, supra note 252, at78 n.24.
269. See T.J. Moss Tie & Timber Co. v. Martin, 220 Ark. 265, 247 S.W.2d 198
(1952); Ohnmacht v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 178 Neb. 741, 135 N.W.2d 237 (1965);
Collins v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 123 Neb. 227, 242 N.W. 457 (1932); Tirocchi
v. United States Rubber Co., 101 R.I. 429, 224 A.2d 387 (1966).
270. When compensation for occupational diseases is limited to diseases specifically
listed in the statute, the exact medical diagnosis may be essential. See Wilson v. Van
Buren County, 196 Tenn. 487, 268 S.W.2d 363 (1954).
271. See Cleveland v. Laclede Christy Clay Prod. Co., 129 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1939):
[What claimant knew prior to [date of correct diagnosis] was not added to
by Dr. Weinel on that date by giving him the specific name of "silicosis" as
the disease from which he suffered. The greatest poet has said, "What is in
a name? That which we call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet."
The claimant was precluded from compensation because he knew, more than six months
before filing claim, that he had suffered disability caused by his work.
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pone the commencement of the limitations period under the discovery
rule. Therefore, the result in the above cases cannot be determined
without knowing more facts, facts that would indicate whether the em-
ployee's ignorance of the exact nature or ultimate seriousness of his
injury prevented him from knowing that his condition was compensa-
ble,
Addition of other facts to Case One shows how different circum-
stances may affect the application of the discovery rule. Assume in
Case One that immediately after the accident the employee could not
perform sorie of his former tasks at work and it was obvious that his
wage-earning capacity was decreased. Assume further that the statute
authorized partial disability payments for impaired earning capacity.
Under the circumstances, the employee would be precluded because
he failed to claim compensation for partial disability within twelve
months after he discovered or should have discovered the facts neces-
sary to establish his right to compensation.2 71 Similarly, if the employ-
ee's back injury resulted in any period of compensable total temporary
disability, failure to file claim within twelve months after the discovery
of the facts establishing a right to receive compensation for temporary
total disability would bar his subsequent claims.2  These examples
suggest that the employee in Case One can avoid the limitations bar
in a nonseparability state only if (1) the original medical care was pro-
vided by the employer,27 4 (2) the employee subsequently suffered no
compensable temporary total disability, and (3) facts establishing the
right to compensation for partial disability were not discovered or
reasonably discoverable before the condition was correctly diagnosed
and the need for an operation became apparent.2 75 As a practical mat-
ter, the facts establishing partial or total disability-impaired earning
capacity or actual wage loss-are usually obvious and discoverable im-
mediately. Therefore, the results under a discovery-rule interpretation
ordinarily will be the same as the results under a compensable-injury
interpretation. The plea for additional relief for late claimants under
272. See Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Smith, 78 Ariz. 355, 280 P.2d 273
(1955); Imperial Shirt Corp. v. Jenkins, 217 Tenn. 602, 399 S.W.2d 757 (1966); ef.
Williams v. S.N. Long Warehouse Co., 426 S.W.2d 725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (discovery
of need for medical treatment starts statutory period).
273. See Hundley v. Matthews Hinsman Co., 379 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. 1964); cf. Stanc
v. Massey, 436 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Webb v. Consumers Coop. Ass'n, 171 Neb.
758, 107 N.W.2d 737 (1961).
274. See text accompanying note 214 supra.
275. See Imperial Shirt Corp. v. Jenkins, 217 Tenn. 602, 399 S.W.2d 757 (1966).
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the discovery rule in such cases is fundamentally an argument for a sep-
arability interpretation of the scope of the limitations bar, since the dis-
covery rule together with the nonseparability rule would preclude re-
covery.
Most of the time, the discovery-rule and the compensable-injury in-
terpretations will lead to identical results in Case Two (the stiffened
arm case) as well. Assume that the case arises in a jurisdiction that (1)
has a nonseparability rule, (2) authorizes compensation without a
showing of impaired earning capacity for scheduled injuries, (3) in-
cludes permanent partial loss of the use of an arm as a scheduled injury,
but (4) does not authorize compensation for temporary partial loss of
the use of an arm.270  Assume further ,that under the rules deter-
mining partial disability the employee would not have qualified at any
time after the accident for compensation for partial disability. Under
these circumstances the injury first becomes compensable when it be-
comes permanent. But when is that? Permanency is an unusual
"fact" because it involves a prediction, a judgment about the future.
It could be argued that a condition that never gets any better is "per-
manent" from its inception. On the other hand, it could be argued that
a condition is permanent only when the facts would support a know-
ledgeable prediction that the condition will not change. The latter in-
terpretation has been adopted by courts that have faced the problem.2 77
In Case Two, this interpretation would lead a court using a compensa-
276. See Helle v. Eyermann Contracting Co., 44 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931).
277. See, e.g., Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., 101 RI. 429, 224 A.2d 387
(1966). The Rhode Island court rejected the argument that the limitations period pre-
cluded compensation for scheduled percentage loss of use of hands because the physical
condition of the employee's hands had remained stable since the date of unsuccessful
corrective surgery which had taken place more than the allotted time before the claim
was filed. The court said that the issue was
at what time following surgery did the percentage of uselessness of the hands,
if any, become manifest. In justice to both an employer as well as an em-
ployee, reason and experience recommend judicial recognition of a period of
use of impaired bodily members before an opinion as distinguished from a
guess can be given. We think then that in circumstances such as are here pres-
ent the statute begins to run at the time sound medical opinion has it that, in-
dependent of prosthetic devices, post-surgery functional development can objec-
tively be said to have reached its potential. Involved therein are such condi-
tions as the extent of the healing of scar tissues, improvement of circulation,
reasonable minimum tenderness, not to mention such damage to the sensory
nerves as time may prove to be irreparable.
Id. at 434, 224 A.2d at 391. The court noted that had the employee filed her claim
shortly after the surgery, the employer could have justifiably contended there was no
competent evidence to establish the permanency of any percentage of uselessness.
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ble-injury interpretation to the same result as a court using a discovery
rule if the employee was under the continual observation and care of
a competent physician. Under such circumstances, compensable-injury
courts278 and discovery-rule courts27 9 alike have held that the limi-
tations period begins to run from the date the employee was informed
by a physician that the condition was permanent.
A compensable-injury court may reach a different result than a dis-
covery-rule court in Case Two when the employee, after being told at
first that the injury will be temporary, subsequently fails to return or
consult another physician about the condition until some time after it
would have been apparent to a physician that the injury was permanent.
If claim is filed more than twelve months after a doctor could have de-
termined that the injury was permanent, but less than twelve months
after the employee in fact learned that the injury was permanent, the
compensable-injury interpretation would presumably preclude the em-
ployee from suit and the discovery rule might not preclude him, de-
pending on whether the court determines that the employee's failure
to consult a doctor sooner was reasonable. This case arose in Nebraska,
and the court there applied the discovery rule to bar the employee's
claim. 80 In denying recovery, the Nebraska Supreme Court reasoned:
There can be no question that the plaintiff knew that he had a physical
disability, and that it was due to his employment. It might be said
that the mere fact that the plaintiff did not know the full extent of his
injury from a medical standpoint does not make it latent, particularly
where the medical facts were reasonably discoverable. . . . Al-
though 'each case must be determined on its own facts and circum-
stances, the evidence here establishes that it should have become reason-
ably apparent that the plaintiff had a compensable disability more than
I year before filing his petition.
We hold that where an injury is latent and progressive, the tolled
statute of limitations begins to run against an employee from the time
it becomes reasonably apparent, or should have become reasonably ap-
parent, that he has a compensable disability of any class from an acci-
dent (whether he is working or not) if the employee is aware that the
disability is due to his employment.281
278. Anderson v. Marion Plumbing Co., 236 So. 2d 299 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
279. Collins v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 123 Neb. 227, 242 N.W. 457 (1932);
Duran v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 83 N.M. 38, 487 P.2d 1343 (1971).
280. Ohnmacht v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 178 Neb. 741, 135 N.W.2d 237 (1965).
Other discovery-rule courts might well hold to the contrary.
281. Id. at 746, 135 N.W.2d at 240.
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From the court's statement of the case, it seems that the employee
was claiming compensation for a permanent "scheduled" injury. Since
he had continued at the same work, presumably at the same pay, at
all times after the accident, he probably could not have claimed com-
pensation for partial disability under the Nebraska statute. 2 The em-
ployee's physical disability was not compensable, then, until it became
permanent. The court's argument that the employee must have known
that he had a physical disability is convincing; the conclusion that he
must have known his physical disability was permanent does not follow.
The court seems to be charging plaintiff with constructive knowledge of
the permanency of his disability because a physician could have deter-
mined permanency six months after the accident. This constructive-
knowledge test could be seen as just an application of the ordinary cir-
cumstantial evidence test for determining the existence of a subjective
state. That is, the court could simply be trying to determine whether
the employee knew that his condition was permanent by asking
whether a reasonable man in the employee's circumstances would have
known that his condition was permanent. If so, the application of the
test in the Nebraska case seems suspect, since a worker told that his
injury was a temporary sprain might not suspect his continued physical
disability was permanent until long after the original accident. The
Nebraska court seems to use the constructive-knowledge test not just
as an aid in determining the claimant's subjective knowledge, but as
a substantive standard by which to judge the reasonableness of the em-
ployee's conduct in failing to consult a physician to determine the na-
ture and probable duration of his condition.
Two questions arise. First, what standards can a court use to judge
the reasonableness of the employee's decision not to consult a physi-
cian? A stoic worker, inured to working with various aches and pains,
limps and "hitches," may not consult a doctor for a condition that would
send a judge running to one. Secondly, and more importantly, why
should the employee's failure to act reasonably in attempting to dis-
cover the nature and probable duration of his condition prevent him
from asserting the discovery-rule exception to the limitations bar if in
fact he did not know the compensable nature of his injury? The rea-
sonableness of the employee's action is not relevant under any other
statutory provision that affects his right to compensation.
282. See Anderson v. Cowger, 158 Neb. 772, 65 N.W.2d 51 (1954).
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The Nebraska standard is not required by the logic or the history
of the discovery rule. True, the discovery rule has often been phrased
in terms of the actions of a reasonable man:28  "[T]he limitations period
starts when a man exercising reasonable diligence would have discov-
ered the facts supporting compensability." Except for Nebraska and
possibly Iowa,28 4 however, the reasonable-man test has not been ap-
plied as a standard of conduct. The reluctance of courts in other states
to turn the announced reasonable-man standard into a standard of con-
duct can be understood in light of the origins of the reasonable-man
language in the discovery-rule formulation. How did the reasonable
man creep into the discovery rule? First, in the judicial development
of the discovery rule the court in the initial "compensable-injury" inter-
pretation in a latent-physical-injury case may have attempted to de-
scribe the time when the injury became compensable-the time when
the process initiated by the accident culminated in serious, com-
pensable injury-in terms that emphasized the discoverability of the
compensable condition, 2 5 for want of a better way to describe the time
when the injury becomes compensable. The focus was not really
on the discoverability, but rather on the compensability of the under-
lying latent physical injury. When the court in a subsequent causation-
misdiagnosis case shifted the emphasis from the employee's observable
physical condition to the employee's knowledge of his physical condi-
tion and its relationship to his work, the court seized on the "reasonably
discoverable" language in the prior compensable-injury case and elab-
orated it into an announced test of whether the compensable character
and work-relation of the injury were "discoverable by one acting with
reasonable diligence." 286s The main purpose of the reasonable-man
formulation seemed to be to demonstrate the continuity between the
discovery rule and the prior compensable-injury interpretation. Sec-
ondly, in explaining the rationale for holding in favor of the em-
ployee in the causation-misdiagnosis cases, the courts often dwelt on
283. See, e.g., 3 LARSON § 78.41, at 47.
284. Mousel v. Bituminous Material & Supply Co., - Iowa -, 169 N.W.2d 763
(1969) (dictum).
285. See Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 43 Ariz. 50, 56, 29 P.2d
142, 144 (1934) ("date the results of the injury become manifest"); Wheeler v. Missouri
Pae. R.R., 328 Mo. 888, 894, 42 S.W.2d 579, 582 (1931) ("reasonably discoverable and
apparent"); Johansen v. Union Stock Yards Co., 99 Neb. 328, 156 N.W. 511 (1916).
286. See English v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Ariz. 86, 237 P.2d 815 (1951); Myers
v. Rival Mfg. Co., 442 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Clarey v. R.S. Proudfit Co.,
124 Neb. 582, 247 N.W. 417 (1933).
[Vol. 1974:541
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
the plight of the employee who acted with reasonable prudence and
was misled by an incorrect diagnosis. 28 7 To emphasize this argument,
the court often stated the rule in terms of discoverability by one acting
with reasonable diligence. 28 8
Given the origins of the reasonable-man language, the refusal of
most discovery-rule courts to turn the reasonable-man test ifito a stand-
ard of conduct is not surprising. Simply because a court deems the
claimant's reasonable diligence in not filing claim sooner an additional
reason for avoiding the limitations bar in one case does not require the
court to apply the limitations bar in another case when the claimant
failed to act with reasonable diligence to discover the nature and extent
of his injury. Nothing in the statutory language supports a distinction
between a claimant who discovered his compensable injuries as soon
as a reasonable man in his circumstance would have and a claimant who
discovered his compensable injuries long after a reasonable man in his
circumstances would have. The important arguments for a discovery-
rule result apply to support the claimant in both cases.28 9 The critical
question is "When did the employee in fact discover the facts establish-
ing his right to compensation?" Certainly, in answering that question, a
reasonable-man test as a circumstantial evidence test of the claimant's
subjective knowledge may be desirable, but that is not the same as us-
ing the test as a conclusive substantive standard of conduct.
4. The Reasonable Man in Texas
In adopting the discovery rule, some courts reasoned that the em-
ployee should not be precluded for failure to file claim if a reasonable
man with the employee's knowledge would not have filed claim before
he did.290 Perhaps because of the relationship between the discovery
rule and the underlying compensable-injury interpretation, 291 courts
have not incorporated this rationale into the announced rule for decis-
287 See, e.g., Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Britton, 179 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Im-
perial Shirt Corp. v. Jenkins, 217 Tenn. 602, 399 S.W.2d 757 (1966), citing 2 LARSON
§ 78.41-.42.
288. Some courts quote Professor Larson's statement of the rule, 2 LARSON § 78.41,
in announcing a reasonable-man standard. City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345,
352, 426 P.2d 194, 197 (1967); Tabor Motor Co. v. Garrard, - Miss. -, -, 233 So.
2d 811,814 (1970).
289. See text accompanying notes 253-55 supra.
290. See Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Britton, 179 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Tabor
Motor Co. v. Garrard, - Miss. -, 233 So. 2d 811 (1970).
291. See text accompanying notes 231-43 supra.
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ion. The courts have not said that the limitations period starts to run
when a reasonable man would have filed claim; rather, they have said
that the limitations period starts to run when the employee, acting with
reasonable diligence, discovered or should have discovered all the facts
necessary to establish his right to compensation. In Texas, however,
the broad rationale underlying the discovery rule in other states has
been adopted as a rule of decision.
From its inception, the Texas claim limitations provision authorized
the Industrial Accident Board to waive compliance with the notice and
claim provision in "meritorious cases for good cause. ' 2 2  The Texas
courts have interpreted the "good cause" provision as establishing a
reasonable-man standard: 293 the employee has good cause for delay
if an ordinary prudent man in the same situation would not have
brought suit sooner. The ordinary-prudent-man test in Texas does not
determine the time when the limitations period begins. It just deter-
mines whether the otherwise late claimant has "good cause" for delay.
The Texas courts have held that good cause must exist until the late
claimant files his claim. 94 Good cause for delay after an ordinary pru-
dent man would decide to file claim continues to exist only for the rea-
sonable time needed to consult a lawyer and file a claim.299
To be a judicially manageable test, the Texas ordinary-prudent-man
standard must yield an objective, discoverable meaning when applied
to a late claimant's failure to file claim sooner. But there seems to
292. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
293. The Texas Court of Civil Appeal for the Beaumont district first announced the
interpretation. Consolidated Underwriters v. Scale, 237 S.W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App.
1922). The Courts of Civil Appeal developed and applied the interpretation in a num-
ber of cases. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Clark, 23 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1930); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Chamness, 63 S.W.2d 1058 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Merchant, 81 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). The
Texas Supreme Court announced its acceptance of the interpretation in Hawkins v.
Safety Cas. Co., 146 Tex. 381, 207 S.W.2d 370 (1948). The Texas Supreme Court had
previously decided several cases under the "good cause" provision without adopting the
ordinary-prudent-man standard or stating any criteria at all for determining good cause.
See Petroleum Cas. Co. v. Dean, 132 Tex. 320, 122 S.W.2d 1053 (1939); Johnson v.
Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 131 Tex. 357, 112 S.W.2d 449 (1938); Williams v. Safety
Cas. Co., 129 Tex. 184, 102 S.W.2d 178 (1937); Jones v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n,
128 Tex. 437, 99 S.W.2d 903 (1937); Williamson v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 127 Tex.
71, 90 S.W.2d 1088 (1936).
294. Jones v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 128 Tex. 437, 99 S.W.2d 903 (1937).
295. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brantley, 402 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1966);
Texas Cas. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 391 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 994
(1966); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hancox, 162 Tex. 565, 349 S.W.2d 102 (1961).
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be no readily discoverable custom or community moral standard the
court can use to determine when one ordinarily would or should sue.
How then can the court determine when the ordinary prudent man
would decide to sue?
The Texas courts seem to have solved ,the problem of giving objec-
tive content to the ordinary-prudent-man standard by simply assuming
that the ordinary prudent man would decide to file claim for workmen's
compensation when he discovers all the facts necessary to establish his
right to receive compensation.196 The courts reached this assumption
in a roundabout way. In cases in which the employee was justifiably
ignorant of one of the facts necessary to establish his right to compensa-
tion, the courts explained that there was good cause for the delay be-
cause an ordinary prudent man would not file claim until he discovered
all the facts necessary to establish his right to compensation. 297 It was
then an easy, although not a necessary, step to the conclusion that the
ordinary prudent man would decide to file claim as soon as he learned
all the facts necessary to establish his right to compensation.298 The
assumption that the ordinary prudent man would not decide to file claim
until he discovered all the facts necessary to establish his right to com-
pensation is seriously flawed, since it fails to take into account indivi-
dual differences in claim-consciousness. One worker, knowing only that
he has a disability, may be eager to sue someone for something and
therefore will investigate to find evidence that would support a claim for
compensation.299 Who is to say that this worker is not an ordinary pru-
dent man? Even if the court's first assumption were valid, the conclu-
sion that an ordinary prudent man would file claim as soon as he learns
the facts establishing his right to compensation would still be suspect.
The court's first assumption can be stated narrowly: the ordinary pru-
dent man would not file claim at least until he learned all the facts nec-
296. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Portley, 153 Tex. 62, 263 S.W.2d 247
(1953); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maines, 468 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
297. Hawkins v. Safety Cas. Co., 146 Tex. 381, 207 S.W.2d 370 (1948); Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Jackson, 201 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Dean v. Safety
Cas. Co., 190 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
298. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1969); Texas Em-
ployers' Ins. Ass'n v. Portley, 153 Tex. 62, 263 S.W.2d 247 (1953); Copinjon v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 242 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
299. Compare Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Leathers, 395 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1965),
and Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Crawford, 149 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941), with Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 495 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973),
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maines, 468 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), and Zurich Gen.
Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 135 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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essary to establish his right to compensation. The court's conclusion,
then, does not follow. An employee may have reasons other than sim-
ple inattention for not filing suit as soon as he learned the facts; he
may not realize he has a right to compensation based on the facts he
knows or he may not want to antagonize his employer and jeopardize
his continued employment by filing claim for compensation. These con-
siderations raise two questions. First, does the ordinary prudent man
know the law? Secondly, would the ordinary prudent man forego his
claim for fear of jeopardizing his continued employment by filing
claim? Although they have not discussed the reasons for their conclu-
sion, the Texas courts have answered "yes" to the first question, 800
making the standard that of the ordinary prudent man who knows the
workmen's compensation law.801 They have answered "no" to the sec-
ond question, holding that fear of jeopardizing one's continued employ-
ment is not "good cause" for delay in filing claim.802
The Texas courts thus resolved the problem of giving content to the
reasonable-man standard by adopting the compensation system itself
as their standard. The results -are arguably consistent with the basic
purpose of the workmen's compensation system. Since the objeotive
300. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602 ('rex. 1969); Driver v. Texas Em-
ployers' Ins. Ass'n, 266 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (ignorance of six-month limi-
tations provision not good cause); LaCour v. Continental Cas. Co., 163 S.W.2d 676
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942) (same); Sandage v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 140 S.W.2d 871
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Zurich Gen. Ace. & Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Walker, 35 S.W.2d 115
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1931) (applying special statutory provision, ch. 177, § 3c, [19231
Tex. Laws 388-89 (now T-x. Rv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3c (1967)), creating
presumption that employee knows that employer is covered by workmen's compensation
act). But see Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 147 S.W.2d 908 ('rex. Civ. App.), ap-
plication for writ of error denied on other grounds, 136 Tex. 187, 149 S.W.2d 88 (1941)
(per curiam).
301. Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602 ('rex. 1969). Texas courts have de-
viated from -this standard only in cases in which courts in other jurisdictions probably
would have applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel, see notes 116-25 supra and ac-
companying text. These include cases in which the employer or his insurer innocently
or intentionally misled the claimant as to his legal rights, Western Cas. Co. v. Lapeo,
108 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Chamness, 63
S.W.2d 1058 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), or cases in which the employer or his insurer stated
that any compensation would be paid, United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Herzik, 359
S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Crain, 259 S.W.2d
905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). The Texas courts held that the claimant's reliance on these
misleading statements constituted good cause for failure to file a claim, despite an admis-
sion by the claimant that he would have filed claim sooner had he known the law.
302. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Leake, 196 S.W.2d 842 ('rex. Civ. App. 1946);
Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 87 S.W.2d 830 ('rex. Civ. App. 1935).
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of shifting the cost of industrial accidents from the injured worker to
the employer30 3 can be achieved fully only if each injured worker
claims the compensation that is due him, an out-of-time injured worker
should have a duty to claim compensation once he knows the facts es-
tablishing his right to compensation.
At best, the argument involves oppressive and unrealistic paternal-
ism, as demonstrated in the following situations. Partial disability is
defined in the Texas statute in terms of impairment of wage-earning
capacity.10 4  The courts have interpreted this to mean that an employee
may receive compensation for partial incapacity even though he re-
ceives the same wages as before the injury."' In addition, the Texas
statute authorizes compensation for specific scheduled injuries without
a showing of impairment of wage-earning capacity or loss of wages.30 6
In these two situations, the employee may know all the facts establish-
ing his right to compensation long before he ever loses any wages be-
cause of his injury. Texas courts have held in such cases that the pay-
ment of full wages (for work done and not in lieu of compensation)
will not justify a delay in filing claim-it is not "good cause. '30 7 With
full salary being paid, however, a reasonably prudent employee is not
likely to realize that he has a compensable claim or even be concerned
about finding out whether he might have a claim.308 Furthermore,
since compensation payments for disability are intentionally pegged be-
low full wage replacement levels,30 9 a reasonably prudent employee
303. Ultimately, the cost is shifted to those who benefit from the employer's enter-
prise.
304. TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. Ar. art. 8306, § 11 (1967).
305. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pacheco Co., 497 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gomez, 462 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Goetz, 337 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Strawn, 44 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
306. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANw. art. 8306, § 12 (Supp. 1974).
307. Despite earlier cases suggesting the contrary by the Courts of Civil Appeals, see,
eg., Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Chancey, 166 S.W.2d 966 (Tex. Civ. App.
1943); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v Wedgeworth, 140 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Jackson, 139 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), the rule
stated in the text is now firmly established. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Port-
icy, 263 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1953); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Matejek, 381 S.W.2d
942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Lambert v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 260 S.W.2d 691
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Copinjon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 242 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951). But cf. Consolidated Underwriters v. Pittman, 388 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964).
308. See Sandage v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 140 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
309. The purpose of setting compensation payments below full wage replacement lev-
Vol. 1974:541]
Washington University Open Scholarship
618 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
who continues to work for the employer may decide to forego claim,
for fear of jeopardizing his continued employment, even though he
knows that he has a valid compensable claim. The Texas courts, how-
ever, hold that fear of jeopardizing one's employment is not good cause
for delay in filing claim. 1°
The reasonable-man test, either in its broad formulation in Texas or
in its narrower formulation in the discovery-rule states, seems flawed.
The courts have turned a simple rationale for excusing claimant's late
claim in one kind of case into a standard of conduct that may preclude
the employee if he fails to live up to the standard-if he is somehow
at fault. In light of the basic compensation purposes of the workmen's
compensation system, it makes little sense to use notions of fault, par-
ticularly paternalistic notions of fault derived from those very same pur-
poses, to preclude the late claimant. Furthermore, use of the employ-
ee's fault as a limitation on an exception to the limitations bar cannot
be supported by reference to the personal certainty and evidentiary
purposes of the limitations provision. That is, these purposes provide
no basis for choosing a "reasonable-man" discovery rule over a
"straight" discovery rule3 1' or for choosing the Texas reasonable-man
standard of "good cause" over a more liberal interpretation that would
find good cause whenever the late claimant had a good reason for not
filing claim sooner. Each of the possible tests seems to eliminate the
personal certainty achievable under the "accident" limitations provi-
sion. The only significant difference between the tests appears -to be
in the different number of cases with possible evidentiary problems
each lets past the limitations bar. The court should have a better rea-
son for choosing the reasonable-man discovery rule over a more liberal
rule than that the more liberal rule would let more cases with possible
evidentiary problems go before the trier of fact. If the possibility of
evidentiary problems were controlling, there would be no reason for
any exception to the original strict limitations rule. Perhaps most im-
portantly, the court's application of a reasonable-man standard seems
to depend more on the abstract purposes and technical compensation
rules of the workmen's compensation act than on the realities of the
employment relationship and the reasonable expectations of the parties.
els is to discourage malingering by employees. See generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON
STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 56 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
NATIONAL COma'N REPORT].
310. See cases cited note 302 supra.
311. Le., a rule that would start the limitations period from the time the employee
discovered the compensable injury.
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Courts may thus deny claims based on the application of a purported
standard of reasonableness to the employee's conduct even though the
judges of that court, if put in the position of the employee, would have
done just what he did. 12
V. ALTERNATIVES TO COMPENSABLE-INJURY AND
DISCOVERY RULES
A. Minnesota Notice and Claim Provisions
Many statutes require the employer to report all accidental injuries
of which it has knowledge 318 to the state workmen's compensation com-
mission. Maryland, 14 Michigan,315 Minnesota, 16 and Missouri s
have provisions that postpone the beginning of the limitations period
until the employer makes the required report. The various statutory
provisions differ in wording and interpretation, and there is no "typical"
wording or interpretation. Minnesota's provision will be analyzed for
the light it may shed on the possible reach of this kind of provision.
In Minnesota, a compensation claim must be filed within two years
of the date of the employer's written report of the injury to the commis-
sioner of the Department of Labor and Industry.""s Claim must be
filed in any event within six years of the accident, 19 and written notice
of the injury must be given to the employer within ninety days of the
occurrence of the injury. 320 After receiving the employer's report of
the injury, the commissioner is required to send a letter to the employee,
explaining the employer's duty to pay compensation and to furnish
medical treatment, and inviting the employee to ask the advice of the
local division of the commission.32 1 This employee-notification re-
312. See, e.g., Ohnmacht v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 178 Neb. 741, 135 N.W.2d 237
(1965); Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1969); Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Leake, 196 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
313. See generally 3 LARSON § 79.41; id., app. F, at 583.
314. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 38(c) (Supp. 1973).
315. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.23(381)(1) (Supp. 1974).
316. MmN. STAT. ANN. § 176.151 (Supp. 1974).
317. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.430 (1969).
318. MwmN. STAT. ANN. § 176.151(1) (Supp. 1974).
319. Id.
320. Id. § 176.141 (1966).
321. Id. § 176.235 (Supp. 1974). Compare the 1974 amendment to the Kentucky
statute requiring the employer to inform the employee of the applicable limitations pe-
riod not later than 30 days prior to the expiration date. Ch. 93, § 1, [1974] Ky. Acts
180.
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quirement figured prominently in an early cage in which the employer
filed a "nondisabling-accident report' of an injury that had no im-
mediate disabling effect. 22 When the condition became disabling five
years later, the employee filed claim for compensation. The court held
that the statute did not authorize the filing of nondisabling-accident
reports and that filing such a report did not trigger ,the limitations pe-
riod. The court reasoned:
The main purpose of such notice [to the commission] is doubtless to en-
able the commission to advise the employee of his rights as required
by [the statute]. When -the report is such as to lead the commission
to believe that no just claim for compensation can arise, it serves no
proper purpose.3 23
The combination of 'the claim limitations period running from the
date of the employer's report of a compensable injury with the require-
ment that the commission inform the employee of his rights upon re-
ceipt of 'the report tended to equate the limitations bar with a knowing
waiver by the employee of his right to compensation.
Because the six-year overall cutoff and the notice requirement pre-
vented total identification of the limitations bar with knowing waiver,
interpretation of -the Minnesota notice requirement became vitally im-
portant. In the leading Minnesota case interpreting the provision re-
quiring written notice to the employer within ninety days after "occur-
rence of the injury," the court held that the injury occurred "when dis-
ability occurs, or when it becomes reasonably apparent that disability
or loss of member is likely to occur.1324 This interpretation of the date
of the "occurrence of the injury" differed significantly from the com-
pensable-injury or discovery-rule interpretations of the "date of injury"
in claim limitations provisions in other states. The Minnesota court said
the limitations period began when the injury resulted in disability or
when it became reasonably apparent that disability was likely to occur.
The ordinary compensable-injury interpretation starts the limitations
period from the date the injury becomes compensable; the discovery
rule normally starts the limitations period at the time the employee dis-
covers or should discover the compensable injury, not the likelihood of
compensable injury. The difference between 'the Minnesota rule and
the ordinary compensable-injury or discovery-rule interpretations was
322. Pease v. Minnesota Steel Co., 196 Minn. 555, 265 N.W. 427 (1936).
323. Id. at 555, 265 N.W. at 428.
324. Clausen v, Minnesota Steel Co., 186 Minn. 80, 87, 242 N,W. 397, 400 (1932).
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not crucial to the outcome of the first case, but it became important in
two subsequent cases. In both cases the court held that the employees
were precluded by failure to give written notice within ninety days after
the time a reasonable man would have known that future disability was
likely, even though notice had been given within ninety days after ac-
tual compensable disability.12 5 After these two cases, however, the
court applied the "likelihood" rule less harshly, 26 and finally rejected
the "likelihood" rule completely,32 7 without stating it was doing so.
As a matter of statutory construction of the "injury" language, the
ordinary compensable-injury interpretation is more supportable than
the "likelihood" interpretation. How can the date of the injury mean
the date when it is reasonably apparent that future compensable injury
is likely? Viewed simply as a matter of policy, however, the "likeli-
hood" rule has much to commend it. If the employee knows the likeli-
hood of future compensable injury from the work-related accident, he
should be required to give notice to enable the employer to investigate
the accident. The rule requires only that notice be given; it does not re-
quire the employee to file claim for compensation before the injury be-
comes compensable, and, in faot, the Minnesota two-year claim limita-
tions period does not start until the injury becomes compensable and
the employer reports the compensable injury to the commission. This
combination of rules seems to give the employer time tto investigate ef-
fectively, and to impose on the employee a duty consistent with good
faith and fair dealing. On the other hand, the employee may be pre-
cluded from compensation because of his failure to give timely notice
when the employer's ability to investigate and defend has not been im-
paired by the lack of timely notice. In those circumstances, there
seems no good reason to bar the employee's claim.
B. Massachusetts "No Prejudice" Exception
The British Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 amended the no-
tice provision of the 1897 Act to excuse late notice of the injury to
the employer if the employer was not prejudiced by the delay. 28 Sev-
eral state statutes have a similar provision,829 perhaps derived from the
325. Bruggeman v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Minn. 427, 30 N.W.2d 711 (1948); Rinne
v. W.C. Griffis Co., 234 Minn. 146,47 N.W.2d 872 (1951).
326. Balow v. Kellogg Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 248 Minn. 20, 78 N.W.2d 430 (1956).
327. Davidson v. Bermo, Inc., 272 Minn. 97, 137 N.W.2d 567 (1965).
328. Workmen's Compensation Act, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, § 2(a) (1906).
329. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1317(c)(2) (1960); CAL. LABoR CODE § 5403
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British example. The Massachusetts3 0 and Vermont88' statutes go be-
yond the British Act. Besides excusing late notice, they also excuse
late claim if the employer or insurer has not been prejudiced by the
delay. The New Hampshire Supreme Court at one time interpreted
that state's statute to provide a "no prejudice" excuse for delayed
claims.382 The decision was later overruled by legislative amend-
ment, 38 but Justice Snow's opinion for the New Hampshire court in
the original case remains as the best explanation of the relationship be-
tween the "no prejudice" exception and the purpose of the workmen's
compensation act. Justice Snow said:
(Deering 1964); Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.420 (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 24
(1973). Some statutes require a showing of a reasonable excuse for delay plus a show-
ing of lack of prejudice from the delay. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-5(2)
(1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-303 (1973). See also Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 912(d) (1970). Note the similar problem of
judicial interpretation of notice provisions in insurance contracts. Gibson v. Colonial
Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 33, 206 P.2d 387 (1949); 51 MIcH. L. REv. 275 (1952).
330. MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 152, § 49 (1965).
331. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 662 (1967).
332. In Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 80 N.H. 194, 115 A. 449 (1921), the employee
gave notice and filed claim more than the allotted six months after the injury. The trial
court entered judgment for the employee, after finding that the employer was not preju-
diced by the delay in giving notice and that the employer's conduct estopped it from
asserting the claim limitations defense. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed
on these two grounds, adding in dictum that the statutory excuse for delay applied to
delay in making claim as well as delay in giving notice of injury. The statutory provi-
sion the court interpreted, ch. 163, § 5, [1911] N.H. Laws 183-84, read as follows:
No proceedings for compensation under this act shall be maintained unless no-
tice of the accident as hereinafter provided has been given to the employer as
soon as practicable after the happening thereof. . . and unless claim for com-
pensation has been made within six months from the occurrence of the acci-
dent . . . but no want or defect or inaccuracy of a notice shall be a bar to
the maintenance of proceedings unless the employer proves that he is preju-
diced by such want, defect, or inaccuracy. Notice of the accident shall apprise
the employer of the claim for compensation under this article, and shall state
the name and address of the workman injured, and the date and place of the
accident ....
The court argued that this provision could be construed to excuse delay in making claim
because the last sentence of the provision equated notice with claim; if notice necessarily
includes a claim, the sentence excusing delay in giving notice necessarily excuses delay
in making claim.
333. Ch. 77, § 1, [1951] N.H. Laws 249. After the Mulhall court interpreted the
statutory exception allowing late notice to an employer not prejudiced by delay to apply
to claims, too, by reading "notice" to include "claim," the legislature recognized the do
facto uselessness of any separate mention of claim in the statute, and eliminated the
claim limitation provision completely in the 1947 Act, ch. 266, § 14, 11947] N.H. Laws
408-09. The 1951 Act added a specific claim limitation starting from the date of the
accident, not subject to the "no prejudice" exception. The 1951 Act remains in force,
with minor changes. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 281:17 (1966).https://openschola ship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/
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One of the more important aims of this legislation is to secure to the
injured workman, or to his dependents, compensation by direct payments
"under certain fixed rules without a law-suit and without friction."
. . . This is to be accomplished by a "procedure at once simple
and inexpensive." . . . Certainty of relief to all injured employees
not guilty of willful misconduct is assured in the place of uncertain
relief to a limited number. . . . With these objects in mind, it can-
not be presumed that the legislature intended to set up a rigid limi-
tation which would defeat the purpose of the act in respect to in-
jured workmen and their dependents who, from their unfamiliarity
with business affairs and legal requirements, fail to make a claim within
a limited time where the employer is in no way prejudiced by such fail-
ure. Such a result would be in the teeth of the legislative design to
liquidate through -the employer the statutory compensation for such a
claim and distribute it as a part of the cost of production. To the extent
that claims for compensation, authorized by the statute, fail to be pre-
sented, the underlying purpose of the statute fails. The object of the
limitations, with respect to notice of the accident and the making of
a claim for compensation, was not to create technical defences to other-
wise valid claims. The intention of the legislature was to cut off fraudu-
lent claims and to protect the employer if he has been prejudiced by the
employee's negligence in seasonably presenting his claim.334
Justice Snow's analysis is persuasive in theory, but two questions re-
main about the practical application of the "no prejudice" exception.
First, does the "no prejudice" exception present any practical or ad-
ministrative difficulties that might argue against its widespread adop-
tion? Secondly, does the "no prejudice" exception sacrifice other pur-
poses of the limitations provision overlooked by Justice Snow? The
extensive case law applying the Massachusetts "no prejudice" excep-
tion may help answer these questions.
Two caveats should be entered before examining the Massachusetts
cases with this purpose in mind. First, the examination is limited to
appellate court opinions reviewing decisions initially made by an ad-
ministrative agency. The appellate court opinions may not reflect
accurately the full range of problems in administering a "no prejudice"
exception. Secondly, since the court in reviewing administrative de-
cisions gives deference to administrative determinations of facts and
recognizes that the existence of prejudice to the insurer from delay in
334. 80 N.H. at 200-01, 115 A. at 453-54. Justice Snow's statement was technically
dictum, because the court based its affirmance solely on grounds of estoppel.
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filing claim is a question of fact,18 5 caution in dealing with 'the "facts"
of decided cases is in order.
The Massachusetts legislature added the "no prejudice" exception
to the claim limitations provision in 1920.330 In applying this excep-
tion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court soon decided that the
claimant had the burden of proving that the insurer was not prejudiced
by the delay in making claim,337 thus raising the practical problem of
the quantum of proof necessary to prove that negative. At first, the
court said that the claimant could carry the burden even though he did
not negate all possibilities of prejudice,88 and that the burden was sus-
tainable by "warrantable inferences from circumstances without evi-
dence specifically directed to disproving particular forms of preju-
dice." '89 Later, the court identified the two most usual forms of preju-
dice from delay in making claim as (1) lack of prompt medical treat-
ment the employer might have provided to minimize the seriousness of
the injury, and (2) inability to gather all immediately available evi-
dence to support the employer's position. The court said that the claim-
ant had met the burden of proof if the evidence supported a finding
that these two kinds of prejudice were not present. 40
How can the claimant prove lack of prejudice from inability to gather
evidence immediately after the accident? The Massachusetts court has
held, in essence, that the claimant has met his burden of proof if all
the evidence presented fails to suggest that evidence favorable to the
employer was once available but is no longer available.341 In practice,
this test shifts the actual burden of proving prejudice to the employer.
335. See, e.g., De Felippo's Case, 245 Mass. 308, 139 N.E. 543 (1923).
336. Ch. 223, § 2, [1920] Mass. Acts 194. This amendment added another inde-
pendent excuse for late claim to the two already provided by the 1912 Act, ch. 571,
§ 5, [1912] Mass. Acts 578-79. After the 1920 Act, the excuse provision read:
The failure to make a claim within the period prescribed ...shall not be a
bar to the maintenance of proceedings under this act if it is found that it was
occasioned by mistake or other reasonable cause, or if it is found that the in-
surer was not prejudiced by the delay.
337. Kanga's Case, 282 Mass. 155, 184 N.E. 380 (1933).
338. Id.
339. Anderson's Case, 288 Mass. 96, 101, 192 N.E. 520, 522 (1934), quoted with
approval in Coakley's Case, 289 Mass. 312, 313, 194 N.E. 122, 123 (1935).
340. Kulig's Case, 331 Mass. 524, 120 N.E.2d 757 (1954); Tassone's Case, 330
Mass. 545, 116 N.E.2d 126 (1953).
341. See Goodale's Case, 353 Mass. 765, 232 N.E.2d 926 (1968); Thayer's Case, 345
Mass. 36, 185 N.E.2d 292 (1962); Berthiaume's Case, 328 Mass, 186, 102 NE.2d 412
(1951).
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That burden may be heavy, for if the insurer has been prejudiced by
inability to gather evidence that is now unavailable, it seems likely that
the insurer will have difficulty in ascertaining whether favorable evi-
dence ever existed. 342 The Massachusetts court has responded to the
employer's problem of proving prejudice by holding that where there
is a conflict or inconsistency in testimony or evidence on a factual issue
relevant to the merits of the claim, a finding of no prejudice cannot
be supported. 3  Earlier investigation of the claim might have revealed
additional evidence to resolve the conflict in the insurer's favor.3 44
In applying its announced criteria to determine whether the evidence
supports a finding of no prejudice, the Massachusetts court has shown
remarkable sensitivity to the nuances of the evidence presented. The
court has found insufficient evidence to support a finding of no prej-
udice when the facts suggest collusion or the possible fabrication of
evidence, 345 and when the claimant's story of the details of the accident
is unverifiable.316 The court has seized on weaknesses, inconsisten-
cies, and conflicts in the evidence to reject findings of no prejudice
when it seems to have doubted the administrative judgment that the
injury was work-related.3 47
The transformation of the prejudice issue into -the question of the
extent of the court's reservations about 'the facts found by the adminis-
trative agency suggests a possible problem with the "no prejudice" ex-
ception. In cases where the facts supporting recovery are practically in-
disputable, the test works. But when the facts supporting the right to
compensation are the subject of serious controversy, the "no prejudice"
exception in effect asks the trier of fact to certify the validity of his own
findings of fact, a task arguably beyond the competence of any fact-
342. Cf. Malloy v. Head, 90 N.H. 58, 48 A.2d 875 (1939) (discussing "no prejudice"
exception to contractual notice provision in insurance contract).
343. Thibeault's Case, 341 Mass. 647, 171 N.E.2d 151 (1961); Herson's Case, 341
Mass. 402, 169 N.E.2d 865 (1960).
344. The court has not applied this test consistently, though. In other cases in which
the conflicts and inconsistencies in evidence seemed great, the court upheld administra-
tive findings of no prejudice. See Ogonowski's Case, 338 Mass. 468, 155 N.E.2d 787
(1959); Berthiaume's Case, 328 Mass. 186, 102 N.E.2d 412 (1951).
345. Lendall's Case, 342 Mass. 642, 174 N.E.2d 422 (1961).
346. Meagher's Case, 293 Mass. 304, 200 N.E. 1 (1935).
347. Curtin's Case, 354 Mass. 45, 235 N.E.2d 34 (1968); Thibeault's Case, 341
Mass. 647, 171 N.E.2d 151 (1961); Herson's Case, 341 Mass. 402, 169 N.E.2d 865
(1960); Russell's Case, 334 Mass. 680, 138 N.E.2d 286 (1956); Hatch's Case, 290 Mass.
259, 195 N.E. 385 (1935); Booth's Case, 289 Mass. 322, 194 N.E. 124 (1935); Kanga's
Case, 282 Mass. 155, 184 N.E. 380 (1933).
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finder, who just does his best on the evidence available, certifying only
his good faith, not his infallibility. On the other hand, the transforma-
tion of the prejudice issue into the question of the court's reserva-
tions about -the facts found by the commission might be desirable.
Since lack of prejudice may not be provable directly, the best way to
protect the insurer from fraudulent or unfounded claims is either to
raise the employee's burden of proof as to the facts supporting his claim
or to eliminate the presumption on appeal favoring the facts found by
the commission. Either solution or a combination of both may provide
the court with the means of protecting itself from becoming an unwit-
ting tool of fraud or oppression without precluding obviously meritori-
ous claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
Which claim limitations rule is preferable? No one answer, of
course, would be universally acceptable. Any answer must depend on
the relative importance one assigns to the general purposes of the work-
men's compensation system and the traditional purposes of a limitations
provision. The most that an objective analysis can do is to clarify the
character of the competing interests and highlight some of the facts rel-
evant -to balancing and reconciling those interests.
One important purpose of any limitations provision is to bar fraudu-
lent or unfounded claims that otherwise could not be refuted effectively
because of defects in evidence occasioned by the passage of time. This
purpose is arguably unimportant in a workmen's compensation system.
Proof of the disability for which compensation is claimed will ordinarily
not be affected by the passage of time, since it is the claimant's present
condition that is at issue and the trier of fact can determine the present
condition of the employee with as much certainty in a case of delayed
claim as in a case of prompt claim. Defects in evidence from the pas-
sage of time will ordinarily affect only the determination of causation
and work-relatedness of the injury. Arguably, then, even if the trier
of fact errs in determining that the injury was work-related, one impor-
tant purpose of the workmen's compensation system is still achieved:
shifting the burden of a disability from the employee to the employer
takes the burden off the injured party and spreads it over a large num-
ber of persons, thus reducing the total of human suffering.848 The
348. This argument depends on the highly controversial theory of the marginal utility
of money. See generally NATONAL COMM'N CoMPENDum, supra note 34, at 21-26.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
evidentiary purpose behind the limitations provision is relatively unim-
portant in a workmen's compensation system, since the "evil" to be pre-
vented-compensation for non-work-related disabilities-is not much
of an evil within that system. Furthermore, the proposed remedy for
that evil-wholesale preclusion of both valid and invalid late clais-
denies compensation to many deserving claimants, thus frustrating the
purposes of the workmen's compensation system.
Those supporting the importance of the evidentiary purpose might
urge first, that the above contrary argument does not apply in a jurisdic-
tion that authorizes compensation awards retroactive to the beginning
of the claimed disability, 49 and secondly, that the contrary argument
ignores the distinction between a workmen's compensation system
based on the enterprise liability theory and a general social insurance
system based on a "pure!' compensation theory. This distinction is im-
portant.350 The workmen's compensation system was not intended to
provide compensation for injuries unrelated to work; to burden the
workmen's compensation system with compensating non-work-related
injuries would undermine the basic enterprise liability purpose of treat-
ing human injury occasioned by the enterprise as a cost of doing busi-
ness.351
While this last argument may be sound on its face, it seems weak
as a counterattack on the original argument that the evidentiary pur-
pose is unimportant. The original argument did not propose that the
workmen's compensation system provide compensation for non-work-
related injuries as a matter of course. It simply suggested that occa-
sionally granting a claim for compensation for a non-work-related
injury that would otherwise have been prevented by a limitations
provision was not a very significant evil in light of the basic work-
men's compensation purposes, and certainly was not a significant
enough evil to justify precluding all late claims, valid and invalid alike.
Those supporting the continued importance of the evidentiary pur-
pose in a workmen's compensation system might respond that the con-
trary balancing argument misconceives the basic rationale of the evi-
dentiary purpose, which is to protect the integrity of the adjudicative
349. See generally 1 LARSON § 3.40.
350. See generally id. § 3; NATIONAL COMM'N COMPENDrum 41-59.
351. See Bernstein, The Need for Reconsidering the Role of Workmen's Compensa-
tion, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 992, 997-98 (1971).
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process itself. Even though the result of any particular adjudicative
error may not be evil per se, public respect for the integrity of the fact-
finding process, and the integrity and objectivity of the institutionalized
workmen's compensation system itself may be threatened by permitting
the trier of fact to adjudicate factual issues long after the relevant
events, when it may be unable to separate valid from invalid claims.
It could be argued, on the other hand, that insofar as this purpose of
limitations provisions derives from the same source as the exclusionary
rules of evidence-the need to control the kinds of evidence submitted
to a jury-the arguments for eliminating the exclusionary rules of evi-
dence in workmen's compensation cases, m2 which are tried by an ad-
ministrative agency rather than a jury, apply with equal force to support
elimination of the limitations bar. Presumably, the administrative
agency is a more sophisticated factfinder than the jury and does not
need to be protected from the possibility of naive reliance on untrust-
worthy evidence. As a practical matter, however, it seems likely that
"sophisticated" administrative agencies may make mistakes at times,
just as juries do, because of misplaced reliance on untrustworthy evi-
dence. The evidentiary purpose of limitations provisions thus retains
some, although perhaps lessened, importance in a workmen's compen-
sation system.
The certainty of freedom from ultimate liability provided the em-
ployer by liability insurance lessens the need for personal certainty of
freedom from liability after the expiration of the limitations period.353
The personal certainty consideration as a criterion for evaluating dif-
ferent limitations provisions, therefore, breaks down into two criteria:
insurability of the risk and relative cost. In every state, employers can
obtain workmen's compensation insurance, either through private in-
surance companies or the state insurance fund. 4 In practice, then,
the risk of workmen's compensation liability is insurable under every
current limitations provision.3 55 The only remaining issue under the
352. Professor Larson asserts that more than half the state workmen's compensation
statutes provide that common law and statutory rules of evidence shall not apply to com-
pensation proceedings. 3 LARSON § 79.30.
353. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
354. See generally NATIONAL COMM'N COMPENDIUM 243-65.
355. Except for temporary rate-making uncertainties caused by lack of sufficient
claims experience following the changeover to the new system, it is at least possible that
the risk of workmen's compensation liability would be insurable under a system without
a limitations provision at all. Any conclusion on this matter would depend on a compre-
hensive study of actual practices and experience. See REPORT OF THE CoMMrrr ON
[Vol. 1974:541
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/1
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
certainty analysis is the cost to the employers directly attributable to
different limitations provisions. Although no precise figures can be
given at this time, the available data suggest that the cost differential
attributable to the differences in state limitations provisions is probably
~m .
8 5 6
If the cost differential attributable to the difference in limita-
tions provisions is in fact minimal, this might support an argu-
ment for choosing the most liberal limitations provision, or elim-
inating the limitations provision completely. The argument may be de-
ceptive, however. Analytically, the question of cost differentials attrib-
utable to differences in limitations provisions is related only to -the cer-
tainty purpose of the limitations provision. It is not relevant to the evi-
dentiary purpose, which may support choice of a stricter limitations pro-
vision. Additionally, incremental cost arguments in compensation
schemes may be treacherous, for repeated successful applications of
the same argument can lead to a system in which costs become oppres-
sive, causing continued inflation in the price of goods and services and
draining away risk capital needed to keep the private enterprise system
itself alive and healthy. 357
How do the four alternative limitations rules compare when evalua-
ted by the foregoing considerations?
The "accident" limitations provisions, of course, best promote the
traditionally conceived evidentiary and personal certainty purposes.
No serious threat to these purposes, however, even as traditionally con-
ceived, would seem to flow from lengthening the often very short time
periods in these "accident" provisions to the three years urged by the
THE LIMITATION OF AMIONS, CMD. No. 7740, at 7-8 (1949); LAW REFORM COMMrr-
TEE, TwENTIETH REPORT, CMm). No. 5630, at 9-10 (1974).
356. Professor John Burton's statistical analysis of the differences in workmen's com-
pensation insurance costs in different states suggests that most of the cost differential
is attributable to differences in the level of benefits. J. BURTON, THm SION FIcANCE AND
CAUSES OF THE INTERSTATE VARIATIONS IN THE EMPLOYERS' COSTS OF WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION 217-25 (1965). Professor Burton was unable to demonstrate a significant
correlation between other statutory and judicial variables and the differences in costs be-
tween states, although he did not use any limitations variables in his first study. Id.
at 166-204, 231-35. Professor Burton generously agreed to run through his statistical
analysis limitations variables for twenty-two states. That study failed to establish a
statistically significant correlation between insurance costs and either the length of the
limitations period or the harsh "accident" provision. The results of that study may
be obtained from the author or the Washington University Law Quarterly.
357. See B. DEJoUvENEL, THE ETmucs OF REDISTRIUION (1952). But see NA-
TIONAL CoMm'N REPORT, supra note 309, at 128-29; Watkins & Burton, Employer's Costs
of Workmen's Compensation, in 2 SuPPLEMENTAL STUDmES FOR THE NATIONAL COMM'N
ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws 217 (1973).
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National Commission on Workmen's Compensation."" The preceding
analysis, moreover, suggests that the evidentiary and personal certainty
purposes no longer demand a rigid limitations rule. Other competing
considerations may thus justify amelioration of some of the harsher re-
sults arising under the "accident' limitations provision. The injustice
of precluding an employee by limitations before he ever had a right
to compensation strongly supports choice of a compensable-injury limi-
tations provision, at the very least.
Is it possible to go further and formulate a limitations provision that
reconciles the basic workmen's compensation purposes with the surviv-
ing valid limitations purposes?
The discovery rule and the "no prejudice" rule seem the most likely
candidates. They both seem to undermine the traditional personal cer-
tainty purpose of limitations provisions, for neither rule gives the em-
ployer a definitely ascertainable date from which he can confidently
date the limitations period for possible claims arising out of an accident.
The experience in Massachusetts and states with discovery rules, how-
ever, suggests that the risk of loss is insurable under each rule and that
the incremental insurance cost associated with each rule is probably
minimal. 35"
The discovery rule does not seem to be a reasoned reconciliation of
the basic workmen's compensation purposes and the evidentiary limita-
tions purpose. The line drawn between -those who make claim within
the statutory period after they reasonably should have discovered all
the facts necessary to establish their right to compensation and those
who do not make claim within that period (either because they failed
to act reasonably to discover those facts or because they failed to file
claim in time after they learned those facts) seems unrelated to either
the basic workmen's compensation purposes, which would tend to sup-
port removal of the limitations bar in all cases, or the evidentiary limita-
tions purpose, which would tend to support application of the limita-
tions bar in all cases. It could be argued that the claim of an employee
who can prove a good reason for not filing claim sooner is less likely
to be fraudulent or unfounded than other delayed claims, but the argu-
ment seems unsound. In the typical discovery-rule case, doctors have
disagreed over the proper diagnosis of the employee's condition. The
358. NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT 107-08. The Commission supports adoption of the
discovery rule for starting the limitations period.
359. See note 356 supra.
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danger of fraudulent or unfounded claims would seem to be particularly
great in such cases.
A limitations provision is needed that protects against fraudulent
and unfounded claims without precluding delayed meritorious claims.
The likeliest candidate is the Massachusetts "no prejudice" exception,
or a more candid variation that, after the passage of a specified time
after the accident, would simply raise the claimant's burden of proof
and eliminate the presumption on appeal favoring findings of the orig-
inal trier of fact26 This solution would protect the courts on a case-
by-case approach from becoming tools of fraud or injustice while pre-
senting no insuperable barriers to valid delayed claims. The final ques-
tion is whether tribunals are competent to protect themselves in this
fashion. Although that question may not be answerable with any de-
gree of certainty, and the answer may depend on one's own assessment
of the limits of judicial and administrative competence, the Massachu-
setts experience suggests that courts are competent to identify the de-
layed claims that are most likely to be unfounded or fraudulent.
360. For similar suggestions see LAw REFoBm CoMMiTtEi, TWENTIETH REPORT,
CMND. No. 5630, at 9-10 (1974).
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